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1. Introduction.
A very great part of this essay is taken up with the 
discussion of questions about the ordinary meaning of 
various words and longer expressions. None the less, 
this is neither a piece of amateur psychology nor a 
criticism of uses of words in any literary aspect, but 
an authentic philosophical study. To give the 
investigation of meanings the amount of attention I have 
given is inevitable in any work written from the special 
philosophical point of view which this essay is intended 
to illustrate. In reaching this point of view I have 
been more influenced by the writings and teaching of 
professor G. E. Moore than by any other single agency. 
Since I shall often have occasion to refer to professor 
Moore, and propose now to describe the philosophical 
point of view I have mentioned, I think it necessary to 
say that on those points in which I claim to have been 
influenced by him I can not be sure that anything I say 
is or ever has been part of what professor Moore thinks; 
it is specially hard to be sure of this because professor 
Moore's philosophical work is exceptionally subtle and 
precise. And I shall be specially liable to inaccuracy 
in trying to put what may be called a Moorist point of view
2.
in general terms, and to say what is common to the ways 
in which one would treat different sorts of question.
Professor Moore's philosophical method and point of 
view are implicit throughout chapters V - X of 
philosophical studies, appearing by way of their effects 
on particular questions. The fullest and clearest 
general account of them is given in a defence of common 
sense in Contemporary British philosophy II. In section 
IV of that essay professor Moore wrote 'I am not at all 
sceptical as to the truth of such propositions as "The 
earth has existed for many years past", "Many human 
bodies have each lived for many years upon it", i.e. 
propositions which assert the existence of material 
things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with 
certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am 
very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the 
correct analysis of such propositions is .   Again in 
section V, ' just as i hold that the proposition " 'ihere 
are and have been material things " is quite certainly 
true ... so I hold that the proposition " There are and 
have been many selves " is quite certainly true, but that 
here again all the analyses of this proposition that 
have been suggested by philosophers are highly doubtful. 1 
We may say in other words that all or almost all of the
3.
propositions which may be called in a certain sense 
common sense propositions are certainly true; and that 
there is no point in enquiring whether such propositions 
are true, but there are reasons for enquiring how they 
are to be analysed. Professor Moore spoke of the 
analyses of propositions. But since most or all of the 
sort of propositions to be considered are true, we can 
equally well speak, in a closely related sense, of the 
analysis of certain facts or classes of facts. Anything 
which was the analysis of the proposition the earth has 
existed for many years past would obviously also be the 
analysis in a closely related sense of the fact which 
that sentence expresses. My own preference, which need 
not be justified here, is for avoiding the word proposition 
as far as possible, and speaking only of facts and the 
sentences which express them. Instead of saying whether 
a proposition is true or false, I say what comes to just 
the same thing, whether a sentence expresses a fact or 
not. Very often when we are discussing analysis we 
consider sentences about physical objects around us, 
such as that is a chair, supposing on a certain occasion 
this is the actual sentence on which the discussion is 
turning, then it is of no consequence as a rule whether 
the sentence as used on that occasion does express a fact,
4.
so long as it is certain that similar sentences used in 
similar ways do very often express facts. It is 
immaterial, as a rule, whether I say that is a chair and 
point at a chair, or say it and point at a table. So 
in many cases what we are discussing is not the analysis 
of the fact expressed by a particular sentence, but the 
analysis of all the facts of a certain class, the class of 
the facts which could be expressed by sentences having a 
certain sort of resemblance to a given sentence, and used 
in a certain way. Supposing we have discovered what is, 
as professor Moore would say, the analysis of a certain 
proposition, it will obviously be a perfectly simple thing 
to define those senses in which we may say, if we prefer, 
that it is the analysis of a certain fact or set of facts, 
or that it is the analysis of a certain sentence or a 
certain meaning. Since as a rule, when we are discussing 
an analysis, whether a certain sentence does express a 
fact is no part of what we are asking, there is no need 
to mention the fact or class of facts that is being 
analysed. I therefore prefer to speak as a rule of 
analysing sentences or their meanings rather than 
propositions or facts. But which of these four it is 
that we analyse is not a subject for dispute but a matter 
of taste.
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So far I have not tried to say what an analysis is, 
that is, what we mean by the word. This is a question 
which has not yet been clearly and decisively settled; 
but I shall try to say a little about those points 
connected witn it which I think are fairly clear. I do 
not think professor Moore has ever said in print in 
exactly what sense he speaks about analysis. But the 
account I shall give is certainly derived from the method 
of analysis actually used in his writings and from what 
he has said in lectures and conversations. When we have 
found a particular analysis, we have always arrived at 
some sentence which has the same meaning as a sentence 
which we began by considering, or at the means of 
constructing such a sentence, and which has the further 
character of giving the analysis of the fact or 
proposition or sentence which we were trying to analyse. 
We may say if we choose that this sentence we have 
arrived at is the analysis we required; whether we say 
that it is or that it gives the analysis is indifferent. 
In order to define analysis we have to decide what the 
additional character is on account of which some sentences 
having the same meaning as a given sentence are analyses 
of it and others are not. The sense in which I am 
speaking of sentences having the same meaning is, I think,
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a very ordinary familiar sense; the sense in which an 
accurate translation has the same meaning as its original. 
Whether two sentences have the same meaning in this sense 
is a question unaffected by their stylistic or rhetorical 
differences. I think I can give a comparatively brief 
definition of having the same meaning. Two sentences 
have the same meaning in this sense if, supposing one nas 
been used by a certain person on a certain occasion to 
express a certain fact, then the other could have been
used by the same person on the same occasion to express
I 
the same fact. I give a much more elaborate definition
in my third chapter, which I think may be more correct 
than this, or at any rate more precise. But whether this 
definition or the other is the better, I feel sure that 
this definition expresses a relation which holds between 
the members of all pairs of sentences which have the same 
meaning and only between them.
What the additional character is which distinguishes
( The definition has to have this slightly clumsy 
form, instead of saying simply that two sentences have 
the same meaning if they express the same fact, because 
there are so many sentences which express different 
facts according to the circumstances of their use, 
for example, almost all sentences containing 
demonstrative or personal pronouns. The more 
elaborate definition is given on pages nr~ii7.
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analysing sentences from other sentences with the same mean- 
ing as a given sentence is much harder to say. There are 
two characters which seem to be common to all the sentences 
which there is good reason to think are analyses; first, 
each is longer than the sentence it is supposed to analyse, 
and second, when one has seen that the two sentences have 
the same meaning one understands the analysed sentence 
better or more clearly than before. The first of these 
characters suggests one sort of definition, the second 
another. The first suggests that perhaps an analysing 
sentence always has more parts, each of which in some 
sense or other corresponds to an element of the fact which
would be expressed by the sentence, than the analysed
i 
sentence has. This seems to be the sort of account which
2 Professor Moore has made a suggestion of this sort in 
discussion, and said in a letter in April 1932, 'I think 
one can say that "x is male and at least one of his 
parents was also a parent of y" contains more words each 
of which has a separate meaning than does "x is brother of 
y11";and that you would not be giving an analytic 
definition of "brother" by saying M x is brotherofy= def. 
x is male and at least one of his parents etc.", unless 
this were the case.' Professor Moore has also 
distinguished in discussion between the analysis of 
propositions and the analysis of concepts, and would, I 
think, say that the illustration given in my quotation is 
a suggested analysis of a concept. I do not know how far 
there would have to be a formal difference between the 
ways in which one would define analysis of these two 
sorts, or whether professor Moore would think, as I am 
inclined to think, that the analysing of a concept and 
the analysing of a proposition can be defined in the same 
way. If ethical expressions can be analysed, the 
analysis of them will generally be analysis of concepts.
8.
was given in Logical constructions by John Wisdom, in
3 
Mind 1931-3; though it is hard to be sure that I have
classified Mr. Wisdom's opinions rightly. His work is 
the most thorough and detailed attempt I know to answer 
questions connected with analysis, and shows great 
insight into those questions. I think I agree with the 
tendency of his theory, but it is expressed by means of 
a very intricate technical vocabulary, and I have 
certainly not understood everything that he said. It 
may be possible to give a formal definition of the way in 
which the parts of an analysing sentence correspond more 
closely to the elements of a fact than the parts of an 
analysed sentence. If this were done, it might happen 
that two sentences had the same meaning and stood in this 
other defined relation, and yet one seemed not to 
understand the analysed sentence any better as a result 
of recognising this. Because of this possibility, which 
seems to be realised in some cases which would fall 
within any formal definition which has been given, a 
further clause may be needed in the definition, of the 
sort that the second of the two characters I mentioned 
suggests. But I think it is a matter of choice whether
3 Mind. April, Oct. 1931, Oct. 1932, Jan.,April 
   
 
1933.
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we insert such a clause. The alleged analyses which do 
not seem to help us to understand what they analyse any 
better tnan before are presumably superfluous because they 
concern a subject about which most people's minds happen 
already to be fairly clear. We may if we choose define an 
analysis as a sentence which not only in a certain way 
corresponds more closely to a fact than some other, but 
also clears our minds; or we may, as I think is more 
convenient, not include this latter clause in our 
definition, but distinguish between those analyses which 
are helpful and those which happen not to be.
Evidently the aim of philosophers who take the sort 
of point of view I have described is in a certain sense 
not to discover new facts, but to elucidate familiar facts. 
They do, of course, hope to discover some new facts, 
namely facts that some sentence or other is an analysis; 
but only facts which stand in a certain special relation 
to facts already familiar.
What I have said so far very likely differs in many 
points from what professor Moore would say on the same 
subject, but it may none the less be called a conventional 
account of analysis and analytic philosophy. There is 
one point I should like to mention briefly in which I am 
somewhat doubtful about the correctness of this conventional
10.
account. My doubt on this point seems to have been
shared by the late F. P. Ramsey, who wrote in one of his
t\. 
short papers, ' I do not think it is necessary to say
with Moore that the definitions explain what we have 
hitherto meant by our propositions, but rather that they 
show how we intend to use them in the future.' It seems 
to me probable that sentences do not either have fixed or 
accepted meanings or not have them, but that they differ 
in the degree of fixity or acceptance of their meanings. 
When we have found something which is what we call the 
analysis of a certain sentence whose meaning has a low 
degree of fixity, I am doubtful whether it is really true 
that the analysis has the same meaning as the analysed 
sentence. Rather, I am inclined to think, the analysis 
expresses a fact, or could express a fact of a certain 
class, which was not familiar to us before, but which was 
linked in some way or other with the circumstances in 
which the analysed sentence would be used, although the 
analysed sentence would not have been used to express
that fact or a fact of that class. I give as an5" 
incidental part of my third chapter a slightly more
4 The foundations of mathematios page 262, 
last papers, F philosophy ,
5 On pages £l-
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precise but very conjectural account of the way in which 
sentences may perhaps differ in the degree of fixity of 
their meanings, and the way in which an analysis may 
perhaps sometimes give, not the meaning of an analysed 
sentence, but a meaning which it is somehow or other 
proper to substitute for it. When the meaning of an 
analysed sentence has a high degree of fixity, as perhaps 
we can secure that it generally has, I think the sentence 
which would be called its analysis very likely does have 
the same meaning.
In forming my view of ethics I have again been more 
influenced by the writings of professor Moore than by any 
other single agency. But there are many of professor 
Moore's opinions about ethics, as there are not in other 
subjects, of whose truth I feel doubtful. Professor 
Moore's ethical theories are most fully and systematically 
expressed in Principia Ethioa; and various parts of them 
are treated in detail in Ethics, in chapters VIII and X 
of Philosophical studies, and in his contribution to the 
symposium is goodness a quality ? in prop. Arist. soc. 
Sup.vol. XI, 1932. In this last paper he said, on 
page 127 that in Prinoipia Ethica ' all the supposed 
proofs' that goodness was indefinable 'were certainly 
fallacious.' So professor Moore's ethical opinions have
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certainly changed to some extent in the thirty years 
since Principia Ethica was written. But I think their 
general outline has probably remained the same. The 
part of his ethical theory on which the rest turns is that 
which I nave just mentioned, namely that goodness in a 
certain sense is indefinable and is a quality. This 
particular part of his theory is that about which I am most 
sceptical, and it is examined and criticised in detail in 
my second chapter. The remainder of his ethical theory 
I am, within a certain limitation, much more inclined to 
favour. I shall try to give an outline of that part of 
his theory which I find convincing, and say how it is 
related to the part I have mentioned. It is possible that 
I shall not succeed in stating a theory which is exactly 
what professor Moore has at any time thought; but even so 
I shall be satisfied if I can express the theory which I 
have arrived at as a result of reading what professor Moore 
has written, and which does seem to me very convincing, 
but for a certain difficulty which I have just referred to 
and shall shortly explain.
This theory is that all ethical expressions can be 
defined, or at any rate explained or interpreted, in terms 
of one sense or group of senses of the word good, that 
sense or that group in which good has the same sense as the 
phrase intrinsically good, and which according to professor
13.
Moore is indefinable. Supposing the use of the word good 
which I am trying to identify proved to consist of several 
different senses, then one would probably have to say that 
there was one of these senses in terms of which all the
other members of the group could be defined, and likewise
yuuj&i&*i£jz_ GT
all other expressions, either directly or by Aseftji*-*^? 
te$ Ojw«*f a-? A i/UC ®| o^OAujitu>4A, 
&&te^fl^li^^^^ The way in which
according to this theory such words as right and duty 
would be defined or explained is particularly striking. 
In Principia Ethioa, chapter V section 89, professor 
Moore wrote 'what I wish to point out is that "right" does 
and can mean nothing but "cause of a good result", and is 
thus identical with "useful"; whence it follows that the 
end always will justify the means, and that no action which 
is not justified by its results can be right. 1 In this 
and other statements professor Moore quite plainly 
claimed that Tightness was definable in terms of goodness. 
Mr. W. D. Ross has pointed out, on page 10 of the right 
and the good, that professor Moore had perhaps ceased to 
think that Tightness could be defined in terms of goodness 
when he wrote his later book, Ethics; but that even if 
he had given up thinking this he continued to think that 
whether an act produced a good result was a test of its 
Tightness, that is, that there was some character definable 
in terms of goodness which all right acts and only right
14.
acts possessed. In that case I should say that 
Tightness was not to be defined, but, in the words I 
used above, explained or interpreted, in terms of 
goodness. I think professor Moore's definition of 
Tightness which I have quoted is rather vague, and I 
think that as a matter of fact the word right undoubtedly 
has a number of different uses in which it may be called 
an ethical expression, and of which not more than one or 
one group could possibly be defined by professor Moore's 
definition. The sort of theory which professor Moore 
has expressed has been named by Hastings Rashdall ideal
6 v
utilitarianism, and by Mr. Ross agathistic utilitarianism. 
These names have oeen given because the theory formally 
resembles ordinary, that is, hedonistic, utilitarianism, 
but differs from that theory in that in ideal 
utilitarianism a certain indefinable character takes the 
place taken by pleasure in the older theory. The theory 
originally called utilitarianism had a kind of multiple 
adaptation, which made it possible for the form or 
structure of its account of Tightness to be incorporated 
in other theories which avoid the evident mistakes made
6 The theory of good and evil, book I oh. VII
§ VIII.
7 The right and the good, page 9.
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by Bentham and Mill about goodness and pleasure. Any 
theory which contains this formal or structural element 
might be called utilitarian in a more inclusive sense. 
All theories which are utilitarian in this sense give as a 
test of the Tightness or wrongness of any action the 
extent to which some character, for example goodness or 
pleasure, has occurred or would occur or be likely to 
occur in the world as a result of it, in comparison with
the extent to which the same character would occur as a
* 
result of alternative actions; and they give this test
either on the ground that to call an action right is 
simply to say that it is related in a certain way to the 
occurrence of a certain character in the world, or on the 
ground that all right actions and only right actions are 
related in a certain way to the occurrence of that 
character.
I believe in ideal utilitarianism to this extent. I
% This is the moso compendious way I can find of 
putting a theory of the sort I am considering in the 
most general form. If I spoke of the extent to 
which the results of an action display some character, 
for example, goodness, or of the goodness, or 
whatever it may be, of the results, I should not 
allow for the possibility that the character in 
question belonged to the action itself, or to wholes 
of which wither the action itself, or previous and 
simultaneous happenings, or both, were parts.
16.
feel sure that any theory which both denies the truth 
of every sort of utilitarianism, and gives some 
interpretation of the meanings of the words right and 
good in their ethical uses, is false; and I feel sure 
that every sort of hedonistic utilitarianism, whether to 
the effect that intrinsic goodness can be defined in -eras 
of pleasure, or that something to do with pleasure is a 
criterion of the presence of some other character, called 
intrinsic goodness, is false. But both professor 
Moore's attempt, and all other attempts I know of, to 
explain the meaning of such expressions as intrinsic 
goodness seem to me very dubious. This is the 
limitation or difficulty I referred to above. In my 
third chapter I suggest, without stating it as at all 
certain, a radical kind of scepticism about ethical 
expressions, to the effect that the meaning of those 
expressions can not be explained simpjy because they 
are meaningless. Supposing this sceptical theory were 
true, as I think it may be, it is hard to say what reason 
I should have for favouring some kind of utilitarianism 
more than other false theories, although I should 
certainly be inclined to favour it. But suppose we 
use the word uti1itarianiam, not as a name for a definite 
type of theory, but simply for a practical maxim, to the
17.
effect tnat in considering questions about conduct it 
pays, or is worth while, to give attention to results, 
then I think I may say that I am certainly a utilitarian 
in the sense that I believe in that maxim, even if it is 
difficult to say exactly how such a proceeding pays. 
And there is one further point about which I think I am 
much more inclined to agree with professor Moore than 
with most upholders of theories contrary to his. It 
seems to me tnat if such words as good and right in their 
ethical uses have meanings which we can explain, then 
it is very probable that their meanings can not be 
explained wholly in natural terms; and I am even more 
prone to think that no naturalistic definitions of them 
that have been suggested and that I have heard of are 
correct.
I am afraid that the sense in which I write about 
ethical expressions or ethical uses of expressions may 
not be very precise. I assume throughout this essay 
that it is fairly clear what the expressions and uses are 
to which I refer in this way: and I think probably it is 
clear, except about a few doubtful cases. But I should 
express myself much more clearly if I could define the 
sense in which I call these expressions or uses ethical, 
by saying that they are expressions which have a certain
18.
sort of meaning. This definition I am precluded from 
giving by my uncertainty, upon which this whole essay turns, 
whether they have any meaning in the ordinary sense, and if 
they have, then what sort. But I am afraid that I 
occasionally use language which suggests that I do know 
part of the definition of the sense in which I call certain 
expressions ethical; I think perhaps I sometimes write as
though if an expression stood for, or could be defined in
« 
terms of, a non-natural character, it would be an ethical
expression. I think there may be an ordinary sense of the 
word ethical such that if an expression had the sort of 
meaning I have described it would follow that it was an 
ethical expression, and a sense such that to call an 
expression ethical is to say that it has such a meaning. 
But if so, it is not in either of these senses that I 
generally call expressions ethical; I suppose my usual 
practice is to call an expression or a use ethical if it 
is one which ethical philosophers have often discussed, 
or of a sort which they have often discussed. But this 
answer of course makes it hard to settle the question 
who ethical philosophers are.
I tried to explain in outline in the earlier part of 
this chapter the procedure which I called analysing. The 
extent to which this procedure can be applied to ethical 
questions is unfortunately very uncertain. If a clear
19.
and conclusive account could be given of the meaning of 
one single ethical expression, whether in the form of an 
analysis of it or the discovery that no analysis of it 
was possible, as professor Moore has suggested about 
goodness, we might hope that analysis on the regular plan 
could be applied to other expressions, which we should 
hope to be able to define partly by means of the 
expression first defined. But so far, it seems to me, 
no such clear and conclusive account has been given of any 
expression. Accordingly the greater part of this essay 
consists, not of attempts at analysis, but frf preliminary 
investigations to discover whether analysis is possible. 
These investigations consist in part of criticism of 
suggested analyses of certain expressions, and in part of 
the testing of hypotheses from which it would follow that 
analysis is not possible for any ethical expressions.
There is an assumption about the use and meaning of 
words which is very commonly made by analytic philosophers, 
and which I am afraid is often made in this essay, but 
about whose justification I am very doubtful. This 
assumption is that as a rule it is possible to make clear 
exactly what sense or use of an expression one wants to 
consider in some quite simple way, for example by saying 
that it is that use or sense in which the expression in 
question has the same sense as a certain other expression,
20.
or that it is the sense the expression would have if a 
certain sentence preceded it, or the sense it would have 
if it were used during the occurrence of a certain 
physical condition, or by mentioning some other single 
circumstance which might accompany its use. It is assumed 
that either by connecting an expression with some other, 
or by indicating by some simple means an occasion on which 
or a written context in which it might be used, we can 
identify what is commonly called a particular sense of an 
expression, in the sense in which we speak of the police 
identifying a prisoner. It is difficult to be quite sure 
how far assumptions like this are justified, because the 
meaning of expressions about the different senses of an 
expression has itself not yet been adequately analysed. 
But I think the general assumption is probably mistaken, 
although there may be some expressions whose use is 
specially simple and uniform and whose senses can be 
identified by such simple means as I have described. I 
think as a rule the question what sense an expression has 
on a certain occasion is the question what sense most
hearers or readers would be likely to attach to it on
y that occasion. The sense which hearers or readers attach
to an expression probably depends upon a very complex set
? Whether this is so is discussed more fully in 
my third chapter, on pages 10 >  8".
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of circumstances. If the expression is spoken, the 
sense which its hearers attach to it will very likely 
be affected by a great many parts of a preceding 
conversation, by the tone of the conversation, serious or 
frivolous, by their knowledge of the speaker's character 
and interests, by the reasons for which those present have 
met, by the place, the time of day, or a variety of other 
causes, or by several of these circumstances. Similarly, 
if an expression is written or printed, the sense which 
its readers attach to it may be affected by the whole or 
many parts of what comes before it in the piece of writing 
in which it occurs, their Knowledge of the writer's 
opinions, their knowledge of the expression's use by 
other writers on the same subject, and so on. And I 
think I have only mentioned causes by which it is 
reasonable to be affected. Supposing the question to 
be settled is not what sense an expression has on a 
particular occasion, that is, what sense would be attached 
to it by hearers or readers, but in what sense an 
expression was used or would be used on a particular 
occasion by a writer or speaker, then I think there is 
probably just as great a variety of causes which may 
affect the sense the writer or speaker attaches to it. 
The sense which is attached to colloquial expressions is 
perhaps specially affected by the variety of causes I
22.
have described, for the use of colloquial expressions is 
as a rule exceptionally flexible and adaptable to the 
needs of the moment. Analytic philosophers have very 
often made a point of concentrating their attention on 
colloquial expressions, and trying to analyse the 
meaning of colloquial expressions in uses which they 
try to identify. So for their purposes the simple kind 
of identification I have described is specially likely 
to be inadequate.
It seems to me that we need to develop a new method 
of pointing out the sense of an expression to which we 
want to attend. As it is not yet clear to me $$$ri? 
exactly/this is to be done, I have not tried to use such 
a method in this essay. But there are several courses 
with which it might be useful to experiment. We might 
construct a whole conversation or a whole argument in 
which a certain expression would be used, and say that the 
sense which is to be considered is that in which the 
expression is used in a particular place in that 
conversation or argument. Or we might be able to find 
uses of the expression in some novel or story, by a 
writer who used words with care, in which it seemed to 
have the required sense; we should then say that the 
sense to be considered was that in which the expression 
was used in a particular place in that book or story, and
23.
it would be understood that in order to discover precisely 
what sense was in question it was necessary to read the 
whole or a large part of the work referred to. Or we 
might refer to a large number of passages in books in each 
of which a certain expression seemed to have the same 
sense. Very likely there are many other methods by which 
it may perhaps be possible to point out exactly what sense 
of an expression is under discussion. I am sure that some 
method or other whicn shows the sense of an expression by 
much more elaborate means than are generally used is very 
often needed.
In the second chapter of this essay as I have said 
above, I examine and criticise professor G. E. Moore's 
theory about the meaning of such expressions as 
intrinsically good. Professor Moore's theory does not 
give an analysis of goodness, since it is to the effect 
that goodness is indefinable; but it may be called in a 
sense a theory about analysis, for it would show, if it 
were true, what place goodness can taice in the analysis 
of other expressions. In my third chapter I enquire 
whether all ethical expressions can be analysed in a 
particular way in which it has often been supposed that 
they can, namely the naturalistic wayj I suggest that 
perhaps they can not De analysed but can be explained in 
that way, and I put forward a hypothesis under which all
24.
ethical expressions would be in a certain sense 
meaningless, and it would follow that they can not be 
analysed. In my fourth chapter I examine the meanings 
of various expressions about reason, which have not up 
to this point been specifically included in the scope of 
what has been said; for many of these expressions I 
suggest analyses or describe ways in which they could be 
analysed, and try to show that they are always to be 
analysed in terms of natural characters unless they contain 
such a word as good. In my concluding chapter I consider 
the way in which it may be reasonable for our use of 
ethical expressions to be affected by the considerations 
that have been put forward; and I enquire whether we 
can discover typical states of affairs which commonly 
accompany the use of ethical expressions, whether or not 
they give us tne means of defining those expressions; and 
whether ethical expressions have any special and 
characteristic use in those situations in which people 
present can assume that they have a certain community 
of purpose or interest.
2. INTRINSIC gOODNESS as a QUALITY.
The account given by Professor Moore of one or one 
group of our uses of the words good and goodness, that use 
or group^ namely, in which these words are used in the same 
senses in which we use the phrases intrinsically good and 
intrinsic goodness, is that goodness in this sense is a 
quality. On pages 10 and XIII of the third impression of 
Principia Ethica he used the words'"good" denotes a simple and 
indefinable quality,' and 'denotes one unique simple object 
of thought.' On page 126 of Is Goodness a Quality (Proc. 
Arist. Soc. Sup. Vol.XI) he said 'what I_ meant by saying 
that "good" denoted a quality I think I can say quite simply. 
I meant merely that the character of being worth having for 
its own sake was a character and was not a relational pro- 
perty' . I shall try to discover first what professor Uoore 
meant when he called goodness a quality, and next whether 
what he meant was true.
The clearest indication known to me which professor 
Moore has given in print of the way in which he used the 
word quality in Principia Ethica is in the third of my 
quotations. I think I understand how he was there using
the word character, and I shall try to explain his use 
there, although I cannot define it. If I say that there 
are such things as character-sin that sense, I am not 
stating a philosophical theory, but am saying something 
quite obvious to anyone who understands my use of the word, 
perhaps something tautological. If I say the carpet is 
red_ I ascribe a character in this sense to the carpetj if
SL-
I say this carpet is too big for the room I ascribe.char- 
acter to the carpet and also another character to the roomj 
if I say if it rains we shall get wet I ascribe characters 
to rain and to us. If there are such facts as sentences 
like these would express it follows that there are characters 
in this sense. The word property is I think also some- 
times used in this sense. Suppose redness were a quality 
in professor Moore's sense, then we could a§so say that 
the character of being red is a character and is not a 
relational property. And since under professor lloore's 
definition every character must be either a quality or a 
relational property, it is pretty clear that the characters 
ascribed in my second and third sentences would be of the 
latter and not the former sort. If I am right in think- 
ing that professor Loore was using pj?operty in the same 
sense in which he was using character^ then the definition 
of quality which he gives is simply that a quality is a
non-relational character.
But this definition does not I think suffice to show 
exactly how professor Moore was using the word quality. 
This use can perhaps "be further explained by considering his 
statement that ' "good" is a simple notion, just as 
"yellow" is a simple notion 1 , and a passage of which I 
have already quoted part, 'there is ... no intrinsic 
difficulty in the contention that "good" denotes a simple 
and indefinable quality. There are many other instances
*
of -such qualities. Consider yellow, for example.' 
(Principia Ethica pages 7 and 10). Prom these passages 
we can add two parts to professor Moore's account of good- 
ness; he not only thought that goodness was a non-relation- 
al character, but also that it was something simple, and 
that there was some analogy between it and yellowness. 
What exactly is the effect of these additions depends 
upon the ways in which professor Koore was using the 
words simple and yellow. It seems to me that simple has 
several different senses, and yellow perhaps more than one. 
But it is fairly clear that yellow has one single sense 
or group of closely connected senses in which it is far 
more commonly used than in any other way. If I say the_ 
carpet was yellow, or I have a yellow tie, I am using the 
word in this ordinary sense. To consider this sense may
help us to see how professor Lloore was using the word 
simpJLe. For there is a sense or group of senses of 
simple in which yellowness in this ordinary sense is 
certainly not simple. To say that the carpet was yellow 
has the same meaning as to say there is^ some shade of 
yellow which was the shade of the carpet; thus yellow- 
ness in the ordinary sense is something general or 
determinable, not completely determinate, and it is 
therefore in a certain sense not simple. In the sense 
in which yellowness is not simple, the determinate shade 
of yellow, on account of whose occurrence a statement 
about yellowness is true, is simple. In what sense 
would professor i;oore have said that yellowness was 
simple? He may have been using the word yellow as 
though it stood for a determinate shade of yellow, and 
have intended to say that it was simple in the sense I 
have just tried to distinguish. Or he may have been 
using simple in another sense, some sense for example in 
which to call a thing simple is to say that it is not 
composed of parts, or that it is not a conjunction of 
several characters. In that case he may have wanted to 
say that yellowness either in the ordinary sense or in 
the other sense I have suggested was not composed of 
parts, or was not a conjunction of several characters. 
Each of these statements is clearly true.
To discover in what sense professor Moore said that 
goodness was simple we must consider the effects of his 
comparison with yellowness. If the comparison was with 
yellowness in the ordinary sense, professor Moore either 
did not intend to say that goodness was simple in the first 
sort of sense to which I drew attention or made the mistake 
of thinking that yellowness was simple in that sensej and 
I think the latter alternative unlikely, as I think it un- 
likely that he thought yellowness in the ordinary sense a 
determinate character. Now it seems to me, though it is 
hard to be sure on such a point, that the only senses of 
the word simple_ which could be relevant in a discussion of 
this kind fall within one or the other of the groups I have 
distinguished. If this is so, professor Moore either in- 
tended to say merely that goodness was not composed of 
parts or was not a conjunction of several characters, or 
was using the word yellow otherwise than in what I have 
called the ordinary sense. Suppose the latter alternative 
were true, it would be compatible with the truth of the 
former, but also with possibilities incompatible with the 
former. For if professor L'oore was using the word yej-low 
to stand for a determinate shade, he may none the less have 
intended to say merely that goodness was not composed of 
parts or a conjunction of characters, but he may have
intended to say that it was simple in the first sense which 
I pointed out, the sense in which a determinate shade may 
be simple, but an indeterminate character is not. It 
seems to me that if anything is simple in this sense it 
follows that it is also not composed of parts and not a 
conjunction of characters. I therefore think it likely 
that in any case part of what professor Lloore intended to 
say or of what followed, if that is different, from what he 
intended to say, was, that goodness was not composed of 
parts or not a conjunction of several characters; and I 
think it fairly clear that, if he was using the word 
yellow in its ordinary sense, this was all he intended to 
say in calling goodness simple.
But I do not feel sure that professor Iloore was not 
using the word yellow_ otherwise than in the ordinary sense, 
whether as though yellovsr were a determinate shade or in 
some other way. If so, he may have wanted to say that 
yellowness and goodness were simple in a sense in which 
only a completely determinate character can be, and con- 
sequently that goodness was not, as is yellowness in the 
ordinary sense, something general or determinable. I do 
not know whether there is any sense in which the word 
y_eJLlow_ could properly have been used, other than the 
ordinary sense, so that yellowness would not be a determin- 
ate shade, but it seems to me not. I suspect that
a l
yellowness in the ordinary sense may "be a relational 
character, and therefore not a quality in professor 
Moore's sense; but I do not propose to go into this 
question, as I am inclined to think that professor Moore 
did intend to speak as though yellowness were a determinate 
shade, and as though goodness were simple in both the sorts 
of sense to which I have drav/n attention. So my conclusion 
aboutlprof essor I.'oore's meaning is that he thought goodness 
a non-relational character, that he either thought it not 
composed of parts or not a conjunction of several characters 
and that he very likely thought it comparable to a deter- 
minate shade on account of whose occurrence a given state- 
ment about yellowness would be true, and simple in a sense 
in which nothing general or determinable can be simple.
There is still one more part of professor Moore's 
account of goodness which I must examine; it is not a 
part of his account of what he meant by calling goodness a 
quality, but it will help me to answer the other question I 
proposed to consider, namely whether his account of goodness 
is true. Before answering this question I shall examine 
one of professor Lloore's accounts of what is meant by 
calling goodness in the sense I am considering intrinsic. 
In Philosophical Studies on page 260 he said 'to say that 
a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree 
it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of 
the thing in question'. Further on he used language which 
suggests that intrinsic value is not an intrinsic property. 
And on page 274 he said 'if you could enumerate all the 
intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would 
have given a complete description of it, and would not need 
to mention any predicates of value it possessed. 1 From 
these and similar statements and also from numerous state- 
ments in Principia Ethica it appears that professor Lioore 
thought that goodness was in some sense or other a non-
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natural character; this conclusion does not depend upon 
any close connexion of senae between the phrase intrinsic 
nature as used above and the word non-natural as used here.
Obviously no comparison is possible between goodness 
and yellowness so far as goodness is intrinsic in the sense 
which professor Moore explained. For in the first place 
yellowness is unquestionably a natural character; and 
secondly, if anything is yellow you cannot enumerate all 
that thing's intrinsic properties without in some sense 
mentioning its yellowness; yellowness is evidently in
10 I think expressions like this have some sense in which 
they are commonly used. I try to define the sense in 
which I speak of naturalism at the beginning of my third 
chapter. Using the same terms that I use there, I may 
say that a non-natural character is a character which can 
not be mentioned in describing the order of nature or 
the things that happen.
some sense an intrinsic character. I spoke of mentioning 
in some sense, because if, as in fact never happens, you 
were enumerating all the determinate characters of some- 
thing, and the thing were yellow, you would not mention by 
name yellowness, but a determinate shade, or several such 
shades, from whose occurrence it would follow that the 
thing was yellow. It seems pretty clear that there is 
one sense of the phrase intrinsic character or property 
appropriate to determinate characters, and another 
appropriate to general characters like yellowness, and 
that these senses are systematically connected in the 
following way; if a certain intrinsic determinate 
character occurs, it follows that a certain intrinsic 
general character occurs, or a set of such characters 
interrelated by their degrees of generality, and if a 
certain intrinsic general character occurs, it follows 
that one or several of a certain set of intrinsic deter- 
minate characters occur, though not that any particular 
selection occurs. I think that when professor Lloore 
wrote about enumerating all the intrinsic properties of 
something, and of giving a complete description, he must 
certainly have intended to speak: of intrinsic determinate 
characters. For the characters which would be enumerated 
in the way he described would constitute what he called 
the intrinsic nature of the thing described, upon v/hich
according to him the thing's intrinsic value solely 
depends. But if the intrinsic nature of a thing were 
constituted by general characters, things having the same 
intrinsic nature might differ widely in their intrinsic 
determinate characters. I am sure that in that case 
professor Moore would think that they might well differ 
also in their intrinsic values. So I think it safe to 
say that he was considering intrinsic determinate charac- 
ters in the passages I have quoted.
The answer I shall give to my second question is 
that goodness is not a non-relational character which is 
not composed of parts nor a conjunction of several char- 
acters, and which is simple in the sense in which a 
determinate shade is simple, and whose possession by 
something depends solely upon the intrinsic determinate 
characters of that thing, although it is not itself an 
intrinsic character. I am not sure that I can give any 
absolutely conclusive reasons for rejecting the account 
of goodness which I have attributed to professor Lloore, 
but I can give reasons which I think make his-account seem 
very unplausible, and of which some are perhaps conclusive 
against it. The things which professor lioore thought 
intrinsically good are without exception complexes or 
wholes containing parts, as indeed, I should say, are all 
the things which are ever thought intrinsically good. For
example in chapter VI of Principia Ethioa he described 
personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments as by far 
the greatest goods with which we are acquainted; and all 
instances of personal affection or aesthetic enjoyment are 
certainly complex happenings or states of affairs. UM'tou-oto 
IfMWMM I shall suggest in the first place that no whole has 
any character which is a quality and simple in the sort of 
sense I have described, and that no such character can -in 
any circumstances occur in the world unless it occurs as 
an element of an atomic fact, secondly that the word good 
is not used to stand for such a character, and thirdly 
that we do not find the sort of evidence we should expect 
for the occurrence in the world of any such character which 
is also a non-natural ethical character of complex wholes.
My first objection to professor Moore's sort of 
opinion is, I am inclined to think, the most cogent, if it 
is sound; but I am not sure of its soundness. I may 
divide it into a consideration of the nature of complexes, 
and a consideration of the nature of simple non-relational 
characters. The first of these considerations can be put 
very shortly; it is simply that, as it seems to me, no 
complex whole can have any character at all which is not 
composed of parts nor a conjunction of several characters 
and which is a non-relational character, and therefore none 
can have such a character which is also a non-natural
character its possession of which depends solely on its 
intrinsic nature. I am here, I think, using the word 
complex in such a sense that a whole is complex or is a 
complex if it is composed of parts, or if it has any 
intrinsic character which is a conjunction of several 
characters; if a whole has the former of these characters 
it probably follows that it also has the latter, so that 
I think the latter alone might give the definition. In 
order to see this point clearly, we may ask ourselves 
whether any whole which has some intrinsic conjunctive 
character in the sense given above can also have a non- 
relational non-composite and non-conjunctive character 
which is a character of the whole as a whole, and not merely 
of some element of it. It seems to me that the answer 
must be, no. Or we may ask ourselves whether any com- 
plex whole ever has any non-relational non-composite and 
non-conjunctive character other than goodness, and whether 
if not we can think of any such character which might be- 
long to a complex whole, in the sense that it makes sense, 
although it is false, to say of a certain whole that it 
has that character. I think that again the answer to 
either question must be, no. To ask such questions as 
these perhaps comes to the same thing as asking whether 
complex wholefcan as wholes have what would ordinarily 
be called qualities. I think also that to consider in
this way the nature of complexes may come to the same 
thing as considering the nature of simple non-relational 
characters, to which I shall proceedj but I am not sure 
about this point, and in any case think it useful to 
approach the topic from either end.
The second part of my first objection is the part of 
my criticism upon which I should wish to put most emphasis 
if I had entirely clear insight into the questions in- 
volved, and could see that this objection really has the
(I
force that I am prone to think it has. It seems to me
that a non-relational character which is simple in the 
sense in which a determinate shade is simple, and which, 
as appears to follow from the last clause, is non-composite 
and non-conjunctive, can only occur in the world if it 
occurs as an element of an atomic fact. T put what I have 
to say in this form for the reason that it is pretty clear 
that such a character, and in fact any character, can be 
an element of a non-atomic or molecular fact, but in each
 
case it only is so, it seems to me, because it is an 
element of some atomic fact or other, <So to each occurrence 
of such a character in a non-atomic fact there corresponds
an occurrence of it in an atomic fact, and the same 
occurrence in an atomic fact may correspond to a large 
number of occurrences in non-atomic facts, and the
<i The argument which I have based on a connexion between" 
simple non-relational characters and atomic facts was 
suggested to me by remarks made in conversation by Lir. 
A.J. Ayer, though I have no reason to think that he would 
agree with anything that I sayt
relation "between atomic and non-atomic occurrences is 
probably a one  many relation.
The theory of atomic facts, and the vocabulary con- 
nected with it, is by this time comparatively familiar. 
The theory is expressed in various parts of Mr. L. 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. I shall 
not venture to define the expression atomic faqt^ but I 
think I see how it is commonly used. It is not easy to 
give an example of an atomic fact, but I propose to say 
what I have to say by means of an example which is some- 
times suggested in discussions. It appears that the only 
examples we can find are those which can be taken from an 
individual person's sense-fieldj and the sort of facts 
we have to consider, if they are to be expressed, can 
only be expressed by means of expressions of a sort which 
one can only intelligibly address to one's self. Suppose 
I consider my own visual field at some moment at which it 
contains a uniformly coloured red sense-datum with definite 
limits, I can, if I choose, express to myself a certain 
fact by the words thisjis here now; if I used these words 
so that this stood for the determinate shade of red which 
belonged to the sense-datum, here stood for the situation 
of that shade, or the area which it filled, and now for 
the time at which that shade was filling that area, it
is sometimes suggested that I should be expressing an
ca
atomic fact. The sort of use of these words about
which this suggestion would be made can only be made 
clear if the sense in which I have spoken of a word 
standing for something can be made clearj and this I 
find difficult to explain. It seems to me that the 
sort of use of these words which is in question is in 
accordance with the ordinary use of English, whereas it 
would not be in accordance with that ordinary use if the 
words this or here were being used to stand for something 
in that sense or those senses in which the word red_ or 
the phrase in the middle of my visual field may stand 
for something. The sort of use of the words this is here 
now in which it would be suggested that they might express 
an atomic fact is sometimes described by saying that the 
words this^, here and now would be used as logically proper 
names. It seems to me that if we could explain what an 
atomic fact is and show that a certain sentence would 
express an atomic fact, we might be able to define 
logically proper names, or what we might call atomic 
names, as words used in a particular way in expressing an 
atomic fact; or if we could define logically proper or
12 I am not sure of the original author of this suggestion. 
I first heard it in discussions in which professor Moore 
was taking part, and I think professor Moore attributed 
it to the late P. P. Ramsey.
atomic names we might be able to define atomic facts as 
facts expressed by sentences in which names of that sort 
were combined in a certain way.
There are many difficulties connected with the ex- 
pression atomic fact and the opinio^ that there are such 
things, and it is not easy to separate difficulties arising 
from incomplete analysis from difficulties which are only 
felt because of the awkwardness of considering facts which 
cannot be communicated and sentences which cannot be ad- 
dressed to another person. If I had the solution of these 
difficulties I should give it, but as it is I think it 
suffices &ere to say that I think there are such things as 
atomic facts, and that I think the sentence this is here now, 
or something like it^could probably be used in accordance 
with the ordinary use of English to express an atomic fact. 
I am not certain that this is the right sentence to use 
for an illustration. Suppose that in my visual field at 
some moment there is a uniformly coloured red sense-datum 
with definite limits, touching and lying on the left of a 
uniformly coloured blue sense-datum with definite limits; 
then I can, if I choose, express to myself a certain fact 
by the words this is now thus to that, or is now related 
thus, using the word this in such a way as to stand for the 
red sense-datum, not for its colour, that_to stand for the
blue sense-datum, and thus to stand for the determinate 
spatial relation of one sense-datum to the other, in the 
sense in which I spoke of the words in the other sentence 
standing for certain things. It might be suggested that 
this sentence also would express an atomic fact; and I am 
not sure that it would not, but I think it would be diffi- 
cult to say exactly how the fact it would express would be 
related to the fact expressed by the other sentence. I 
want at present to draw attention to a difference between 
the ways in which the word this is used in the two sentences. 
In the first sentence it stands for a determinate shade, 
which is what has commonly been called a universal; in 
the second sentence it stands for a sense-datum, which is 
not a universal, but which one is naturally inclined to 
call a particular- To define or explain the use of such 
words as particular and universal is specially hard, and 
very often the only possible course seems to be to point 
out the S'ort of thing which has one or another of the 
characters which are being spoken of. I think the use 
of universal^ is much easier to understand than the use of 
particular, for it seems to me pretty clear that a determinate 
non-relational character, or a determinate relation, is a 
universal, whereas I find it much harder to say what sort 
of thing would be a particular; whether an indeterminate 
character or a complex relational character is a universal
I am doubtful. However it seems as though in the first 
of the two sentences I am considering the word this does 
stand for a non-relational determinate character, and for 
a universal; whether any word in either sentence stands 
for a particular is more doubtful, as is also the question 
what sort of thing can be said about the other words in 
the sentences comparable to saying about this in the 
first sentence that it stands for a universal. It seems 
to me that if we are to say, about all the words, or all 
the words other than is, in sentences like these, 
something comparable to saying about this in the first 
sentence that it stands for a universal, we shall need to 
distinguish more different kinds of thing, which can be 
said in this way than have so far been distinguished; 
I doubt whether it is appropriate to say of here, for 
example, in the first sentence, either that it stands for 
a particular or for a universal, and I am sure it is not 
appropriate to say either of now. If words like 
particular and universal are to keep their utility I 
think we must introduce others of the same kind. It 
seems to me that perhaps here, for example, as used in 
the fir^t sentence, stands for something which is neither
a particular nor a universal, but which we may call a
'3
setting. I wish it were possible to say clearly what is
meant by saying that a word is like or of the same kind 
as particular and universal, but at present I do not see 
how to do this. I think it possible that the late
W. E. Johnson's uses of such words as tie have been
ij.
misunderstood by those who have criticised those uses,
and that he was trying to introduce words which should be 
comparable to particular and universal in the way I am 
speaking of. Thus I think we might say that the word 
is sometimes, and perhaps in the sentences I am 
considering, stands for a tie in the same sort of way 
in which this in the first sentence stands for a 
universal. To say that there are ties would, if I am 
right, notbetoatate a philosophical theory any more than 
to say that there are characters would be so, in the 
sense in which I suggested early in this chapter that to 
say that there are characters is not to state a 
philosophical theory.
II Professor Moore has, I think, made a suggestion in 
conversation, to the effect that it is a mistake to 
suppose that an element of an atomic fact must be 
either a particular or a universal.
lit For example, by the late F. P. Ramsey, in what he 
said on page 115 of the foundations of mathematics. For 
Johnson's use of the word tie, see his Logic I page 10 
and elsewhere; and for an interpret at ionof" it John 
Wisdom's Logical Constructions I § 3, liind April 1931.
ave digregsed gomQ ^stance from the subject of 
simple non-relational characters for the sake of making 
a little clearer my use of the phrase atomic fact. It 
is fairly clear that what the word this would stand for, 
if it were used in the way I have described in such a 
sentence as this is here now, would be a non-relational 
character and a determinate shade, simple therefore in 
the sense in which a determinate shade is simple; and 
that it would be non-composite and non-conjunctive, 
whether this follows from the previous clause or not. 
Suppose there is a situation such as I have described in 
which someone or other can and does use the sentence 
this is here now to express an atomic fact, then I should 
say, in words which I have used above without explaining 
them, that a determinate shade of red is occurring as. an 
element of an atomic fact. But obviously there may be 
an atomic fact of this sort, and similarly an occurrence 
of a determinate shade, without anyone expressing the 
fact, and without a causal possibility of anyone 
expressing the fact. For the sort of fact I an speaking 
of is defined as a fact which could be expressed by words 
of a certain kind, that is, a fact such that if anyone 
in a certain situation used those words in a certain
a 
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sense he would be expressing it. And it is natural 
to suppose that there are countless facts of this sort 
which nobody ever dreams of expressing; for it is natural 
to suppose that the whole of the sense-field of every 
human being is in a certain sense constituted by countless 
facts of this sort. There are countless facts the 
expression of which, in the way I have described by means 
of such words as I have suggested, was logically possible, 
in the sense that it makes sense, though it is as a rule 
false, to say of each that someone did so express it.
I have suggested above that a non-relational 
character which is simple in the sense in which a 
determinate shade is simple, and non-composite and 
non-conjunctive, if it occurs as an element of a non- 
atomic fact only does so because it also occurs as an 
element of some atomic fact. I can give as a test of the 
truth of what I say a very simple question. Does it 
mane sense to say that a certain non-relational character, 
which is simple in the sense in which a determinate shade 
is simple, and non-composite and non-conjunctive, occurs
as an element of a non-atomic fact, but not because it
ir 
also occurs as an element of some atomic fact ? in other,
and I think less clear, words, is such a thing logically 
possible ? I think I can explain in what sense I am
speaking of a character occurring as an element of one 
fact because it is an element of some other. A character 
occurs as an element of a non-atomic fact because it 
occurs as an element of some atomic fact if it occurs as 
an element of the non-atomic fact, either because one or 
more atomic facts, of which it is an element, are parts of 
the non-atomic fact, or because the non-atomic fact is
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in a certain sense about/one or more atomic facts of
A.
which the character in question is an element. So my 
question is, does it make sense to say that a certain non- 
relational character such as is described above occurs 
as an element of a non-atomic fact, but not because any
part of that non-atomic fact is an atomic fact of which
TIPH- 
the character is an element, nor because the/atomic fact
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is about/any atomic fact of which the character is an 
element ? It seems to me that the answer to this 
question is, no.
I have already suggested, in the first part of my 
first objection, that a character of the sort described 
can not belong to a complex whole. If I am right in 
saying what I have just said, a much clearer reason can 
be given for this assertion. If any complex whole had 
any character of the sort described, the fact that the 
whole had that character would be a non-atomic fact, and
the character would be an element of that fact, and 
probably of other facts, simply because it belonged to 
the whole in question. So if I am right in suggesting 
that a non-relational character of the sort described can 
only be an element of a non-atomic fact either because 
at least one atomic fact is a part of the non-atomic fact 
or because the non-atomic fact is about at least one 
atomic fact, it follows that no character of the sort 
described can belong to any complex whole. It follows 
that either intrinsic goodness is never a character of a 
complex whole, or it is not a non-relational character, 
which is simple in the sense in which a determinate shade 
is simple, and non-composite and non-conjunctive; whereas 
professor LToore suggested both that goodness was sometimes 
a character of complex wholes and that it was a non- 
relational character of the sort described. I think that 
if my suggestions are sound it would probably also follow 
from the same considerations that a quality in the ordinary 
sense can not belong to a complex whole.
I suppose that anyone who admitted the validity of 
these considerations would be likely to say that goodness
but is not a quality or a
non-relational character of the sort described, rather than 
the other way round. But it would be possible to take the
other line, and say that intrinsic goodness is a non- 
relational character of the sort described, but does not 
belong to complex wholes, and only occurs as an element of 
any fact if it occurs as an element of an atomic fact. I 
doubt whether professor Moore could consistently say this, 
because I do not see how a character could be an element 
of an atomic fact which was intrinsic in the special sense 
in which he thought that goodness was intrinsic, that is, 
which was not an intrinsic character of anything, but 
which was such that %&& whether something possessed it 
depended solely on that thing's intrinsic nature.
I have tried to show that there can be no such thing 
as what professor Moore called goodness. I have not yet 
considered whether what is commonly called goodness is a 
quality or a non-relational character of the sort described; 
my answer to this question will form my second objection 
to professor Moore f s sort of opinion. It seems from what 
I have said under the title of my first objection that a 
non-relational character of the sort described can only 
occur in the world if it occurs as an element of an 
atomic fact. So I may ask first whether the word good 
really is used to stand for a character of which this is 
true, and secondly, if we do not allow this conclusion 
which I have put forward in my first objection, but admit
that a character cf the sort described can be an element 
of an atomic fact, whether the word good is used to 
stand for a character which could be an element of an 
atomic fact. These and other questions about the way 
in which the word good is actually used seem to me very 
difficult to answer. It is very generally thought that 
the word good is used in a great many different senses, 
so many and differing in such subtle ways that they can 
scarcely be classified. I think this is true, so that 
it seems to me that in considering the meaning of the word 
good when it is used in the same sense as the phrase 
intr insi cally^ good we have to limit our attention to the 
word's careful use among comparatively sophisticated 
people. I think it is pretty clear that within these 
limits, and in those uses in which the word seems to have 
the required sense, the things which are said to be good 
are all complex, just as the things which professor Moore 
thought good were complex. If those who ascribe goodness 
to complex wholes are sometimes expressing facts when they 
do so, it follows that the answer to my first question, on 
the assumption that I made in asking that question, is that 
the word good is not used to stand for a non-relational 
character of the sort which has been described; for the 
assumption which I made was that such a character can never
belong to a complex whole. But the case is not quite so 
simple as this; for those who say that this or that 
complex whole is good may want to say that the whole 
in question has a certain non-relational character of the 
sort described, but be mistaken in thinking so. That is, 
it may be that goodness in one sense is a quality or is a 
non-relational character of the sort that has been des- 
cribed, but the word good in this sense is always mis- 
applied. This would be very paradoxical, and it is 
natural to think that the sorts of thing which are 
commonly said to have a certain character are some guide 
to the nature of the character which they are said to 
have. But I think that besides two definite reasons can 
be given for denying that intrinsic goodness is a non- 
relational character of the sort that has been described 
which is always ascribed to complex wholes, and ascribed 
wrongly since such a character can never belong to any 
complex whole. First, I think it does not make sense to 
speak of using a word to stand for a quality as a non- 
relational character of the sort described of which there 
is no instance; so that if the word good is being used 
so as to make sense, or so as to have a meaning, either it 
is being used to stand for some quality or non-relational 
character of the sort described of which there is some
instance or it is not being used to stand for a character 
of that kind or those kinds at all. But it seems im- 
possible to think that people can speak about a quality or 
non-relational character of the sort described without 
anyone being acquainted with any instances of it; and 
equally impossible to think that people can be acquainted 
with instances of a certain character and yet always 
ascribe it, not to those things which actually have it, 
but to things of a kind to which it never belongs, and to 
ascribe it to which makes nonsense. Secondly, although 
arguments from such things as the origin of names are 
usually worthless, I think we may say in this case that 
it is very hard to see how the word good can ever have 
been applied in such a way as to stand for a quality or 
non-relational character of the sort described if the 
only use that has been made of it in this sense is to 
ascribe goodness to things of a kind which cannot possess 
it, and if it is never used to ascribe goodness to the 
things which do possess it.
Liy second question was whether, apart from the 
reasons I have adduced for thinking that a non-relational 
character of the sort that has been described cannot 
belong to a complex whole, it may be that the word good^ 
is used to stand for a character which can be an element
of an atomic fact. On this point I think it suffices
to say that if the word good were used to stand for such 
a character we should expect to be able to find some 
sentence containing the word good or the phrase 
intrinsically good which could "be used to express an 
atomic fact, or at any rate such that it was not absurd 
to suggest that it could be used to express an atomic fact, 
And I think it is pretty clear that we can not find any 
such sentence. If this consideration is conclusive, it 
suffices to give a negative answer to my first as well as 
to my second question.
I have tried to show that if it is admitted that any 
quality or any non-relational character which is simple in 
the sense in which a determinate shade is simple, and non» 
composite and non-conjunctive, can occur as an element of 
atomic fact, and if it is admitted that, if the word good 
is used to stand for a character of the sort described, 
there must be some instance of the character for which it 
stands, then it follows from considerations I have put 
forward that the word good is not used to stand for a 
character of the sort described. If at least these two 
admissions are not made, then my second objection to 
professor Moore's sort of opinion is not conclusive. I 
have tried to show in my second objection that the word goo* 
is never used to stand for a character of the sort that
professor Moore would call a quality and which I think 
is generally so called. It is possible that professor 
Moore has used the word good in a way in which it is not 
ordinarily used, but this is very unlikely, and is ex- 
pressly disavowed on page 6 of Principia Ethioa. So I 
think that on the two assumptions I have mentioned it 
can be shown that goodness is not what professor Moore 
called a quality. My third objection will rest upon 
the latter of these assumptions, but not on the former-
I.Iy third objection to professor l.loore's sort of 
opinion is that we do not find the sort of evidence we 
should expect for the occurrence in the world of a 
non-relational character which is simple in the sense 
in which a determinate shade is simple, and non-composite 
and non-conjunctive, and which is also a non-natural 
ethical character of complex wholes. I have said that I 
do not myself think that it makes sense to ascribe a charac- 
ter of the sort described to a complex whole; but since 
this would not be admitted by everyone it is worth while 
to consider the question without making this assumption. 
I assume that if a word is used to stand for a certain 
non-relational character of the sort described, there 
must be instances of this character. If this is so, and 
if the word good^ stands for such a character, and if, as 
would be generally said, and as professor Moore would say,
a large number of things in the world have that character, 
then we should expect to find fairly complete agreement 
on the question which the things are that have that 
characterj just as it is generally agreed that the sky 
is usually either blue or grey. But there is no sort of 
agreement, either among philosophers or people in general, 
that certain things are good and that certain other things 
are notj on the contrary,disputes about the value of this 
or that kind of thing are constantly occurring. If it were 
possible, as I think it is not, for the word good to stand 
for a non-relational character of the sort described of 
which there are no instances, the answer might be made 
that everyone is always mistaken in all ascriptions of 
goodness, for as it happens nothing is good. Even if 
this answer were admissible, I scarcely think anyone would 
make it. As it is, since people's ascriptions of good- 
ness conflict, we must conclude that either a large number 
of them are mistaken or they are using the word good, not 
to stand for a non-relational character of the sort 
described, but in some such way that their apparently 
conflicting statements are not incompatible. But about 
other non-relational characters of the sort I am consider- 
ing there do not seem to be many mistakes made. The 
comparison is difficult because we do not ordinarily speak
about determinate non-relational characters; but only 
about general characters having a certain sort of connexion 
with them; for example about red or blue, but not about 
determinate shades. But there seems as a rule to be 
agreement that this or that thing has some determinate 
shade falling within a certain range; or, to take tactual 
characters, that this or that thing has s6ffi© determinate 
degree of smoothness or roughness falling within a certain 
range. It is strange if there is one non-relational 
character, or two, if badness is to be treated in the same 
way, about which so little can be ascertained.
I think professor Moore might say that many of the 
disagreements about goodness are due to failures to 
recognise the variety of senses, in which the word good 
is used, and misunderstandings of the way in which one 
is using it one's self. I think this is true. But it 
seems to me that even when we have done all we can to 
remove misunderstanding and to ensure that we are only 
speaking about intrinsic goodness in a particular sense, 
we are almost as likely as ever to disagree about the 
things which are good. Supposing this is so, it does not, 
I think, follow that goodness is not a quality in professor 
Moore's sense; people may, for all we can tell, make 
frequent mistakes about the incidence of some quality.
Nor can I go on to ask what the reasons are for thinking
that a thing has a quality called goodness; according to 
professor Moore's sort of opinion there would be no 
reasons. But I can ask what the reasons are for think- 
ing that there is such a thing as the quality called 
goodness. Supposing a colour-blind person asks me what 
the reasons are for thinking that there is a character, or 
quality in the sense of that word appropriate to general 
characters, called red, since he can discover no uniform 
difference between the things said to be red and the things 
said to be green, I can answer that almost everyone agrees 
in thinking that the red things have a certain common 
character and the green things a certain different common 
character. But supposing I am asked what the reasons are 
for thinking that there is a non-relational character or 
quality called goodness, and what reason there is to 
think there is a uniform difference between the things 
called good and the things called bad, I do not see any 
comparable answer which can be given.
In this chapter I have examined the meaning of state- 
ments of professor Moore to the effect that goodness is 
a quality, and have come to the conclusion that he thought 
goodness a non-relational character which is not composed 
of parts nor a conjunction of several characters, and that 
he probably thought it simple in the sense in which a 
determinate shade is simplej and that he thought that
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goodness belongs to complex wholes. I have argued that 
these statements I have ascribed to him can not all be 
true, on the three grounds that no character of the 
sort described can belong to a complex whole, that the 
word good is never used in an ordinary sense to stand 
for a non-relational character of the sort described, 
and that we do not find the sort of evidence we should 
expect for the existence of such a character as goodness 
would be if professor Moore were right. I may have been 
wrong in saying that professor Moore thought goodness 
simple in the sense in which a determinate shade is 
simplej he may only have thought it simple in some 
other sense, such as that sense, for example, in which 
we can call yellowness simple. If he wanted to call 
goodness simple only in some other sense, I think my 
arguments can be adapted so as not to depend upon the 
sense in which a determinate shade is simple; but the 
exact way in which they would have to be adapted would 
I think depend upon the sort of relation which professor 
Moore thought there was between goodness and things which 
are simple in'this sense. He might think, for example, 
that goodness was related to something determinate in 
the same sort of way in which yellowness, a. general 
chacaeter, is related to determinate shades; this is the
interpretation to which his comparison between goodness 
and yellowness would "be most favourable; but he might 
Wt^m think that some other relation held.
3 NATURALISM.
In this chapter I shall examine some aspects of one 
special sort of definition or explanation of the meanings
of the words good, and right and other expressions of the
Ife
sort we may call ethical expressions, namely that sort
of definition or explanation which would very commonly be 
called naturalistic; I shall first review certain sorts 
of argument against naturalism which I think are often 
considered to disprove any naturalistic theory; next I 
shall state a special sort of naturalistic theory which I 
am inclined to hold, in doing which I shall express a part 
of my opinions about the nature of meaning; and I shall 
conclude by examining and adapting another naturalistic 
theory originated by i.'.r. A. B. Braithwaite. I think 
the words riaturalisgi and naturalistic as i am using them 
have a fairly clear sense in which they are often used, 
but which is not very easy to define. However I shall 
givs a definition of naturalism which is not very precisa 
on clear, but which I think suffices to show what that 
familiar sense is in which I shall speak of naturalism.
It In this chapter and elsewhere I try to use the word 
expression in one sense only, which 1 think it often bears. 
In this sense an expression is a word, or a phrase, or a 
clause, or a sentence.
I shall say that an ethical theory or argument is 
naturalistic if it is asserted in it that some ethical 
expression in one of its ethical uses does not stand for 
any character which can not be mentioned in describing the 
things that happen, or in describing the order of nature; 
or if in it an ethical conclusion is derived solely from 
premisses about things that happen or about the order of 
nature. I -think it will be understood that the expressions 
I call ethical are the words good, value, right, and so on, 
such phrases as worth having for its own sake, and a variety 
of other expressions; and that there is a certain group of 
their uses which can be called their ethical uses, which are 
not exemplified, for instance, by the use of the word good 
in the sentence Mollison has a good prospect of flying the 
Atlanticj and that a conclusion is an ethical conclusion 
if it can be expressed by a sentence in which one of these 
ethical uses of an expression occurs. Criticisms of 
naturalism are one of the chief parts of Prinoipia Ethica, 
on page 10 of which, in the third impression, professor 
Moore said that many philosophers had thought that when 
they named the properties other than goodness belonging to 
all things which are sood ' they were actually defining 
good,' and thought that these properties were 'absolutely 
and entirely the same with goodness'; and he added that 
he proposed to call this opinion the 'naturalistic fallacy.'
This use of the word naturalistic seems to differ 
somewhat from mine, although probably most of the theories 
which I should call naturalistic professor Moore would 
also have called naturalistic; and I am not sure that this 
quotation fairly represents professor Moored use of the 
word, as in chapter II § 26 he gave a different account of 
naturalism, which is possibly incompatible with that which
I have quoted and compatible with my own definition, but
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which I find very obscure.
Theories which are quite clearly naturalistic have 
been put forward by many philosophers, such as Hume, the
(7 Still another definition of naturalism, or at 
least of the naturalistic fallacy, was given by John 
Wisdom in Logical Constructions^I, note 1 on page 213, 
jyLnd April 1931. To put this in ray own words, so 
far as I can, without letters as symbols; someone is 
committing the naturalistic fallacy if he is saying 
that goodness could be an element of an atomic 
fact or contains a part which could be an element 
of an atomic fact, or is saying that goodness is 
something which in fact has one of these characters. 
This is an ingenious definition; if naturalism 
so defined is a fallacy, and if the arguments of 
my second chapter about atomic facts and qualities 
are correct, then goodness can certainly not be a 
quality. I am not sure whether to define naturalism 
in this way comes to the same thing as saying, in my 
own vaguer terms, that a theory is naturalistic if it 
is asserted iw it that goodness is a character which 
can be mentioned in describing the things that 
happen.
hedonistic utilitarians, the evolutionary ethical writers, 
and in modern times professor Westermarck, although few 
of their writings have been free from occasional remarks 
which seem inconsistent with naturalism. But besides 
the naturalism of avowed naturalists we can detect here and 
there naturalistic arguments in the writings of many 
authors who seem to have no intention of expressing a 
naturalistic theory. For example professor J. S. 
Mackenzie in his Manual of ethics, in the introduotion I 
§ 1, said that ' since Ethics is the science of Conduct as 
a whole, and not of any particular kinds of Conduct, it is 
not any of these special ends that it sets itself to 
consider, but the supreme or ultimate end to which our 
whole lives are directed. This end is commonly referred 
to as the Summum Bonum or Supreme Good.* Professor 
Mackenzie's words seem to suggest that if we could discover 
the supreme end, supposing there were such a thing, to 
which our whole lives are as a matter of fact directed, 
it would follow that we had discovered the supreme good 
or the end towards which our lives ought to be directed. 
If this were so, an ethical conclusion would have followed 
solely from premisses about things that happen, and 
professor Mackenzie's theory would be naturalistic in my 
sense, which I feel sure he did not intend. The same
sort of confusion can I think be found in many places in 
the first two books of Aristotle's Ethics, and many 
modern writings. It does not seem worth while to study 
instances of this confusion systematically, but I call 
attention to it to show that some care is needed to 
distinguish between a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic 
theory or argument.
The considerations and arguments which I shall give 
against and for naturalism in this chapter apply equally, 
I think, to all ethical expressions, although the 
particular form in which I give them will sometimes 
depend upon the examples I use. The ethical expressions 
I shall use for examples will generally be the words 
good and goodness, in that use in which they have the same 
sense as intrinsically good and intrinsic goodness. I 
shall state three possible arguments against naturalistic 
theories, each of which seeias to have considerable weight. 
Next I shall try to say why I am, on the whole, inclined 
to believe in naturalism, and I shall express at 
considerable length a special naturalistic theory which 
seems not to be open to two, and perhaps to all three, of 
the objections to naturalism which I shall have given. 
I shall conclude by criticising another naturalistic 
theory, which seems to me incorrect in its original form,
but capable of being adapted in such a way as to supplement 
my own theory.
The first sort of argument against naturalism that I 
want to consider can be brought against any theory which 
contains a suggested analysis or definition of such 
expressions as intrinsically good; but it is specially 
hard to see what answer there can be from a naturalistic
point of view. This sort of argument was used by
is 
professor Moore in Principia Ethioa, and it would be
convenient to give it a name; it might perhaps be called 
the argument from the uniqueness of goodness. The 
argument consists of saying, about any character for 
which it is suggested that the expression intrinsically 
good is used to stand, that it makes sense to say that to 
possess that character, or a thing which possesses that 
character, is good; and that this is so because the word 
good is used to stand for something other than the 
character proposed. For example, if it were suggested 
that the sentence aesthetic enjoyments are good has the 
same meaning as the sentence other things being equal 
I should prefer aesthetic enjoyments to occur rather than 
not, we should reply, using the argument I am speaking of,
On pages 15 and 16 of the thirdjimpression.
that it makes sense to say that o. preference for the 
occurrence rather than the non-occurrence of aesthetic 
enjoyments is good. It is very hard to think that to 
say this is simply to say that someone prefers the 
occurrence to the non-occurrence of a preference for 
aesthetic enjoyments. The definition of goodness which 
I have used in my illustration is not specially plausible; 
but about any suggested naturalistic definition a 
corresponding argument can be used, and it seems to ma 
that in every case it is very hard not to think that the 
word good is being used in a different sense from that 
which it would be given by the proposed definition. The 
same sort of objection oan of course be made, not merely 
to any naturalistic theory which gives a definition of 
goodness, but to any theory at all which gives a 
definition; and this objection was in fact used by 
professor Moore to show that goodness is indefinable. 
But the objection seems much less convincing against a 
non-natural*!stic than against a naturalistic definition. 
Suppose it were suggested that to say that something is 
good is to say that other things being equal it would 
be right to bring it into existence if possible, we 
could ask whether what it is right to bring into existence 
is °-ood. This question appears to make sense, but it
seems to me far from clear that to ask it is not simply to 
ask whether it is right to bring into existence what it is 
right to bring into existence; that is, it does not seem 
to me clear that an affirmative answer does not merely 
make sense by being a tautology. So I am inclined to say 
that the sort of argument I am considering is much stronger 
against naturalistic than against non-naturalistic theories. 
But I think the examples I have given serve to show the 
special way in which questions about the meaning of such 
words as good are puzzling. To me the argument from 
the uniqueness of goodness seems convincing - I do not say 
that it seems conclusive - against naturalistic theories, 
but much less convincing against those that are not 
naturalistic ; yet it is very hard to say what sort of 
test can be given to decide whether in a given sentence the 
word good is being used in such a way as to make a 
tautology or in such a way as to make a synthetic statement. 
The second sort of argument I shall consider is one
'^ Since what we now call a tautology seems to be the 
same as what used to be called an analytic proposition, 
we may as well call sentences that make sense and are 
not tautologies synthetic. A sentence expresses a 
synthetic statement or proposition if it and its 
contradictory make sense.
which can be used against any naturalistic theory giving 
a definition of such an expression as intrinsically good,
as well as against some proposed accounts of the things
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which are intrinsically good. For any naturalistic
definition of goodness, we can imagine two situations 
one of which exemplifies the character for which according 
to the definition the word good stands in a much higher 
degree or to a much greater extent than the other, but 
about which those who use this argument would suggest that 
the situation which would be the worse of the two according 
to the proposed definition is evidently the better. This 
may be called the argument from comparison. The example 
to be chosen depends on the particular definition which is 
to be criticised. Suppose it is suggested that to say 
that something is good in a certain sense of the word good
~*
is to say that either it is a state of happiness or it is 
a whole in which there are enough states of happiness to 
allow us to say that the person or people involved in the 
whole are happy on the whole; and that other ethical uses 
of the word good can be defined in terms of this use. If
2O An argument of this sort with the latter aim seems to 
be used in the third chapter of Principia Ethica, on 
page 89, and to be implicit in various parts of the 
chapter; but it is not elaborated.
we are to advance the sort of argument I ara describing, 
we shall imagine a state of affairs in a particular 
society in which most people are generally happy, but 
are also as a rule stupid, selfish, bad mannered, and 
vulgar in their tastes, and on thefother hand we shall 
imagine a state of affairs in which most people are rarely 
happy, but are on the whole intelligent, generous, polite, 
and sensitive } and we shall suggest that if either of these 
states of afrairs would be good the latter would be rather 
than the former, and that in any case the latter would 
certainly be better than the former, that is to say either 
its degree of goodness would be greater or its degree of 
badness less than that of the former. And it does seem 
as though for any proposed naturalistic definition of 
intrinsic goodness some case can be imagined in which a 
state of affairs answering to the proposed definition would 
not be good, or would be less good than a state of affairs 
not answering to the definition, even if the particular 
case I have suggested is not convincing. This sort of 
argument would show conclusively that a particular 
naturalistic theory was false, provided it were clear that 
the sense of the word good which the theory was supposed 
to define was the same as the sense in which it was 
proposed to show that something answering to the definition
given by the theory was not good; similarly the first 
sort of argument I described would show conclusively that 
a particular theory was false, provided it were clear that 
the sense of the word good in which it was proposed to show 
that it made sense, and made a synthetic statement, to say 
that something answering to the definition was or was not 
good was the same as the sense which the theory was 
supposed to define.
The third sort of argument against naturalism that I 
want to consider is much harder than the other two to put 
in a clear and convincing form, yet it is one which I 
think for some people decides the question against 
naturalism. I can only express this argument, or this 
consideration, in a very vague way. Suppose any 
definition or explanation of the meaning of the phrase 
intrinsic goodness, or some such ethical expression, is 
offered, which is naturalistic in the sense I ha,ve defined; 
then those who are convinced by the sort of consideration 
I want to express will say something like this; it seems 
to me as though, or I feel as though the world is 
incomplete or as though some familiar element of the world 
has been left out, unless something is good in some other 
sense than that which has been suggested. The answer 
can be made that things are undoubtedly good in a number 
of other sense^ since the word good has a great variety
of uses. But this answer does not suffice to refute the 
objection I am considering; for provided the theory that 
is being objected to is naturalistic throughout, the same 
sort of objection will be made to the explanation it 
gives of any use of the word good; and those who take the 
line of my third argument will finally say something like 
this: I feel as though some things are good in some sense 
other than any you have suggested. As I have put it, 
this argument seems exceedingly weakj it seems to come 
to the same thing as saying that there is a non- 
naturalistic sense of the word good which is familiar 
to most people, or in which the word stands for something 
familiar to most people ; and this is not so much an 
argument for anything, as the very thing that has to be 
proved. Yet it seems to be worth stating, because many 
people seem to be convinced by arguments of this sort, 
and I find myself not entirely unaffected by them. 
Unfortunately I can think of no clearer way of expressing 
it, though I can think of ways which would be more obscure 
or confused. I think one confusion that is very 
commonly made by people who are convinced by the sort 
of consideration I am describing is thisj it is often 
supposed, I think, that a naturalistic theory says that 
there is no such thing as goodness, when really it says
that there is such a thing and that goodness is to be 
defined in a certain way; and it is often supposed that 
a naturalistic theory can properly be answered by saying 
it seems to me clear that there is such a thing as 
goodness, although this statement is quite consistent 
with the theory in question. If it is proposed to define 
goodness in a naturalistic way, then supposing for 
example someone holds a non-naturalistic theory of 
professor Moore's type, considering that goodness is a 
quality, to refute the naturalistic theory he must show, 
not that there is such a thing as goodness, but that 
there is such a thing as goodness which does not answer to 
the naturalistic definition. It seems to me that the 
only possible tests of the soundness of this third sort 
of argument are reflective or imaginative, such as each 
person has to construct for himself; we have to ask 
ourselves what difference it would make to the world if 
there were no such thing as goodness in any sense which 
can not be defined in a naturalistic way. If we 
conclude that it would make no difference, we shall be 
satisfied that some naturalistic theory is true. But 
if we conclude that it would make a difference of a 
certain sort, the sort of difference which we find would 
be made will show us how the use of the word good is to
be defined or explained in a non-naturalistic way.
I find it muoh easier to state arguments against 
naturalism than to give the reasons which lead me on the 
whole to favour naturalism. I am far from feeling certain 
that some naturalistic theory is true, I am not sure that 
I can give the reasons which actually lead me to think 
that this is probably so, and I am afraid that such 
reasons as I can give may seem to be merely prejudices.
I shall begin my general defence of naturalism by 
stating, as shortly and clearly as I can, the belief I am 
strongly inclined to hold, the prejudice as it may be 
called, which leads me, and I think leads other people, 
to look for a naturalistic explanation of the meaning of 
ethical words. I shall go on to express certain 
considerations which do not, I think, amount to anything 
like a proof of naturalism, but which seem to show that 
a much simpler and easier answer to ethical questions can 
be p;iven in a naturalistic way than in any other. But 
since we have no general ground for expecting the answers 
to questions to be simple and easy, I am doubtful whether 
this is worth showing as an argument for naturalism.
The belief I have mentioned is, I think, a belief 
that everything in the world can be described or explained 
in a certain way; namely in the course of describing the
things that happen or the order of nature. I am using 
now the terms which I used in my definition of naturalism, 
and it seems as though the belief I am describing comes to 
the same thing as a belief that everything can be 
explained in a naturalistic way; so that a statement of 
this belief is unfortunately a poor argument for 
naturalism in any particular subject. But I think a 
belief of this sort, or a tendency to have such a belief, 
whether or not well founded, is very common, and is 
expressed in a number of different ways besides that 
which I have used. For example one sort of remark that 
is very commonly made is that everything in the World can 
be explained in a scientific way, and another is that 
there is nothing which is not a part of nature. Remarks 
like these seem to express beliefs resembling that which 
I have said that I am inclined to have. I am not sure 
what reasons can be given in favour of beliefs like these. 
One way in which they are commonly defended is by giving 
in terms of them causal accounts of how contrary beliefs 
may have come into existence. It does not seem as though
as a rule a belief is proved false if it is shown that it
it
wais caused in this or that way. But I am not sure that
a( Although the causes of a belief and its truth are, I 
think, rarely unconnected. If a true belief is not held 
as a result of a mistake, it is well founded; and some of 
the happenings which are causes of its being held will as 
a rule also be reasons for holding it.
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any better reasons can be given in favour of general 
beliefs of the naturalistic sort.
In putting forward the following considerations, as 
showing that a simple and easy naturalistic answer can be 
given to ethical questions, I think J shall very likely 
be touching problems which can not be properly solved by 
philosophical methods, but onJy by experimental psychojo- 
gists. None the less it may be worth while to express 
a problem that seems to require solution, even if it 
cannot yet be solved. The proper solution of the sort 
of problems which arise from what I have to say seems to 
me to depend upon the solving of various questions about 
what is meant by the word meaning in some of its uses 
and also perhaps upon the solving of certain problems, 
which I take to be psychological rather than philosophical, 
about the way in which people learn or understand a 
language. It will not be disputed that every normal 
human being, as he rrrows up, becomes aware of more and 
more features or elements of the world, and at the same 
time becomes acquainted with more and more parts or 
aspects of one or more languages. The process of 
becoming acquainted with a language consists of hearing 
or seeing words and combinations of words, learning in a 
certain sense how the words and their combinations are
correlated with elements of the world which users of the 
words want to bring to the notice of their hearers or 
readers, and learning to use and combine the words, 
making use of the accepted correlations, so as to bring 
some element of the world to the notice of a hearer or
2=k
reader. This account of the process of becoming 
acquainted with a language is both obscure and vague; 
the way in which I have used the word learn is obscure, 
and the way in which I have used expressions about 
bringing elements of the world to someone's notice is 
vague. The obscurity I think I can lessen a little, but 
I do not know how to say exactly what it is that anyone 
is doing who uses a combination of words in a particular 
sense; if I could do this I think I should have solved 
one of the chief questions about meaning. To learn how 
combinations of words are correlated with elements of the 
world which their user wants to bring to someone's notice, 
in the sense in which I have spoken of learning this, is
2.2 This expression about bringing an element of the 
world to someone's notice is intentionally as vague as 
possible. It disregards the difference between the way 
in which a sentence works and the way in which a word 
works. I wish I knew how to analyse this difference, 
but as I do not, I have avoided the difficulty at 
this point. A very conjectural analysis of some 
aspects of the meaning of words and sentences is given 
later in this chapter.
Kto form a habit of responding or reacting, or a 
disposition to respond to the use of these combinations 
in the way which I can only call, for want of more 
precise knowledge, appropriate to the elements of the 
world with which the combinations are correlated2.3 And 
to use and combine words, according to the accepted 
correlations, so as to bring some element of the world to 
someone's notice, is to form a habit of using, or a 
disposition to use, to bring elements of the world to 
someone's notice, those combinations to which the habit has 
been formed of making a response appropriate to the 
required elements. This account of learning a language 
could perhaps be expressed in terms of behaviour psychology. 
There is one point about which I was forced to be 
inaccurate in what I have said so far, in order to avoid 
excessive complication. I spoke of making a response 
appropriate to the elements of the world with which a 
combination of words is correlated; but as a matter of 
fact it is not quite accurate to speak of elements of 
the world being correlated with combinations of words, or 
at any rate not accurate to speak as though they have 
accepted correlations. The correlations which actually
23'The silent adjustments to understand colloquial 
language are enormously complicated,' L. Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus 4.002.
oocur link elements of the world, not with combinations of 
words, but with particular words and schemes or construct- 
ions by means of which they can be combined; we might 
call these schemes rules of combination, but they are rules 
that are usually observed unconsciously. I wish it were 
possible to avoid mentioning schemes or rules, as they are 
of a different logical type from words, whereas combin- 
ations of words are either of the same or of a closely 
connected logical type. But we may perhaps say that the 
rules or schemes of combination are logical constructions 
from the combinations which have actually been used. 
The rules or schemes prevailing in modern European 
languages are very complex; the significance of a 
particular construction depends not only upon the sorts 
of words, the parts of speech for example, which make up 
the combination called a sentence, but upon the particular 
words. Compare the king is dead and the day is cloudy. 
I have explained at some length the sort of account 
I should give of the process of becoming acquainted with 
a language. It seems to me that most people go through 
the process sufficiently far to be able to use their 
native languages quite adequately for ordinary purposes, 
but are much less able to see what the correlations are, 
with which they are as a matter of fact conforming, 
between elements of the world and words. The erratic
way in which the elements of the world are correlated with 
words and their schemes of combination seems to be one of 
the chief sources of philosophical problems. As a result 
of these erratic correlations people sometimes, when they 
are making abstract or complicated statements, use 
combinations of words which are not part of any accepted 
scheme. There seem to be several ways in which this can 
happen. A clear account of what meaning is would say 
exactly how these ways differ; I think it suffices for me 
to point out that there are different ways. Sometimes 
people use combinations of words which are not part of an 
accepted scheme in such a way as to produce what would 
usually be called contradictions, and sometimes in such a 
way as to produce what would usually be called nonsense. 
It seems that sometimes people also use novel combinations 
which are neither contradictory nor nonsensical, and are 
making innovations as a result of which a new scheme of 
combination is added to the language they are using.
So far I have only spoken of combinations of words 
as instruments which either are significant, that is to 
say communicate beliefs or statements, or are intended to 
be significant, but are not so because they do not follow 
an accepted scheme of combination. But it is pretty clear 
that people use combinations of words not only for the sake
of making statements, but from various other motives. The 
motives for using words on any occasion are probably as a 
rule, and chiefly, desires to produce certain effects in 
some person or people who hear or read the words. 
Probably the effect which is most commonly desired is that 
the hearer or reader shall become aware of the statement 
which is being made, or in other words shall understand the 
sentence which is being used, or make the response 
appropriate to certain elements of the world; perhaps I 
should say the joint effect consisting of understanding and 
belief. That is, the desire to communicate is probably 
the commonest, though not the sole motive. But other 
effects are also often sought, and among those which are 
perhaps, after understanding, most commonly sought are that 
the hearer or reader shall act or feel in a particular way.
Ik The distinction between the wish to make a statement 
and other motives resembles the distinction drawn by 
C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in the meaning of meaning 
between the referential and the emotive use of words. 
The distinction is first introduced on page 10, in the 
third edition, and use is made of it in many places. 
But Messrs. Ogden and Richards often write as though 
words spoken on a particular occasion exemplified one 
use or the other, but not both. It seems to me 
that most sentences are used from several kinds of 
motive. The general account of meaning which I 
suggest in this chapter differs a good deal, 
I think, from that given by Messrs. Ogden and 
Richards.
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It is obvious that both these objects are sought by a man 
who makes a political speech or delivers a warning. It is 
also pretty clear that some words and expressions are 
particularly likely to lead to actions or feelings on the 
part of the hearer or reader; for example, patriot, noble, 
selfish, inhuman, coward, loyalty, whitepnan, honour, and 
coxantless others. It seems to me that most ethical words 
are in this class; right, good, ought, duty, and so on, 
though not optimifio or deontological. I am not called 
upon to say what the causes are of this or that word being 
a specially effective stimulus to action or feeling; all 
I require is agreement that there are words which are 
specially effective in this way.
It is fairly familiar that the same statement can 
often be made in several different ways, that is,several 
sentences can be found with the same meaning, and that 
sometimes one sentence is much more likely than another 
which has the same meaning to lead to actions or feelings 
on the part of the hearer or reader- If a man has to 
choose between sentences some of which are more likely 
than others to stimulate actions or feelings, and chooses 
one of those that are more likely, the cause of his 
choosing this rather than some other sentence is probably 
that he desires the occurrence of some kind of action or 
feeling on the part of the hearer or reader. It seems to
me that most people are not as a rule aware that they are 
choosing the words they use from other motives than the 
desire to make a particular statement, and that if there are 
any expressions or uses of expressions which commonly occur 
in sentences without having an accepted correlation with 
elements of the world, most people are not as a rule aware 
of the difference between the use of these expressions and 
of others. But that there are expressions or uses of 
expressions which commonly occur in sentences without having 
an accepted correlation with elements of the world is not 
at all a general belief. None the less I think it not im- 
probable that there are such expressions or uses, and if 
there are, a very easy naturalistic explanation of the use 
of ethical expressions is possible.
This explanation would be something like what follows. 
An expression or use of an expression has an accepted mean- 
ing if those who use it have the habit of responding, when 
they hear or read it, in a way appropriate to some element 
of the world, or a habit of so responding to its occurrence 
in some accepted scheme of combination. The distinction 
between expressions which have and expressions which lack 
accepted meanings is not entirely definite; some meanings 
are more fixed than others, and the more fixed are those 
for which there are fewer failures to make the appropriate 
response. As a rule a speaker or writer chooses a word, 
if it is a word for which he might find alternatives,
either as a result of its meaning being more fixed than that of 
the alternatives, or as a result of the assumed greater probab- 
ility of its leading to a desired action or feeling on the part 
of the hearer or reader. Sometimes an expression has no 
accepted meaning at all, but is specially likely to give some 
sort of stimulus to action or feeling; and the motives which 
lead people to choose such expressions are usually desires for 
the occurrence of an action or feeling on someone's part. Most 
people are not aware that some expressions have no accepted 
meanings, and suppose that they are doing the same sort of thing 
in using such expressions as in using expressions with accepted 
meanings from a desire to produce understanding. It is the 
easier for them to make this mistake, because as a rule a 
sentence in which an expression with 110 accepted meaning occurs 
has some meaning, to which the expression in question does not 
contribute. The word good, about which there is so much 
discussion, is in certain of its uses a word with no accepted 
meaning, but it is a word which is constantly used because it 
is specially likely to lead to actions or feelings on the part 
of the hearer or reader. Consequently such a sentence as 
to lower the rate of income tax would be a good thing, if it 
exemplifies one of the uses of the word good which have no 
accepted meaning, has no meaning as a whole, because not all 
the words in it are capable of contributing to its meaning; but 
it has some meaning, namely that income tax is in force.
But the sentence evidently has not the same meaning 
as the sentence income tax is in force, for in that 
case, that income tax is in force would be the meaning 
of the sentence as a whole. Since sentences containing 
expressions with no accepted meaning have as a rule a 
meaning in this limited way, it has been harder than it 
would have been otherwise for people to see that there 
are some words and other expressions which are in a 
certain sense meaningless.
If it is admitted that there are expressions which, 
in the sense I have tried to explain, have no accepted 
meanings, then I think that the account I have just given 
of the use of ethical words may well be true. Host ethical 
expressions clearly fall within the class I have already 
spoken of which consists of expressions that are specially 
likely to lead to some action or feeling on the part of 
the hearer or reader. The expressions in this class seem 
to have another common character, namely that their mean- 
ings are much harder than those of others to define or 
explain. There is no definite line between the expressions 
that are specially effective and othersj they differ 
in degree of effectiveness. Similarly the difference 
in difficulty or ease of definition or explanation is 
one of degree, and the degree of this difficulty seems
to correspond approximately to the degree of an ex- 
pressionV:?' effectiveness. It is natural to conjecture 
that some or all of these expressions are harder to 
explain and more effective stimuli to action or feeling 
the more they depart from having an accepted meaning. 
So if it is admitted that there are expressions with no 
accepted meanings, a fairly convincing argument can be 
used to show that most or all ethical expressions are of 
this sort, so that ethical naturalism is probably or 
certainly true. Whether such an argument really can 
give a proof of naturalism I do not feel sure, and I can 
see various difficulties which would still have to be 
solved.
There are two sorts of difficulty,Larising from 
the sort of naturalistic argument I have stated, which 
impress me most strongly. One of these difficulties is 
that we can apparently distinguish between different senses 
or uses of expressions which, according to my argument, 
have no accepted meanings, and can to some extent define 
them or explain their use or meaning; the other is that 
there are certain ethical expressions which do not seem 
to be nearly so likely as the majority consisting of the 
more familiar expressions to lead to some action or 
feeling on the part of the hearer or reader; these less 
effective expressions are mostly expressions which have
been invented by philosophers for technical purposes. 
I propose to consider these difficulties in the order in 
which I have stated them.
We often speak, and I have spoken in this essay, 
about different senses or uses of this or that ethical 
expressionj for example, I have had occasion to write 
about that use of the word good in which it has the same 
sense in which the phrase intr insi cally goqd_ is used.} I 
have also distinguished above between uses of the word 
good which have no accepted meaning and uses which have. 
I do not think the latter distinction involves a special 
problem} we are faced|with a problem when we try to see 
what is meant by saying that a certain word is used in 
one sense on one occasion and in another sense on another, 
and when we try to see exactly what is meant by saying 
that a word in a certain use has no accepted meaning, 
or that a certain meaningless use is the same as or 
different from a certain other, but I do not think there 
is a third problem about the difference between signifi- 
cant and meaningless uses.
When we distinguish between different uses or senses 
of ordinary words with accepted meanings, what sort of 
distinction we are making is up to a point fairly clear. 
We are saying that in some sentences in which a certain 
word occurs the adjoining words, or the context of the
sentence, or the voice of the speaker, or something of 
that sort, indicate that the word is being used with a 
different accepted meaning from that which similar indica- 
tions show that it has in some other sentences. So it is 
pretty clear that if there are expressions or uses of ex- 
pressions without accepted meanings, either we must be 
mistaken in supposing there are ever different meaningless 
uses or senses of one expression, or the meaningless uses 
or senses of an expression must differ from one another in 
quite a different sense from that in which the ordinary 
uses or senses of expressions differ.
I stated as a second part of my first difficulty that 
we can to some extent define meaningless uses of expressions 
or explain such uses or their meanings; this point is, I 
think, closely, connected with that which I have just stated. 
If I may assume that there is a clear distinction between 
ethical and non-ethical expressions, I may say that ethical 
expressions can be defined either by means of each other, 
or by means of non-ethical expressions; a definition will 
be by means of ethical expressions, or in ethical terms, if 
it contains at least one ethical expression; otherwise it 
will be by means of non-ethical expressions, or in non- 
ethical terms. Both kinds of definition have been given 
by philosophers. Any theory which includes definitions
of all ethical expressions in non-ethical terms will of 
course be naturalistic. It seems to me that all non- 
ethical definitions of ethical expressions have always 
aroused controversy, have not bee-n at all widely accepted, 
and have been far from plausible, even if they have not 
actually been the result of mistakes} whereas some de-t- 
finitions of ethical expressions in ethical terms would be 
questioned by scarcely anyone, and about many others it 
seems very hard to be sure that they are wrong, even if 
they have not been generally accepted. For example, 
probably almost everyone would admit that to speak of 
someone's duty, in certain senses or uses of the word 
duty, has the same meaning as to speak of what he ought to 
do, and in certain senses or uses, the same perhaps, has 
the same meaning as to speak of what it is right for him 
to do. Professor Moore argued in Principia Ethica that
0-5T
rightness can be defined in terms of goodness. That
* 
this is so is not generally admitted, it is denied for
26
example, by :_"r. V/.D. Ross in the Right and the Good. 
But it is very hard to see for certain that professor Iloore's 
opinion is false, and it cannot be disproved by the sort 
of tests which, I have suggested, seem to disprove
On pages 14-6-7 of the third impression. 
On pages 8-11 and elsewhere.
naturalistic definitions of ethical expressions. So it 
seems as though in some sort of way ethical expressions 
make a closed system, and stand in quite a different 
relation to each other from that in which they stand to 
other expressionsj as though their uses or meanings are 
inter connected in a way in which they are not connected 
with the uses or meanings of other expressions. If we 
think, as I have just been supposing, that most or all 
ethical expressions have no accepted meanings, although 
most people make the mistake of thinking they have the same 
sort of meanings as ordinary expressions, we shall not be 
surprised to find the uses or apparent meanings of ethical 
expressions isolated in this way. VJe shall naturally expect 
that if ethical expressions seem to be capable of defini- 
tion, they will seem to be definable by means of each 
other rather than by means of expressions with accepted 
meanings. That the uses or meanings of ethical expressions 
seem to be closed or isolated in this way is entirely 
compatible with the sort of naturalism I am suggesting, 
but it is also compatible with most or all non-naturalistic 
theories. For according to those theories ethical expres- 
sions will have accepted meanings, and meanings of a 
special sort which could only be defined in ethical terms. 
It seems, then, as though we can distinguish between 
different uses or senses of expressions which have no
accepted meaning, and can say that in a certain meaning- 
less use such an expression is used in the same sense as a 
certain other; and can thus define such expressions in 
terms of each other, though not in terms of significant 
expressions. If we -accept the conclusion, which is I 
think surprising, "but which is part of my account of 
having an accepted meaning, that expressions differ in the 
degree in which they have an accepted meaning, then I think 
we can explain on the same lines the apparent differences 
of use or sense among meaningless expressions, or the 
possession of different meaningless uses, and the apparent 
identity of sense between different meaningless expressions 
or uses. Suppose any expression, significant or not, 
leads on some occasion to some action or feeling on the 
part of the hearer or reader, or in fact any response on 
his part other than understanding of a statement, I shall 
call for the sake of convenience this result which is 
produced the efficacy which the expression has on that 
occasion. Then if the meaningless use of an expression 
has on nearly all occasions efficacies closely resembling 
one another, the expression has only one meaningless use. 
But if the meaningless use of an expression has very 
diverse efficacies on different occasions, the expression 
has as many meaningless uses as there are sets of efficacies
whose members closely resemble one another. A meaning- 
less use of one expression has the same sense as a 
meaningless use of another expression if most members of 
the set of efficacies which constitute one use closely 
resemble most members of the set constituting the other 
use. Supposing these definitions are approximately right, 
and supposing ethical uses of expressions really are 
meaningless uses, then a fairly adequate naturalistic 
account of them has been given, even if it is harder to 
see in exactly what sense meaningless uses can be defined 
by means of each other- Y7e may perhaps say that one of 
these uses gives the definition of another if they have 
the same sense, in the sense that has been defined, and 
if the defining expression has more parts than the defined 
expression has each of which has a meaningless use of its 
own, that is each of which has a set of efficacies closely 
resembling one another.
There remains one subsidiary obscurity which I 
should like to clear up before considering my second 
difficulty; in what sense can one speak, as I have 
above, of these definitions about meaningless uses as 
right or correct? As a rule, I think that to say a 
definition is right is to say that the expression or 
use of an expression which is supposed to be defined 
actually is commonly used in the sense in which the
definition states that it is used. But my definitions 
appear to define not only uses of my own phrase meaningless 
use, but also some quite familiar expressions; for 
example I profess to say in what sense a meaningless 
use of one expression has the same sense as a meaningless 
use of another. It seems to me very unlikely that people 
commonly speak of expressions having the same sense in 
the sense given "by my definition. I think they make the 
mistake of supposing that meaningless uses are significant 
uses, they perceive the relations on account of which I 
should say that meaningless uses have the same sense in 
the special sense appropriate to them, and they mistake 
these relations for those on account of which we say that 
significant uses have the same sense, in the ordinary 
sense. So I think people would as a rule mistakenly 
ascribe identity of sense in the ordinary sense to 
meaningless uses. Then my definitions are not correct 
in the ordinary sense, for they are not correct interpre- 
tations of ordinary usage. They are correct in this 
special sense, which I think we have to aim at, in
subjects about which mistakes are widespread, that it
(^tYoA^Uc^y
is -ttttnranB* to ascribe identity of sense in the ordinary
sense to meaningless uses, that none the less there is a 
certain relation which holds between all or a great 
majority of the pairs of meaningless uses to which
identity of sense would commonly be ascribed, and that 
there is a certain formal analogy between the sets of 
things in which this relation is found and the sets of 
things in which identity of sense in the ordinary sense 
is found. A similar explanation would be given about 
all my definitions.
The second of the difficulties, arising from the 
sort of naturalistic argument I have suggested, which I 
proposed to consider, was that that there are certain 
ethiaal expressions which do not seem to be nearly so 
likely as the majority to lead to some action or feeling 
on the part of the hearer or reader. A very good example 
of this class of ethical expressions is given by the 
word optimific, which was used, I do not know whether 
for the first time, by Mr. W. D. Ross in The Right^ and 
the Good. On page 34 he defined the word by implication 
as having the same sense as the expression productive of 
the best possible consequences^ The word optimific is 
evidently not a familiar word, but must have been invented 
by some philosopher to have the sense I have just given, 
or something like it; whereas the defining phrase con- 
tains the familiar ethical word best, and will therefore, 
according to the sort of theory I am proposing, be a 
phrase with a meaningless use. But it seems as though 
there is not very much likelihood of the use of the
word optimific leading to actions or feelings on the 
part of the hearer or reader, or at any rate not much 
likelihood of its having sets of efficacies whose members 
closely resemble one another. So it seems as though it 
must be false to say that the word optimific has the same 
sense as the defining phrase, in the special sense appro- 
priate to meaningless uses, and as though some special 
explanation of the way in which such a word is used is 
needed.
I think all- ethical expressions belong to one or 
the other of the two classes exemplified by this word 
and the expression used to define it; that is, I think 
all are either familiar ethical expressions about which 
my theory that their ethical uses are meaningless is 
comparatively plausible, or expressions which have been 
invented by philosophers for technical purposes, and used 
chiefly by them, and defined by them by means of familiar 
ethical expressions. For all I know, there may be 
expressions which have begun as members of the second 
class and pressed into familiar use5 but these will now 
simply either be members of the first class, or have 
acquired a non-ethical sense, so that they will not 
concern me now. So having accounted for familiar 
ethical expressions, to complete my theory I only have 
to account for those of which the word optimific is a
representative, which we may call technical ethical 
expressions. I think there are two ways at least 
in which I could take account of the technical ex- 
pressions, and I shall state first that which seems to me 
less probable. If my theory is admitted to be true as 
far as it is about familiar expressions, I think it is 
not worth while to consider the possibility that none 
the less a non-naturalistic account of the technical 
expressions is true.
The first possible account of these expressions, 
and that which on the whole I should reject, is that 
unlike the other expressions they are significant, and 
have meanings which can be defined not only by means of 
the expressions which would usually be said to define 
them, but also in terms of or in reference to those ex- 
pressions. It may be, for instance, that the word 
optimific is used in the same sense, in the ordinary sense 
appropriate to significant uses, in which one would use 
the expression having the character for which the phrase 
productive of the best possible consequences would be used 
to stand. This is a perfectly intelligible account of the 
word's use, and the defining phrase is certainly signifi- 
cant, although according to my theory there is no character 
for which the phrase productive of the best possible 
consequences would be used to stand, and so nothing ever
would be optimific; it is not only possible but pro- 
bable that philosophers have thought there was such a 
character. But for technical ethical expressions to 
have meanings of the sort I have described would be 
imcompatible with the sort of definition of them that 
would always be given. For an expression is never defined 
as having the same sense as an expression like h.aving 
the character a certain phrase would be used to stand 
for, but simply as having the same sense as whatever 
phrase could have been used in a larger expression of 
this sort. If a definition were of the sort I have 
suggested, then whenever a defined expression was used 
something would be said by the sentence containing it 
about part of the defining expression, for example about 
the phrase productive of the best possible consequences. 
But obviously sentences containing defined expressions 
never, or hardly ever, are about part of the defining 
expression, but only about whatever the defining expres- 
sion is used to stand for.
I am inclined to think the second of the possible 
accounts of these technical expressions which I can 
discover is approximately right. It seems to me that, 
although one might naturally think otherwise, technical 
ethical expressions are expressions with meaningless uses, 
and have sets of efficacies whose members closely resemble
one another, and closely resemble most members of a 
set of efficacies which constitutes some use of the 
defining expressions; that is, in the appropriate 
sense these expressions have the same sense as some use 
of their defining expression. But these technical 
ethical expressions are only used within small circles 
of people, and rarely among them. If one of them were 
used among people who had not heard the definition, or 
not accustomed to the use of definitions, its efficacy, 
if any, would probably not much resemble those which it 
ordinarily had among people familiar with it; this of 
course would not give the expression a meaning. On the 
other hand if the expression passed into ordinary use, and 
its definition were fairly widely known, it would simply 
become a familiar ethical expression. I am inclined to 
think that, within these small circles of people in 
which they are used, technical ethical expressions have 
meaningless uses entirely comparable to the meaningless 
uses of familiar expressions.
The sort of naturalistic theory I have suggested, 
based on a particular view of the meaning of expressions, 
has a considerable advantage over most naturalistic 
theories. No arguments against naturalism of the first 
and second sort that I suggested seem to have any tendency
to disprove it. Some argument of the third sort might 
perhaps be used against the theory, but as I have said 
it is doubtful whether the third sort of argument amounts 
to more than a particular way of expressing disbelief in 
naturalism. The theory has the further advantage, as 
I have said above, that it is possible to say in terms 
of it how contrary opinions may have arisen. I shall 
only give a very short account of the way in which 
according to this theory contrary opinions may have 
arisen, both because to say what the causes are of some- 
one holding a belief contrary to one's own is not a way 
of disproving what he believes, and because questions 
about the causes of errors are not philosophical questions, 
but more probably psychological, except perhaps for those 
who hold beliefs which make error seem improbable or 
impossible.
I think one would explain the origin of contrary 
opinions in terms of my theory in this sort of way. 
What meaning is, in any of the senses with which philoso- 
phers are concerned, is not at all generally understood. 
Thus no one, or scarcely anyone, has seen that there are 
some expressions which have no meaning in the sense in 
which we most commonly say that expressions have, and 
in which most, but not all, expressions undeniably have
meanings. It has been supposed that all expressions in
ordinary language have meanings in exactly the same 
sense, and a sense in which as it happens ethical 
expressions have none. Since it has been possible to 
elucidate the meaning of expressions of a variety of 
other kinds by analysis and definition, it has been 
supposed that all expressions, including ethical expressions, 
can be treated in the same way. So almost all previous 
ethical theories have been formed, based on the false 
belief that certain uses of expressions had meanings in 
a particular sense in which they had none. But the fact 
that these uses of expressions are, as it happens, meaning- 
less has shown itself in the impossibility of arriving at 
any certainty that the proper analysis or explanation of 
the meaning of one of these expressions has been found, 
except when it has seemed possible to define them in terms 
of each other, as a result of similarities between their 
efficacies, and in the impossibility of finding any test 
to decide whether a proposed definition or explanation is 
correct.
I believe that when a theory such as that which I 
have suggested is true, one is not as a rule convinced 
of its truth by arguments from which it seems as though 
it can be deduced, but rather by reflexion on the theory 
itself, as a result of which one sees more and more clearly
that the problems which previously existed have ceased
il
to be problems. It does not seem to me clear that
as a result of my naturalistic theory of ethics the 
problems it is concerned with are solved; but I doubt 
whether this would in any case seem clear, even if the 
theory were true so far as it goes, as long as what 
meaning is, in various senses of the word meaning, 
remains undecided. Such remarks as I have made on 
that subject leave it, I fear, not much less obscure 
than it was before; though if what I have said about 
various aspects of learning and understanding a language 
is true, it improves our insight into the question 
slightly by showing which of the elements involved need 
our attention if we are to make a thorough analysis. 
I should not be surprised if some theory like that which 
I have suggested were true; I can see no strong objection 
to it, as I can to every other theory on the same subject 
that I am familiar with. But I am by no means fully con- 
vinced of the truth of my sort of theory.
I propose now to say something about an ethical 
theory suggested by Mr. R. B. Braithwaite in a paper 
called Verbal ambiguity and philosophical analysis,
27 F.P. Ramsfty seems to have thought something of this 
sort. See pages 263-9 of the foundations of mathe- 
matics.
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published in Proc. Arist. Soo. 1927-8. Mr. Braithwaite*e 
theory was not entirely unlike my ownj on page 137 of 
his paper he said 'a great number of the sentences in 
which the word "good" occurs are merely noises made 
either to "purge" an emotion in the speaker or to produce 
directly a definite action or emotion in the hearer. 1 
Evidently in part of this sentence he was saying something 
about some ethical expressions not unlike what I liave
19
suggested about all. But the part of his theory I want 
to consider is his opinion about those ethical expressions 
which he thought were not mere noises, but had meanings. 
What he said about these other expressions was directed 
against professor Moore's opinion that intrinsic goodness 
is a quality. His theory was to the effect that the 
word good is commonly used in a great many more senses 
than are commonly distinguished. Many people have seen 
that the word good is used in a great variety of senses, 
for example that it can have the same sense as intrinsi- 
cally good, or morally good, o^good as a means. But Mr. 
Braithwaite thought that the variety was much vri-der than
I have examined this theory much more fully in an 
essay entitled Ethical words and Ethical facts, 
^^gtfS^ifaitfft^ii Mind ^ October 1953. "l am more 
inclined to favour Mr. Braithwaite's theory than I 
was when I wrote that essay.
I only noticed this point of resemblance after forming 
my own conjecture about meaningless uses.
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has been detected, and that even when the word good would 
be said to have the same sense as intrinsically good it
can have a great many different senses. On page 144 of 
his paper he said 'it seems to me that when I express in 
words a genuine ethical judgment .... I am using the 
word "good" .... to stand for a definite constituent 
of the proposition, but that I am by no means certain 
that, when X express in words a second ethical judgment, 
I am referring to the same constituent of the proposition. 1 
And further down on the same page he said 'it seems to 
me possible that when I judge that the mental states of 
a person appreciating Hamlet are good, I am judging simply 
that I approve of these states; but that, when I make 
the judgment that the effects of a decrease in the duty 
on whisky would be good, I am judging that these effects 
contain a greater amount of happiness than would be con- 
tained in the effects of leaving the duty unchanged. 1
Mr. Braithwaite's theory and his statement of it are 
rather complicated, and I could probably not do full 
justice to it except by quoting at great length. But it 
seems to me pretty clear from his paper, and in particular 
from the statements I have quoted, that his theory was 
about the meanings of ethical expressions, and in 
particular of the word good; and that he confined his
toy
attention on the whole to those uses of the word good 
in which it would be said to have the same sense as the
phrase intrijasigally_good. I shall venture to put in my
Wh rcfc 
own words that part of his theory/I want to discuss, so
far as I have understood it not only from my quotations 
but from his whole paper. Philosophers have been right 
in saying that the word good is used in a variety of 
senses, and I suppose Mr. Braithwaite would say the same 
of other ethical words; but they have not perceived the 
extent of this variety. Although all those occasions of 
the word's use when it would commonly be said to be used 
in the same sense may have something in common which is 
not shared by other occasions of its use, yet even within 
these groups of occasions the word is actually used in 
many different senses, more perhaps than could easily 
be classified. This variety of senses is the cause of 
the plausibility of arguments against naturalism of the 
first sort which I described in this chapter, which I 
called arguments from the uniqueness of goodness. Such 
arguments appear to show that the word good, for example, 
is used to -stand for some other character than that for 
which it would stand according to some suggested definition, 
They seem to show this because whenever some definition is 
suggested one unconsciously compares it with some sense
(02
in which the word good can be used other than*which the 
definition would give, and thus concludes that the 
definition is not a correct definition of the sense of 
the word that is being considered, although it may as a 
matter of fact correctly give a sense in which the word 
is sometimes used within that group of occasions within 
which its use in the sense one has unconsciously considered 
in comparison falls.
Something like this was I think part of what Mr. 
Braithwaite wanted to say. I am fairly sure that the 
exact theory which he put forward is not true, though I 
think it contains very useful suggestions. As a result 
of the complex form in "/hich he put his theory it could 
be discussed and criticised from many different points of 
view. I propose only to criticise it here on two grounds; 
first by showing that Mr. Braithwaite*s general conclusion 
is very unlikely, and secondly by showing that one of the 
reasons by which it was supported was the result of a 
mistake. His general conclusion is that the word good, 
and I suppose other words, are used in a large number of 
different senses, so that the word good, for example, is 
sometimes used to stand for something about approval, 
sometimes for something about happiness, and sometimes in 
other senses. A number of reasons could be given for
denying this. I think it suffices for me to say at 
this point that if the word good is used in the way 
llr. Braithwaite suggests, then sentences containing it
are sometimes sentences about approval, sometimes about
a.r4&i$r **& ^vi'^u ^«j*^X*
happiness, and so on, or^are sometimes used ^aaefcgswfej*. °
V^ <*A&^jf a^.e. <A /t*ac Ifcvu/t .
But those who use these sentences are presumably not 
aware that they are using them as sentences about 
approval, or whatever it may be, and that they are using 
them in senses in which they could equally well use 
other sentences, containing for instance, not such a 
word as good, but such a word as approve, which would 
not have the misleading character that good apparently 
has. It seems to me very unlikely that the word good 
and other ethical expressions are really used in this 
complicated way, and in a way involving these compli- 
cated states of ignorance in the users.
The more detailed considerations about Mr. Braith- 
waite's theory which I want to express can more appro- 
priately be given in the second part of my criticism. 
His theory was, as I have said, about the meanings of 
certain expressions, that is, I think, about what would 
ordinarily be called the meanings of these expressions. 
In examining the meaning of any expression there are 
at least two quite separate groups of situations or 
facts v/hich we may consider; namely the intentions
of the people who use the expression in question, which 
we consider when we ask the question what an expression 
is used to stand for or to signify, and effects which 
the use of an expression has upon those who hear or 
read it, which we consider when we ask the question in 
what sense an expression is understood, or what meaning 
is attached to it by its hearers or readers. Whether 
one or the other or both of these kinds of consideration 
is relevant depends upon the sense of the words mean and 
meaning with which we are concerned. For example, if 
we want to discover what someone meant by a certain 
expression on a certain occasion, we are trying to 
answer a question of the first kind, although to attend 
to considerations of the second kind as well may help 
us to answer it. It seems to me that the sort of 
question which Mr. Braithwaite would have to answer if 
he were asking what the meaning of the word good is, 
for instance, is a question about the effects which the 
use of the word has upon those who hear or read it. 
For I think that to ask what the meaning of a certain 
expression is, in the sense in which these words would 
ordinarily be used, is to ask what sense would most 
commonly be attached to it, or something of this sort. 
I do not know hovf to analyse or define at all clearly
expressions about people attaching a sense to this or 
that expression, but I think it is worth while at this 
point to say as much about these expressions as does 
seem to me fairly clear. I can then consider whether 
my own view of meaning conflicts at all with the 
arguments Mr. Braithwaite used.
It seems to me pretty certain that expressions 
about the ordinary meaning of expressions are to be 
defined in terms of the sense which has generally been 
attached to the expressions whose meaning is in question 
by those who have heard or read it, or in terms of the 
sense which in certain circumstances would be attached, 
according to the sort of expression; and that expressions 
about the sense which is attached to some expression by 
its hearers or readers are to be defined in terms of some 
effects or happenings in or affecting those who have 
heard or read the expression. The most obvious alterna- 
tive to defining the ordinary meaning of an expression in 
terms of the sense attached to it, or which would be 
attached to it by hearers or readers, is to define it in 
terms of the sense attached to it, or which would be 
attached to it by people using it, that is in terms of 
what it is used to stand for. 1 think the two sorts of 
definition would very likely come to the same thing,
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because the sense which the users of an expression 
attach to it when they use it is probably as a rule 
the same as they would attach to it if they heard or 
read it. None the less I think that a correct defini- 
tion would be in terms of the sense attached by hearers 
and readers, not by users, although I am not sure what 
is the best way of showing that this is so. But suppose 
it could be shewn that a certain sense had always or 
nearly always been attached to a certain expression by 
those who had used it, then I think this fact by itself 
would suffice to show us what was the ordinary meaning 
of the expression. If on the other hand i£ could be 
shown that a certain expression had always or nearly 
always been used in a certain sense, but had had various 
different senses attached to it by those who had heard 
or read it, I think we should say that it was a coin- 
cidence that the users of the expression had attached 
the same sense to it, and that its ordinary meaning, if 
it had one, could only be found by considering the 
senses attached to the expression by those who had 
heard or read it. So I am fairly sure that the 
ordinary meaning of an expression is to be defined in 
terms of the sense attached to it by hearers or readers. 
I still have to say, so far as I can, how I think the 
sense attached to an expression by its hearers or
tot
readers is to be defined in terms of effects or happenings. 
On this point I can only be very "-P.^I? . I think a 
different sort of definition has to be given for different 
sorts of expreppp'on, that is that different ^orts have 
ordinary meanings in different senses. I think one sort 
of definition has to be ^iven for words and stereotyped 
phrases, another s^rt for other phrases, and another sort 
for clauses and sentences. But if the definitions required 
for v;ords and for sentences could be found I think the 
chief part of the problem would be solved.
I spoke above, in my account of the process of learning 
a language, using what I fear were very obscure expressions, 
about forming a habit of responding to combinations of 
words in a v.ray appropriate to certain eJ^nents of the 
world, with which the combinations of words may be said to 
be correlated. It seems to me that to attach a sense to 
a certain expression is to respond or react to the sound or 
sight of the expression in a way in some sense appropriate 
to some element cf the world or to something about the 
world. But to make this description of the nrooess 
clearer and more explicit is exceedingly har3. Any attempt 
to clear up the iv.ostion seems to me impossible without 
certain assumptions. Of these there are two which seem 
to me the chief, and of whose truth I feel quite sure; 
there may be other unavoidable assumptions that I am not
aware of. These two assumptions are, first, that every 
sentence, whether or not it expresses a fact, if it makes 
sense, is in some sense about some element of the world; 
and second, that to react to the hearing or seeing of a 
sentence in a way appropriate to some element of the world 
or something about it is not to react in a way appropriate 
in the same sense to some fact which the sentence expresses. 
The first of these assumptions I think is pretty obviously 
true, though I do not Know how to prove it; the second 
might perhaps be questioned, but I think a conclusive 
reason for it can be givenj that the process of attaching 
a sense to a sentence is evidently of the same sort whether 
what the sentence says ?s false or true, a~M if what a 
sentence says is false there is no fact which it expresses 
- if th°re were one sort of attaching a sense or of 
understanding for false statements and another for true, 
it would always be possible from sufficient knowledge of 
the state of mind of someone understanding a sentence to 
tell whether what he was understanding was true or false, 
and this is odiously not always possible.
The process of attaching a sense to a word is 
obviously very often a ^art or aspect of the process of 
attaching a sense to a sentence; but not always. If I 
completely understand a sentence I have heard, I have
therefore attached a sense to every word in it, or every 
word of a certain sort. But I may attach a sense to 
an isolated word, as, for example, if i hear a sentence 
in a foreign language and have to say that I only 
understood one word of it. I think we have to say that 
if I attach a sense to a word I sometimes, at any rate, 
make a response appropriate to some element of the world, 
whereas if I attach a sense to a sentence I make a 
response appropriate not merely to some element of the 
world, though I think this is always included, but to some 
sort of arrangement or linking of elements of the world. 
If what the sentence says is true, this arrangement and 
the fact which the sentence expresses are themselves
elements of the world, though elements on different
30 levels from each other and from the elements of the fact.
To say clearly how anyone responds appropriately to an 
arrangement or linking of elements of the world seems to 
me even harder than saying how a response is appropriate 
to some element. We can not say that he responds as
Jo Differences of level were spoken of by John Wisdom 
in logical constructions I and II, Mind April and 
October 1931, in what I think was the same sense that 
I am using. I am inclined to think that to "he on 
a different level comes to the same thing, or almost 
to the same thing, as being of a different logical 
type.
though the elements were linked in the way in question, 
that is, in a way which would be useful to him if they 
were so linked; this, or something like it, is what he 
does if he believes the statement that he understands,
31but not otherwise. It is just possible, however, that 
the fact that a sentence expresses something which can be 
believed, whereas a word as a rule does not, will form 
part of the analysis of attaching a sense to a sentence. 
We may, I think, get some idea of how the analysis 
is to be carried further by reflecting on one part of the 
processes which sometimes occur when people attach a 
sense to an expression. In many people part of what 
happens when they attach a sense to a word or a sentence 
consists of a visual mental image. The connexion 
between the nature of this image and what would ordinarily 
be called the meaning of the expression that is being 
understood may be very obvious or very obsc^r?. I 
propose to consider a case in which the connexion is 
obvious. Supposing I hear the word Prinolpia, I may 
take it that the word is used as an abbreviation for 
Principia Ethica, and I am then attaching a sense to the
31 I have derived this sort of view of belief from 
remarks by F. P. Ramsey in facts and propositions, on page 144 of the foundations of mathematics, end from 
the nature of believing by R. B. Braithwaite, Proc. 
Arist. Soc. 1932-3.
word; I may at the same time have a mental image of my 
cony of the book in its place in my shelves. Supposing, 
again, I hear the rsent^nce your copy of Princiriia ^thica 
i. s nio. the top shelf,, I may attach a sense to thin 
sentence, and at the same time have a mental image of the 
sane sort as ir the first case. In either case there is 
on^ part of my response to what. I hav<= heard which is 
appropriate both to a certain element of the world and 
to a certain arrangement or linking of elements of the 
world in a sense which is up to a nnint fairly cl^ar. 
But the mere having of th^ image I have described cannot 
by itself constitute th° appropriate response to either 
sort of expression, because there would be no intrinsic 
distinction between the images occurring when words were 
understood and those occurring wher sentences were 
understood; althour-h what is understood is in the 
latter case in some ^ nnse some thin,", which can be beli^ve^, 
in the former case not. And I an not sure that the sense 
in whicb my mental inag*3 is appropriate to elements of 
tho vjo^ld holps us to find the r«o\iired sense of the 
vrord. appropriate, though T think it may. It seems a?, 
though we may say that the supposed images are 
representations of some element of the world or some 
arrangements of elements. Th^r nossibly we can explain
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what appropriateness is by saying that someone attaching 
a sense to an expression makes a response which is or 
contains a representation of some element Disarrangement. 
Even if this were true in some ordinary sense of 
representation, the whole problem of appropriateness 
would not be solved, for it would still be necessary to 
say in exactly what sense a response is or contains a 
representation; evidently very few responses are or 
contain representations in the direct pictorial way I 
have used for an illustration. I am not sure that any 
ordinary sense can be found in which we could possibly 
say that most responses which are instances of under- 
standing an expression are or contain representations.
On the question what the difference is between 
attaching a sense to a word and to a sentence I can 
offer nothing better than a conjecture. It seems to me 
that the right definitions may possibly be to this effectj 
that the response made by a person who hears or reads a 
word or a sentence in either case is appropriate to an 
arrangement or a set of arranged elements, that is to say, 
is or contains a representation of them; the arrangement 
or the whole set may or may not itself be an element of 
the world; but the person who attaches a sense to a 
sentence in addition either believes that there is or 
believes that there is not such an arrangement in the
world or has an impulse or tendency to believe that there 
is or an impulse or tendency to believe that there is not. 
This sort of definition sounds as though it were circular. 
It would in fact be circular if belief had to be defined, 
as perhaps it has, in terras of attaching a sense to an 
expression. But it seems to me just possible that belief 
is to be otherwise defined; I can not say exactly what the 
definition by which we should avoid circularity would be, 
but it would be to the effect that for someone to believe 
a certain proposition is to have a disposition to act in a 
way which would be useful to him if the proposition were
31
true. I think there may be an ordinary sense of the 
word belief which can be defined in this sort of way. 
This account of belief resembles that which Mr. Braithwaite 
himself has given in The Nature of believing, Proc. 
Arist. Soc. 1932-3; though it is not the same, as Mr. 
Braithwaite included in his analysis not only a disposition 
to act in a certain way, but a certain mental relation to 
a proposition which he called entertaining it in thought. 
I am not at all convinced that this factor has to he 
included, at any ratp for all senses of the word belief. 
If there is no sense of belief which can be defined without
32. This theory could very well be expressed without 
the use of the word proposition, which I have allowed 
to stand here for the sake of "brevity.
the inclusion of this factor, then my definition of 
attaching a sense to a sentence seems to be circular after 
all; but I am inclined to think there is such a sense. 
There are very considerable difficulties about this sort 
of definition of belief. The chief of then seems to be 
that there are some situations in which one seems to have 
a disposition to act in a way which would be useful if a 
certain proposition were true although as a matter of / 
one does not believe the proposition. But I think it 
may be possible to overcome these difficulties.
I can now sum up the explanation I have given of the 
ordinary meanings of words and sentences, including all 
those parts of it which are only suggested very tentatively. 
A word, according to the sorts of definition I have been 
suggesting, has an ordinary meaning, if all or most of 
those who have heard or read it have made a response 
which has contained a part which was in a certain 'sense 
a representation of somo element or arrangement of 
elements of the world, in the sense in which an arrange- 
ment is something which may occur, but may not, and if 
either all or mostjof the responses have contained 
representations of the same element or arrangement, or 
every one of them or nearly every one has belonged to one 
or another of a definite number of sets, for each of which
there has been only one element or arrangement of which 
all its members have contained representations. The 
explanation of th? ordinary meaning of a sentence has 
to have a slightly different form, for I have to allow 
for sentences which are, only used once or a few times, 
but which may none the less have ordinary meanings; the 
ordinary meanings of sentences can not be explained in 
terms of the senses which actually have been attached to 
them, but only by expressions in a conditional form, and 
in terms of the senses which would be attached to them in 
certair circumstances. To make use of all the 
definitions I have suggested I have to make a very 
elaborate statement. A sentence has an ordinary meaning, 
if either there is only one arrangement of elements of 
the Trorld or set of arranged elements, in the senses in 
which an arrangement or set is something which might 
occur, not which necessarily has occurred, such that if 
anyone knowing the language to which the sentence belongs 
heard or read the sentence he would be likely to make a 
response containing a representation of it, or there is 
a definite number of arrangements or sets such that if 
anyone heard or read the sentence he would be likely to 
make a response containing a representation of one or 
another of them; and if in either case the person 
hearing or reading the sentence would, if he made a
response of the sort that was probable, either have a 
disposition to act in a way which would be useful to him 
if there were in the world the arrangement or set of 
which his response contained a representation, or have 
a disposition to act in a way which would be useful 
to him if there were not, or have a tendency or impulse 
to have one or the other of these sorts of disposition. 
I do not think there is any statement we can make to the 
effect that the ordinary meaning of a word or sentence 
is something or other. But we can sometimes show what 
the ordinary meaning of a particular word or sentence is 
by finding another expression which in the ordinary sense 
has the same meaning. it is convenient to speak of a 
word or sentence being correlated with an element of the 
world or an arrangement or a set of arranged elements, 
or with several; namely with those elements or 
arrangements or sets representations of which are 
connected with the hearing or reading of the expression 
in the way I have described. Then two expressions 
have the same meaning if there is at least one element 
or arrangement or set with which both are correlated. 
About the correctness of most of the details of this 
account of meaning I feel quite uncertain; but of the 
general principle that the ordinary meaning of expressions
Is to be defined in terms of their effects on hearers or 
readers I feel fairljr certain.
It seems to me that this view of meaning affects 
Mr. Braithwaite's theory about the meaning of ethical 
expressions in two ways. First, it is clear that if, 
as I have supposed, he wanted to explain the ordinary 
meaning of these expressions, then he could not prove 
any conclusion about their meaning by showing that a 
particular sense Is attached to them by those who use 
them. But this is the way in which he seems to have 
tried to ^rove such a conclusion, both in what he said in 
my quotation about using a word to stand for a constituent 
of a proposition, and in what he said about judging things 
good. Secondly, it is reasonable to think that as a 
matter of fact people generally do use expressions in 
the^r ordinary meanings, that is, that the sense attached 
to an expression by its user is generally the same as that 
which constitutes, or one of those which constitute, its 
ordinary meaning. So it will not be very likely that 
an expression is often used in a particular sense, unless 
it can be shown that that sense is also its ordinary 
meaning, or one of the senses that constitute its ordinary
>
meaning. Then it will not b° likely that the word good 
is used in the sort of variety of senses that Mr.
Braithwaite suggested unless it can be shown that its 
ordinary meaning in the sort of sense I have explained 
contains or is made up by that variety of senses.
But as I have said, although I do not think Mr. 
Braithwaite*s sort of theory can be true in the form he 
gave it, I think it can be adapted, so as to produce a 
theory with a certain formal resemblance to it which is 
consistent with and supplementary to the theory I have 
suggested about meaningless uses. We shall then say, 
in the terms of the theory I suggested, that all ethical 
uses of expressions are meaningless uses, but that people 
have generally failed to perceive that this is so because 
sentences containing ethical expressions are generally 
partly significant, that is, they have meanings, but there 
is nothing which is the meaning of the sentence as a 
whole. Two sorts of mistake have been made about the 
supposed meanings of expressions in their ethical uses; 
one by those who have thought that ethical expressions 
had meanings of a special and peculiar kind, and have 
therefore given non-naturalistic explanations of their 
meanings, and the other by those who have thought that 
all ethical expressions had meanings which could be 
expressed by means of other expressions, and have 
therefore given naturalistic explanations of their
meanings. The naturalists have as a rule been less in 
error than the non-naturalists, because they have 
generally supposed that ethical expressions were 
correlated with one or more of a certain set of characters, 
which, as it happens, actually have a certain connexion 
with the using of ethical expressions. It is sometimes 
suggested, for example, that to call something good 
is to say something about the amount of happiness that 
will result from it, and sometimes that it is to say 
something about the speaker's attitude to what he calls 
good, for instance that he approves of it; and it is 
suggested by Mr. Braithwaite that to call something good 
is sometimes to say one of these things, sometimes the 
other, and sometimes, I suppose, to attribute various 
other characters to it. All these ascriptions of a 
meaning to the word good are mistaken, but they have a 
certain foundation; namely that when people use the word 
good their use of it is very often accompanied by a 
belief of one or another of several kinds about the thing 
which they call good. Sometimes, for instance, when 
someone uses the word he has at the same time a belief 
that something will lead to more happiness than some 
alternative, and sometime" a belief that he has a feeling 
of approval for some state of affairs, and sometime?
(it
some other kind of belief, although he is in no case 
saying that he has this or that belief by using a 
sentence containing the word good. Pacts such as these 
about beliefs and perhaps other states of mind 
accompanying the use of ethical expressions have caused 
naturalistic moralists to make various false ascriptions 
of meaning to ethical expressions, and among naturalists 
Mr. Braithwaite has come much nearer to the truth than 
most others, both in recognising the possibility that an 
ethical use of an expression may be meaningless and in 
perceiving the variety of the beliefs by which ethical 
uses of expressions are accompanied.
I have now completed my statement of arguments 
against and for naturalism,and of a particular naturalistic 
theory of ethics. The arguments that are adduced against 
naturalism, including the first two I have stated, are 
very plausible, yet do not seem to me conclusive. It 
seems to me that almost all ethical theories that have 
been proposed so far have been open either to very strong 
logical or to very strong common sense objections or 
both. One of the principal recommendations of the 
naturalistic theory I have stated is that it seems to be 
much less open to objections of these sorts than most 
theories of either kind. It is not open, for example,
to the first two sorts of objection to naturalism that I 
stated, but it does seem to be open, like other 
naturalistic theories, to some objection of the third 
sort, so far as the considerations I stated can be allowed 
to count as a clear objection; and it is I think for 
reasons of the third sort, and connected reasons which I 
give elsewhere, that I myself feel very dubious about the 
theory I have based on a consideration of the nature of 
meaning, in spite of its neatness. It does seem as 
though something were left out. But no unobjectionable 
account of what is left out has been given, and a 
tendency to feel as though something were the case is not 
good evidence, but only a reason for seeking evidence. 
On the whole, the search seems to lead in the direction 
of some theory like the theory of meaningless uses I 
have suggested.
4. Reason and reasonableness.
I propose in this chapter to offer some reflexions 
about the meaning of such words as reason and reasonable. 
They have in common with such words as good, right, duty, 
and so on, that they are used to do what would commonly 
be called expressing valuations of conduct. I have not 
said so far whether I have meant to include such words as 
reason in the scope of what I have said about ethical 
expressions. They differ from the sort of expressions 
I have instanced in my earlier chapters in that it does 
not seem as though they can be defined, in most of their 
uses at least, in ethical terms, whereas it seems as 
though the expressions I have hitherto considered can be 
defined in ethical terms, even if as a matter of fact they 
can not be defined at all in any ordinary sense. Accord- 
ing to the theory about meaningless uses suggested in my 
third chapter, such words as good, and right in certain 
uses can not be defined at all in an ordinary sensej but 
whether this is so or not, it does seem as though words 
like these can be defined in terms of each other, and it 
is very difficult to feel sure, short of accepting the 
theory about meaningless uses, that some definition of 
Tightness in terms of goodness, or goodness in terms of
rigfatneas, is not correct. It seems worth while to 
enquire whether, if some sort of theory about the meaning- 
less use of ethical expressions is true, the place that 
people have mistakenly supposed to be taken by these express 
sions in expressing opinions about conduct can be filled 
by expressions about reason; that is, whether some or 
all of the characters that have been supposed to belong 
to the supposed meanings of ethical expressions actually 
belong to the meaning of expressions about reason.
Words such as reason and reasonable are unquestion- 
ably used in various different senses. I propose to try 
to distinguish some of the senses in which we speak about 
reasons for acting, reasonable behaviour, and so on, and 
to give analyses or definitions of some of them. I shall 
try to show, or at least to suggest, that there is no 
sense of any expression of this sort in which the ex- 
pression stands for a non-natural character, or is to be 
defined in terms of a non-natural character, with the 
exception that there are one or two uses of expressions 
which are perhaps to be defined in terms of some such 
ethical character as goodness, if goodness is a character, 
or at any rate explained in terms of a particular use of 
the word good. I shall then consider one or two ways in 
which such expressions are sometimes used by philosophers, 
and enquire whether what is said in these ways is true.
I shall begin by considering various senses in which 
we can speak of a reason for an actionj and I shall 
consider next some senses of the word reasonable. We can 
speak of a reason for an action in various different ways. 
We can say about an action that someone has not yet per- 
formed that he has a reason for performing it, or that 
there is a reason for him to perform itj and about an 
action that he has performed, that he had a reason for 
performing it, or that there was a reason. We can also 
say that he has a good reason, or that there is a good 
reason and that there was a good reason, and so on. We 
can also say that something is the reason or a reason or 
a good reason for someone to act in a certain way, or the 
reason or a reason for which someone did act in a certain 
way. There is one sort of sense in which some of these 
expressions are sometimes used which I do not want to 
discuss, and which is certainly different from those that 
I shall discuss; I may as well illustrate this sort of 
sense and dismiss it at once. Consider such a sentence 
as the reason for his eating so much was that he was very 
hungry. It is just possible that such a sentence as this 
could be used in one of the senses I want to discuss, but 
it seems to me quite clear that in the sense in which it 
would be most likely to be used the word reason simply 
has exactly the same sense which the word cause would 
have in a sentence beginning the cause of his eating so
much. So I may as well say in advance that I do not 
want to examine any uses of the word reason in which to 
say that something is a reason is to say that it is a 
cause, and to say only that. For I only want to consider 
those senses of the word reason in which it stands for 
something which has a special connexion with human 
behaviour. It seems to me that anything which is said 
to be the reason or a reason for a certain action, actual 
or possible, in any of the senses with which I am concern- 
ed, is always either something to do with a desire on the 
part of the actual or possible agent or something to do 
with means by which such a desire might be fulfilled. 
Consider such a sentence as his reason for taking the 
medicine was that he wanted to sleep well, and such a 
sentence as his reason for taking the medicine was that he 
thought it would make him sleep well. It seems as though 
in the situation which would be described by these sentences 
there are two factors, each of which is said to be some- 
one's reason for doing something; one of them is a desire 
for a certain result, the other is a belief that a certain 
action will have a certain result. I think it is clear 
that what is a reason in either of these senses is a 
certain kind of causej but to say that it is a reason is not 
merely to say that it is a cause. I think I can see more 
or less how these uses of the word reason are to be analysed.
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I think the first sentence has the same meaning as his 
desire to sleep well caused him to take the medicine, 
and he believed that taking it was a means to sleeping 
well; and the second the same meaning as hie belief that
the medicine would make him sleep well caused him to take
35 it, and he wanted to sleep well* Since both the sentences
I am interpreting might express facts about the same 
occasion, if these interpretations are correct we must 
obviously be able to use the word cause in such a sense that 
if a certain event or state of affairs caused a certain 
other it does not follow that no other caused it. I think 
we do often use the word in such a sense.
If these explanations of two uses of the word reason 
are more or less right, a reason in these uses is a mental 
event or disposition of one or another of two kinds, a 
desire or a belief. It is fairly clear that in that case 
statements that someone had a reason for some act he per- 
formed, or that there was a reason, can be explained in the 
same sort of way. Their meaning will be that he had some 
desire which he believed would be fulfilled as a result of 
the act in question, and that the desire or the belief or
33 we might speak of someone's reason for acting in a 
certain way, taking medicine, for example, on an occasion 
on which he is not aware of any desire or belief, but 
acts from habit; but the desire and the belief caused 
him to form the habit.
both caused him to perform the act. The explanation to 
be given of reasons for a possible action, an action not 
yet performed, must be different, Hothing has yet caused 
such an action, when we speak about it, and it is not certain 
that anything ever will. So to say that someone has a 
reason for acting in a certain way, or that there is a 
reason for his acting in that way, can not be to say 
anything about what has caused or will cause the act des- 
cribed. I think that such words as reason are probably 
used in more different senses about possible actions than 
they are about actions that have been performed. There 
is one of these senses which is closely connected with 
the sense I have tried to explain in which the word 
reason is used about actual actions. When we say that 
someone has a reason for performing a certain action what 
we say may mean that he has a desire which he believes 
would be fulfilled as a result of that action. When we 
say that there is a reason for someone to act in a certain 
way what we say may mean that he has a desire which as a 
matter of fact that sort of action would be likely to 
satisfy, whether or not he is aware that this is so. I 
have explained these two sorts of expression that we can 
use in the ways that seem most appropriate to them; but 
as a matter of fact I think both sentences beginning in 
such a way as he has a reason and in such a way as there is
a reason can be used in either sort of sense; can be used, 
that is, either to say that someone has a desire and a 
certain sort of belief about it, as to say that someone 
has a desire and there is a certain sort of fact about it. 
This special duplication of senses does not happen when we 
are speaking about actual, not possible, actions, as there 
is then no question of referring to facts about the agent's 
desires which were not known to him. There does not seem 
to be a similar duplication of senses when we say that 
something is a reason for someone to act in a certain way. 
It seems as though when we mention as a reason for a 
possible action on someone's part a desire of his, or 
something about a means of satisfying it, it is usually 
clear whether we are speaking about what he thinks would 
be a means or about something which actually would. If, 
for example, I use such a sentence as a^ reason for him to 
insure his life is that he wants to provide for his family, 
I think it is pretty clear that what I mean is something 
to the effect that he wants to provide for his family, and 
to insure his life would be a means of doing it, whether 
he thinks so or not. The meaning seems to be the same if 
I use such a sentence as a reason for him to insure his 
life is that it would enable him to provide for his family. 
It seems that on the whole we are less likely to mention
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someone's belief about the means of satisfying one of Ms 
desires in speaking about a possible action than in 
speaking about an action he has performed: if we did, 
we should probably use a sentence to the effect that a
reason for his doing something is that he believes it 
would produce a certain result.
I am afraid that I have only treated a small selection 
from the ways in which we can speak about a reason, as 
distinct from a good reason. I have said nothing, for 
example, about the sense in which a phrase about someone's 
reason for a past action means the reason he alleged or 
would have alleged; or the senses in which we can give 
as a reason for an actual or possible action by somebody, not 
a desire of his or a fact or belief about the means of 
satisfying a desire, but some state of affairs which some- 
one wants to counteract or provide against, or which causes 
him to have some desire; for instance that his health is 
bad, or that he sleeps badly» I hope it is not necessary 
for me to treat separately all these uses, which I think 
can be defined on the same sort of lines as those I have 
considered, that is which seem to be related in one way or 
another to a situation forming a sort of practical 
syllogism. The parts of such a situation are a desire, 
a fact or a belief about the way in which the desire could 
be fulfilled, and an action. I think it will be clear that
the senses in which we speak about a reason for acting 
in a certain way are quite different from the sense or 
senses in which we speak about a reason for thinking or 
believing something. A reason for thinking or believing 
is to be defined without any reference to desire, but 
simply in terms of the certainty or probability which a 
belief has in view of the thing said to be a reason, or 
perhaps in view of that in conjunction with other grounds.
I want to consider two other ways in which people 
might possibly speak of a reason for an action, before I 
go on to consider good reasons. People might, I thinks, 
speak as though a certain sort of fact would be a reason 
for an action even in the absence of any connected desire, 
namely a fact that a certain action was or would be the 
best in the circumstances, or the right action. It might 
be said that in that case there was a reason for perform- 
ing the action whether one hoped to satisfy any desire by 
performing it or not, or even that there was a reason 
for wanting to perform it. I have suggested in my third 
chapter that perhaps there are no facts that anything is 
right or best, because when we use these words as I have 
above they are being used in a meaningless way. But it 
seems to me that even if that suggestion is false, as it 
may be, to speak of the Tightness or goodness of an action 
as a reason for performing it or wanting to perform it,
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even for someone who has no desire to which its performance 
is in any way related, is either a mistaken or at any rate 
a misleading way of speaking; I am not sure which, for a
mistaken way of speaking, if it is used often enough, can
H become correct but misleading. Supposing the ethical
uses of such words as good and right have a sense, then the 
Tightness or goodness of an action may be a reason, not 
for acting, but for thinking in a certain way; for instance, 
for thinking that it would be a good thing if the action 
were performed, or if someone wanted to perform it. Again, 
the Tightness or goodness of an action would be a reason 
for someone to perform it if it happened that he wanted 
to do what is right or good. But I can not see how the 
Tightness or goodness of an action could be a reason for 
acting in a certain way, or wanting so to act, except in 
a sense which would be defined in terms of one or another 
of these facts; that is, the facts that the Tightness or 
goodness of an action might be a reason for thinking in 
a certain way, or might be a reason for someone to act 
in a certain way if in addition he wanted to do what is 
right or good.
3il Ir (^
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The second way in which people might, I think, speak 
of a reason for an action seems to me certainly a mistaken 
way of speaking. Supposing a reason is suggested for 
acting in a certain way which displays some character which 
is commonly disapproved of, for example, selfishness, some- 
one may say such a thing as that isn't a reason. It seems 
to me that in such a case the thought the speaker meant to 
express would be something either to the effect that that 
would not be a reason for him or that the reason given was 
not a good reason, was morally objectionable, or something
35
of that sort. But it does not seem to me that there is 
any sense which allows us to say that a reason can not 
have either of these defects.
I am afraid that the account I have given of the way 
in which we speak of a reason for acting is very incomplete, 
and perhaps inaccurate in parts; but I hope I have said 
enough to suggest that all the senses in which we commonly 
speak about a reason, as distinct from a good reason,for 
acting can be defined in terms of something to do with 
desires and the means by which they might be satisfied,
3f Supposing the theory about meaningless uses suggested 
in my third chapter is true, there will be a fresh problem 
to solvej how are we to analyse sentences saying, for 
instance, that someone thinks something good ? It is just 
possible that there can be such a thing as a meaningless 
thought, in some sense j though this would not be the best 
way of describing it, for we do not usually say that 
thoughts have meanings. 1W ^ °*^ c~v<. \
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although I know I have not said enough to prove this. I 
shall next consider some of the ways in which we speak 
about a good reason for acting. I hope I shall be able 
to point them out rather more briefly than I was able to 
point out the senses of the first sort of expression. I 
shall take these expressions in the some sort of order in 
which I took the corresponding expressions of the first sort. 
We may say that someone's reason for acting in a certain 
way in which he did act was a certain desire, or a certain 
belief that the action in question would lead to the sat- 
isfying of a desire, and that that reason was a good reason. 
And we may say that he had a good reason or there was a good 
reason for acting in a certain way. About actions not yet 
performed, we may say that there is a good reason for some- 
one to act in a certain way, or that he has a good reason. 
And we may say that a certain desire felt by someone, or 
a certain fact or a certain belief of his about the means 
by which some desire could be satisfied, is or would be a 
good reason for him to act in a certain way, or that he 
has in it a good reason for acting in a certain way. It 
seems to me that there are at test two ways in which 
expressions of this sort may be used. It seems to me 
that when we call something a good reason or say there 
is a good reason we may simply be saying that it is or
there is a reason in one of the senses I have already 
tried to explain, and in addition that the action for 
whioh we say it is or there is a reason really would 
lead or really would be likely to lead to the desired 
result, I think all the sorts of expression I have 
described can have some such sense as this. But I think 
that all or most of them can also be used in quite another 
way. I think when we call something a good reason or 
say there is a good reason we may be saying that it would 
be a good thing for a certain desire to be satisfied, and 
that a certain action would be a means of satisfying it, 
or that it would be a good thing for a certain result to 
be produced, and that a certain action would be a means 
of producing it. It seems as though part of the meaning 
of a statement that there is a good reason in this sense 
would always be that there is a good reason in the other 
sense I tried to point out. But it seems as though part 
of the meaning would also be that something would be good 
in one of the ethical senses or uses of that word. Then 
if the suggestion made in my third chapter about meaningless 
uses is true, in this use the phrase good reason will be 
meaningless, or will in a certain sense be partly meaning- 
less if we allow that this use includes the meaning of 
good reason in the other sense. But if the suggestion I
made is not true, then the meaning of the phrase good 
reason in this second use is to be explained in terms of 
the meaning, whatever it may "be, of the word good.
I have now tried to give an account of the meaning 
of such expressions as a reason or a good reason for a 
certain action, in which although I have not "been able to 
examine all the ways in which such expressions are used, 
I hope I have been able to point out enough of their uses 
to suggest that what they mean can always be defined in 
terms of people 1 s desires and of means of satisfying them, 
with perhaps one exception. It seems to me that the only 
exception to this principle is made by those uses of the 
phrase good reason in which an ethical use of the word 
good seems to occur; and that the meaning of these uses 
is to be explained in the terms I have described, and, 
in addition, of whatever explanation is to be given of 
the meaning of the word good, whether in terms of meaningless 
uses or in some other way. If this is so, then it follows 
that all the senses in which expressions about a reason for 
acting are used can be defined in terms which do not 
include any non-natural character, unless there is some 
such character for which such ethical expressions as the 
word good sometimes stand, in which case one or two of the 
expressions about reasons would be defined in terms of
that character.
Next I have to consider the various senses of the 
word reasonable, which I fear are even harder to treat 
exhaustively or to classify. We can speak of reasonable 
behaviour, a reasonable person, a reasonable action, 
prospect, objection, chance, proposal, price, belief, proba- 
bility, and so on. I cannot possibly examine the senses 
in which all the different types of thing are said to be 
reasonable which we do call reasonable. There is one set 
of uses of the word all of whose members I can certainly 
excludej that set, namely, whose meanings can be defined 
in terms of some proposition or statement or belief or 
happening following from or being made likely by some 
other, but without reference to the probable effects of a 
particular action or piece of behaviour of a particular 
person. Out of the instances I gave of things which can be 
called reasonable, I can probably exclude on this ground 
chances, beliefs, probabilities, and probably in some senses 
prospects and objections. But there seem; to be a great 
many uses of the word which cannot be excluded on this 
account, and I am forced to confine myself to a small 
selection, I shall therefore consider the senses in 
which we can speak of a reasonable person or action, and 
reasonable behaviourj and besides these phrases I shall
consider certain uses of the word reasonable when it is 
not part of $ phrase of this sort.
The third of the phrases I mentioned I can dismiss 
very briefly. It seems to me that probably every sense 
of the phrase reasonable behaviour is the same as some 
sense of the phrase behaviour of a reasonable person; so I 
only need to consider more fully the two remaining phrases. 
Of these, I think the phrase reasonable action is the more 
easily explained. One sense of this phrase has I think 
a fairly clear relation to a sense in which we speak about 
a reason for actingj an action was reasonable in this 
sense if there was a good reason for it in the sense that 
the agent rightly thought that it would lead or was likely 
to lead to a desired result. Similarly a possible action 
would be a reasonable action on someone's part if it would 
lead or would be likely to lead to a result which he de- 
sires. There is a second sense, which may perhaps be 
definable in terms of the first, in which a reasonable 
action is simply the action of a reasonable person, in some 
sense of this latter phrasej this should perhaps be called 
a group of senses, corresponding to several senses in 
which we can speak about a reasonable person. There may, 
I think, be senses in which we speak of reasonable action 
other than these two, but these seem to be the principal
commonest senses. It is clear that the first sense 
can be defined in terms which do not include any non- 
natural character j whether the second can "be so defined 
will depend upon the interpretation to "be given to the 
expression reasenable person.
I am afraid that this phrase is used in a great 
variety of ways. A reasonable person may, I think, be 
a person most of whose actions are reasonable actions in 
the first sense I pointed out, or who performs more reason*:  
able actions than most people, or something of that kind. 
Secondly, he may be a person who usually thinks clearly. 
Thirdly, perhaps someone who both acts reasonably and thinks 
clearly. Fourthly, someone who will hear reason, who is 
open to argument. Fifthly, someone who habitually re- 
flects before speaking or acting, or does not speak or 
act impulsively. These are some of the senses in which 
we can speak about a reasonable person, and there are 
certainly others. Of those senses I have mentioned I 
have only given brief and approximate definitions. But I 
think it will be clear that the terms in which these uses 
would be defined do not include any non-natural character. 
It seems to me probable that each of the other senses in 
which we can speak of a reasonable person stands in some 
fairly close relation to one or another of the senses I 
have tried to define. If that is so, and it is hard to 
be sure about such a point, then we may take it that there
is no sense in which any expression about a reasonable 
person stands for or has to be defined in terms of a 
non-natural character.
It remains for me to say a little about the use of 
the word reasonable when it is not joined with a noun 
in this way. A great many uses of the word can certainly 
be interpreted in terms of reasonable actions, people and 
so on, but a certain number remain which seem to be less 
straightforward. It is easy to think, for instance, that 
to say that it is reasonable to be reasonable, or it is 
reasonable to act reasonably, makes sense and is not tauto- 
logical. It seems to me that as a matter of fact sentences 
like these are exceptionally ambiguous, and could scarcely 
have a clear sense in any circumstances. Obviously they 
could have senses that would be tautological   that to 
be reasonable is to be reasonable, and to act reasonably is
to act reasonably and so on. Probably, as Mr. R« B.
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Braithwaite has said, 'we always try to interpret a
question as a question that can be asked "with significance"' 
So we are inclined to think of sentences like these I am 
considering as being used in some non-tautological sense 
if possible. There are, it seems to me, a great many non-
36 On page 145 of proc. arist. soc. 1927-8-
tautological senses they could have, so many as to prevent 
them from having any sense, to put it paradoxically • or 
to put it without paradox, they have so many senses in one 
sense, namely senses which the constituent words and the 
syntax allow, that they have no sense in another sense, 
namely no sense which they could be used to communicate. 
For example, to say that it is reasonable to be reasonable 
might be to say that there is a reason or there are reasons 
for performing reasonable actions, which would probably be 
a tautologyj or that there are reasons for being willing 
to hear reason, or for habitually reflecting before acting; 
or a number of other things. A similar variety of inter- 
pretations can be found for a statement that it is reasonable 
to act reasonably. I think it seems very probable that 
all these interpretations would be of one or the other of 
the two kinds I have illustrated, that is, such as to make 
the sentences I am considering either mere tautologies or 
synthetic statements which may quite well be false. But 
the difficulty of deciding whether they are tautologies 
or not may give them a deceptive air of being synthetic 
necessary truths. And I think it also seems very pro- 
bable that no interpretation would have to be given in 
which any non-natural character would be mentioned.
The incomplete and cursory review I have made of 
some of the ways in which we use such words as reason and
reasonable does, I think, suggest that there is no sense 
of such expressions as these in which they stand for a 
non-natural character, or something to be defined in terms 
of a non-natural character, with one possible exception that 
has been mentioned. I think this review also tends to
show something else, which I do not know how to put very
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clearly; that, as Hume said, reason is the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them. Hume's language is very obscure 
and metaphorical, and what he meant by saying in addition 
that reason ought only to be the slave of the passions I 
do not pretend to know. But I shall try to say shortly 
what I think Hume meant by the other part of his conclusion, 
the part with which, if my interpretation of it is right, 
I agree. The conclusion to which I am led by considering 
the meaning of expressions about reason, and which I think 
Hume probably shared, is that there is no sense in which 
there can be a reason for desiring or wishing for some- 
thing, such that the reason has no connexion with any other
s% desire or wish of the person concerned.
57 Treatise of human nature, book II, part III § III.
t>* I think it worth while to define the sense in which I
am using the expression there can be a__re_ason. I am saying 
here that there is no sense of reason such that it makes 
sense to say that there is a reason for desiring something, 
and to say that the reason has no connexion with any other 
desire of the person concerned.
I ahall conclude by considering briefly one or two 
ways in which philosophers have spoken about reason 
which seem to me mistaken. I think there is a particu- 
lar kind of mistake which turns upon the supposition that 
there are possible reasons for desiring something which
are unconnected with other desires. Professor J.S.
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Mackenzie in his Manual of Ethioa criticised the opinion
of Hume that I have mentioned, and in doing so wrote of 
what he called reason as a motive. *Reason .... may', 
he said, 'set before us ends or motives which for an 
irrational being would not exist at all.' Language of a 
connected kind was used by Rashdall in the theory of good
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and evil. He wrote f if an intuition .... persists 
after a due consideration of all the consequences of 
yielding to it, it may probably be taken to represent not 
merely a feeling, but a feeling to which the moral Reason 
attributes intrinsic value,' The sort of argument which 
would be used by writers who refer to reason in such ways 
is I think something like this. There are some things to 
which reason, or the moral reason, attributes goodness or 
intrinsic value. When reason does this it sets before us 
ends or motivesj that is to say, if reason attributes
If Third edition, book I, ch.II i 10. 
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intrinsic value to something, that is a reason for bring- 
ing that thing into existence; or if it is a tendency or 
feeling to which intrinsic value is attributed, then a 
reason for yielding to that tendency or that feeling.
It seems to me that there is something wrong about 
expressions and statements of this kind. Unquestionably 
the things which are reasons in one sense of the word 
reason are also motives. The reason for which someone 
acted in a certain way are the desires and beliefs which 
led him to act in that way, and these were also motives. 
But of course no fact related to this fact could possibly 
be expressed by saying that reason is a motive or that reason 
sets before us motives. I think that probably professor' 
Mackenzie and Rashdfcll considered that there were facts 
that certain things were intrinsically good, and that 
these facts could not have been otherwise; that, in other 
words, that a certain thing is good is a necessary or a 
priori truth. It seems quite clear that if there are 
facts that certain things are intrinsically good, that is, 
if the ethical uses of expressions are not meaningless uses, 
these are certainly not facts that could not have been 
otherwise. For if they were, then to say that anything 
is good which in fact is not would be self-contradictory; 
and in that case, whenever people have disagreed about 
the intrinsic goodness of anything, one party has been
upholding a necessary truth, the other a contradiction. 
If this were so, it would be very strange that no one 
has observed it, and shown in exactly what way false 
opinions about the goodness of something were self-con- 
tradictory. It is very hard to think that, if ethical 
uses of expressions are not meaningless, the facts they 
are used to express are anything but facts which could have 
been otherwise, which it makes sense to deny, and knowledge 
of which would be of the sort called empirical. But even 
if ethical truths were necessary truths, in what sense 
would reason be setting before us motives ? If someone f s 
reason had recognised a necessary ethical truth, then, if 
he wanted to do what was good or right, his recognition of 
that truth might be a reason for him to act in a certain 
way; and if he actually did so act, his recognition of 
the ethical truth would also have been a motive. Again, 
if there are ethical facts, the Tightness or goodness of 
a certain course of action may well be a reason for think- 
ing that it would be a good thing if someone acted in a 
certain way. But no ethical fact or ethical truth, 
whether necessary or not, could be a reason for someone to 
act in a certain way by itself; it could only be a reason 
if also the person concerned wanted to do what was right 
or good.
I shall now sum up the three which seem to me the
most interesting of the results which may be tentatively
drawn from these reflexions. First, that in a certain 
sense there is no special ethical notion connected with 
reason; or in other words, that there is no sense in 
which we talk about reason in which thefexpression we use 
stands for a non-natural character, or which has to be 
defined in terms of a non-natural character; except that 
there may be some sense which is to be defined in terms 
of such a character for which some obviously ethical ex- 
pression, such as the word good or right, sometimes stands 
  in that case the ethical notion involved would not be 
what I called a special ethical notion. Secondly, that 
there are reasons for being reasonable, or that it is 
reasonable to be reasonable, is not, in those senses which 
are most likely to be used, a necessary truth, however 
strong a prejudice one may have in favour of being reason- 
able j and that whether there actually are reasons for it, 
whether it is reasonable for a certain person, depends upon 
that person's wishes. Thirdly, a conclusion connected 
with the second, and having a certain practical effect, 
it is not open to us to call behaviour of which we dis- 
approve unreasonable, simply because of moral objections 
to itj no kind of behaviour can be discovered to be 
reasonable or unreasonable simply on moral grounds;
whether behaviour is reasonable must depend also upon 
the desires or wishes of the person who behaves.
5 Conclusion
I have now tried to show what philosophical method 
and point of view I favour, and how I think they are 
to be applied to ethics. I have explained that the 
ethical theory to which I feel less objection on the 
whole than to any other is the theory expressed by 
professor Moore in Principia Ethica and elsewhere, and 
in ray second chapter I have tried to show why I am not 
satisfied by that theory, by criticising that part of 
it which in a sense gives the key to the rest, the 
part consisting of professor Moore's account of in- 
trinsic goodness; this part gives the key to the other 
parts in the sense that according to professor Moore 
it is in terms of intrinsic goodness that all other 
ethical expressions are to be defined or explained. 
In my third chapter I have examined a type of defini- 
tion or explanation of the word good and other ethical 
words entirely opposed to professor Moore's, namely 
the naturalistic type; I have considered certain general 
reasons in favour of and against any sort or most sorts 
of naturalism, but have admitted that the arguments do 
not seem to be conclusive on either side; I have then 
put forward in detail a particular naturalistic explana- 
tion of the use or meaning of ethical expressions, which
seems not to be exposed to many of the objections that 
can be brought against most sorts of naturalism; but I 
admit that it is not at all clear to me that this 
special theory is true. In my fourth chapter I have 
examined the various meanings of words like reason and 
reasonable, which seem to need a different treatment 
from most of the words which may be called ethical 
words, but which have in common with ethical words 
that they are used to do what it is natural to call ex- 
pressing valuations of conduct. I come to the conclu- 
sion that there are no senses of these words which have 
to be defined in terms of non-natural characters, un- 
less certain other words, such as good, sometimes stand 
for non-natural characters, in which case such an 
expression as good reason may sometimes have to be de- 
fined in sich terras.
I propose in this final chapter to mention a special 
cause of ambiguity or obscurity of meaning which seems 
to affect ethical expressions, and may account for part 
of the difficulty of interpreting them which has appeared 
in this essay, and is very often acknowledged in books 
about ethics. I am not aware that this special cause 
of difficulty has been pointed out before. I shall then 
consider what difference, if any, is likely to be made, 
in their use of ethical expressions, by people who are
Ifo
convinced that the somewhat sceptical theory suggested 
in my third chapter is true; and I shall suggest a way 
in which, by acting in the way in which we should if 
the theory were true, and reflecting on the results of 
doing so, we can test the truth of the theory. Finally, 
I shall suggest that there are one or two circumstances 
which seem often to accompany uses of ethical expres- 
sions in a way which seems to have a regular connexion 
with the thoughts or feelings of the speaker or writer, 
and that these circumstances may help us to understand 
the use of ethical expressions, whether they enable us 
to define them or not.
The special cause of ambiguity or obscurity which 
I mentioned is that some ethical expressions seem to 
have uses, which are probably quite different from 
most of those that may be called their ethical uses, 
in which they quite plainly can be defined in terms of 
mental happenings; and that if the peculiarity of these 
uses is not perceived, it may be thought that some 
sentence containing a word in such a use expresses a 
necessary ethical truth, or at any rate some ethical
truth which is quite obvious and undeniable. Some
¥ 
sentences from the meaning of good, a dialogue by the
late Lowes Dickinson, may illustrate the way in which 
\\ 5th edition, pages 6 and 7.
the sort of use I have described may insensibly intrude 
among other uses of an ethical expression. I am not 
certain that Lowes Dickinson made the sort of mistake 
that I want to point out, but I think it looks as 
though such a mistake must, at any rate, have deter- 
mined the choice of some of his expressions. 'When it 
comes to the point you act, and are practically bound 
to act, upon your opinion about what is good, as though 
you did believe it to be true. ' 'My notion is that what 
systematises a life is choice; and choice, I believe, 
means choice of what we hold to be good.' 'But are 
there not men who deliberately choose what they think 
bad, like Milton's Satan - "Evil be thou ray Good"? Yes, 
but by the very terms of the expression he was choosing 
what he thought good; only he thought that evil was 
good.' In the passage from which these sentences are 
taken Lowes Dickinson was, I think, defending the opinion 
that people as a rule or always make choices and direct 
their actions by reference to what they believe to be 
good; this is an empirical conclusion which may be true 
and may be false, and for and against which reasons can 
be given. But the way in which he expressed this con- 
clusion was I think affected by the fact that the word 
good can be used in another way than that with which he 
was concerned; in such a sense that to say that it
seemed good to someone to act in a certain way simply
tw 
means that he chose to act in that way; and£Consequent-
ly to say that everyone always chooses what seems good 
to him, or what he thinks good, is a tautology. I 
think the mistake is sometimes made of thinking that 
sentences like this, used in the sense I am pointing 
out, express necessary or at any rate undeniable truths 
about goodness in some ethical sense; this is certainly 
a mistake, for whether the ethical uses of the word 
good have meanings or definable meanings, or on the 
other hand are meaningless, it seems quite clear that 
the word is constantly used in other ways than to say 
that something seems or is thought good, and that con- 
sequently it is used in ways which can not be defined 
in terms of choice. I think Lowes Dickinson was not 
entirely free from this mistake. People not only act 
upon their opinion about what is good, he wrote, but 
are practically bound so to act; the phrase practically 
bound was perhaps suggested by an inclination to think 
that what was being expressed was not merely an empiri- 
cal conclusion, but something like a necessary truth; 
though a different explanation is given in the succeed- 
ing sentences. Again, choice, he wrote, means choice 
of what we hold to be good; that you can not choose 
anything but what you think good is the principle from
which this seems to follow, but the reason for believing 
that principle is only that to think something good in 
the appropriate sense simply is to choose it. If there 
are any people who choose what they think bad, they 
must none the less be also choosing in some way what 
they think good. I do not suggest that Lowes Dickinson 
arrived at these conclusions simply as a result of the 
mistake I am describing, but I think it probably con- 
tributed to making up his mind, and to his choice of 
expressions. I think that the fact that there are uses 
of such words as good in which they have meanings of 
the kind I have described is probably one of the causes 
that have made people inclined to think that some or all 
ethical sentences expressed necessary truths. If so, 
this is a special case of a cause of error, or of er- 
roneous reasoning, which is I think fairly common; the 
confusion between different senses of a sentence in one 
of which it expresses a tautology and in another of 
which it expresses an empirical conclusion, which may 
be true and may be false, a confusion from which the 
result follows that an empirical conclusion is thought
to have some sort of certainty or necessity.
I think I have admitted, both here and in other 
parts of this essay, the great difficulty of seeing at 
all clearly what the meanings of ethical expressions 
are, if they have meanings. But if the sceptical theory 
that they have no meanings, which is expressed in my 
third chapter, is true, or if there are strong reasons 
in its favour, when we have seen that this is so, what 
difference will be made to the way in which we use 
such expressions? We shall, I suppose, try to distin- 
guish between our different motives for using words, 
and try to detect which the occasions are on which we 
want to use an expression wholly or ehifcfly to produce 
some action or feeling on the part of some hearer or 
reader, and which are those on which we want to com- 
municate a statement. We shall note that on the occa- 
sions in the former set, in using ethical expressions
I have pointed out what seems to be another case of this 
confusion in my fourth chapter, on page '^' I think 
that in the same sort of way in which the conclusion that 
people always choose what they think good may be deduced 
from the tautology that they always choose what they 
choose, in a disguised form, psychological hedonism and 
psychological egoism are perhaps sometimes deduced from 
the tautologies I like what I like, and I want what I want
we shall very likely be taking the most effective means 
of realising our purpose, but that on the occasions in 
the latter set, if we introduce an ethical expression, 
as habit will very likely prompt us to do, we shall be 
using an expression which is partly meaningless, and 
so shall at best be making our statement in an imperfect 
way. And to reflect in this way on our motives for 
using words may, I think, be part of a very useful 
method of testing the truth of the theory I am speaking 
of. On all occasions on which we feel an inclination 
to use a sentence containing some ethical expression, 
provided we are addressing comparatively sophisticated 
hearers or readers, we may ask ourselves whether some 
other sentence can be found which, whether or not it 
has the same meaning, will serve our purpose for the 
moment, and which leaves out the ethical expression; 
and we may form the habit of using as much as possible 
these substituted expressions. We may then ask our- 
selves whether as a result of using the substituted 
expressions we are habitually leaving out part of what 
we think and want to say. If we find it hard to dis- 
cover expressions which can be substituted, and if we 
conclude that when we use substituted expressions 
there is always or nearly always some part of what we 
think and want to say which is left out, we may
reasonably infer that the theory about meaningless 
uses is not true, and in fact that no naturalistic 
ethical theory is true. But if we find that other 
expressions can always or nearly always be substituted 
for ethical expressions, and if it seems that no part 
of what we think and want to say is left out as a re- 
sult, we may infer that some naturalistic theory is 
true; supposing, further, it seems that when we are 
inclined to use one of the substituted expressions 
and try to replace it by an ethical expression, part 
of what we think and want to say is being left out, we 
may infer that the true naturalistic theory is the 
theory about meaningless uses.
I am afraid that I have left my answer to the 
question what, if anything, ethical expressions mean 
very inconclusive. There are one or two considerations 
about the situations in which ethical expressions are 
used, which I have reserved to the end; I think they 
are not unconnected with the question I have mentioned, 
but it is not clear to me that they enable us to answer 
it. First, there is a certain sort of inference which 
I think can often be made from the fact that someone 
has used a certain ethical expression. Suppose someone 
has used such words as it would be a good thing to return to 
free trade, and there is reason to think that he used
them in good faith, we can infer from the fact that 
he has used these words that he is in favour of return- 
Ing to free trade, or would like free trade to be 
restored; and we can make these inferences in certain 
quite ordinary senses of the expressions I have used. 
The sense in which we should say in ordinary English 
that someone is in favour of free trade is, I think a 
clear and precise sense, although the statement we 
make is very general, since there are many different 
kinds of happening on account of any of which we can 
say that someone is in favour of something, or would 
like something. Again, if someone has said I think it 
would be a good thing to return to free trade, we can 
probably make the same inference as in the other case; 
but in addition it seems as though it follows from 
the statement that he has made, quite apart from the 
fact that he has made it, that he is in favour of free 
trade, though of course what follows need not be true 
unless the premiss is true. But neither of these facts 
enables us to say that the meaning or part of the mean- 
ing of the sentence it would be a good thing to return 
to free trade simply is the same as the meaning of 
I am in favour of free trade, even if they suggest that 
this is so. we should only be justified in saying that, 
if it could be shown that what is meant by I am in
favour of free trade follows from what is meant by 
it would be a good thing to return to free trade. If 
that were so, it would be reasonable to think that the 
meaning or part of the meaning of the word good in a 
certain use could be defined in terms of someone being 
in favour of something. It is possible that there is 
a use of the word which does allow such a definition, 
but there seems to be at least one strong objection 
to such a definition; that if it were correct, sen- 
tences containing the word good, or some of them, 
would, simply because they contained that word, be 
in a certain sense about the person who had spoken or 
written the sentence. Of course this objection is not 
conclusive, because a definition or analysis may be 
correct even if it is surprising. But it suffices to 
make it unreasonable to conclude that a definition of 
the sort I have mentioned would be correct, simply on 
the strength of the two inferences which I have said 
that we can make. So in view of the considerations so 
far put forward, all we can say is that when someone 
says that something is or would be good, he very pro- 
bably is as a matter of fact in favour of the thing 
he calls good.
My second consideration about the situations in 
which ethical expressions are used concerns those
beliefs which accompany the use of such expressions, 
other than beliefs, if they are beliefs, that something 
is good or right. It seems to me that when someone 
says that a certain course of action would be good as 
a means, he very likely at the same time has a belief, 
not, I should say, simply that such an action would 
increase happiness, but perhaps that it would increase 
the happiness of a certain set of people in a certain 
way, or something at least as determinate as this. 
Again, if someone says that a certain state of affairs 
would be intrinsically good, or good on the whole, he 
may at the same time have a belief that in that state 
of affairs many people in a certain group would be 
happy in a certain way, or would be engaged in a cer- 
tain sort of intellectual activity, or something of 
that kind. The sort of belief I am trying to describe 
would be very much more determinate than mere beliefs 
about happiness or activity in general; consequently 
the belief involved on almost every occasion would be 
different from the belief on every other occasion. 
Suppose we thought that goodness could be defined in 
terms of the beliefs I have described, there would be 
two methods of defining it that we might adopt. We 
might say that the word good was a very general 
expression, and that to call something good was to say
\it>
that one had some belief or other of a certain kind. 
Such a definition would have the advantage, that if 
it were correct, though it might be necessary to dis- 
tinguish several ethical senses of the word good, such 
as it is customary to distinguish, it would not be 
necessary to suppose that the word's senses were im- 
mensely varied and almost beyond classification. 
Under the second sort of definition we might give, 
the senses of the word good probably would be immense- 
ly varied; for the second sort of definition would be 
to say that the word is not a very general expression, 
but on different occasions there are different beliefs 
which someone says that he has, by calling something 
good; and that what exactly the belief is that someone 
says he has depends partly upon the subject of which 
he is speaking. I am inclined to think that this se- 
cond sort of definition may very well be a true account 
of a way in which the word good and other ethical words 
are sometimes used, though I do not see any strong 
reason for believing any definition of the first sort; 
and I shall try to construct the second sort of defini- 
tion in more detail.
Suppose the word good or some other ethical expres- 
sion is used within a group of acquaintances each of 
whom is fairly familiar with the feelings and opinions
\<0\
of the rest; or suppose it is used within some group 
of people who have met for a clearly understood com- 
mon purpose, for example a committee to dispense 
relief to the unemployed; and suppose in such a group 
some practical question is being discussed about what 
is to be done in a particular situation; then it is 
very likely that if someone advocates a certain course, 
in words in which he calls something good, he has at 
the same time a belief that the action he is advocating 
will increase the happiness of a certain set of people 
in a particular way, or some equally determinate belief 
I think it is also not unlikely, given the conditions 
I have described, that some at least of his hearers 
will be aware that he is having the belief which in 
fact he has. If this is so, there is a very obvious 
suggestion we may make about the meaning of the word 
good, and of other ethical expressions, when used in 
the circumstances I have described. We may say that 
in such circumstances these expressions are used in a 
great variety of senses, and that the exact sense in 
which an expression is used depends upon the interests 
and aims which the people among whom it is being used 
have in common, or the interests and aims on the part 
of each other which they are familiar with; so that, 
since an indefinite variety of interests and aims is
possible, there is no way of giving an exhaustive 
catalogue of the senses in which the expressions can 
be used. But we shall add that all the senses within 
this large group have something in common. There are 
two alternative accounts that we may give of what these 
senses have in common, and I am not sure which has more 
in its favour. We may say that in all these senses 
the sentence containing an ethical expression means 
either that its user believes that a certain compara- 
tively determinate action would have a certain compara- 
tively determinate result, or that he believes that a 
certain comparatively determinate state of affairs 
would have a certain comparatively determinate intrin- 
sic nature. Or we may say that in all the senses in 
question the sentence that is used means simply either 
that a certain action would have a certain result, or 
that a certain state of affairs would have a certain 
intrinsic nature. The difference on which these al- 
ternatives rest is the difference between saying that 
one has a certain belief and expressing a certain be- 
lief. In either case the result or the intrinsic 
nature involved is either something which most of the 
members of the group I described would like to be 
realised, or something which they are aware that the 
user of the sentence would like to be realised.
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It seems to me not improbable that the word good 
and other ethical expressions are used in the way I 
have just described. Even if they are, there must I 
think be a great many other uses that remain unex- 
plained. Some of the remainder may be explicable or 
definable in terms of someone being in favour of some- 
thing; and some may be explicable or definable in a 
way which combines the complicated explanation I have 
just given with an explanation in terms of someone 
being in favour of something. But I doubt whether all 
can be explained in these ways. If the account I have 
just suggested of the meaning of such words as good, 
when they are used among people who can assume that 
they have a certain community of interest or purpose, 
is true, this use of the words gives a good illustra- 
tion of a general principle I suggested in my intro-
1* 
ductory chapter; the general principle that there are
many uses of words in which their meaning can not be 
discovered without examining a large number of circum- 
stances accompanying their use, and that very often,
at least, there is no single simple means of pointing 
out that sense of an expression which one wants to 
consider. When this principle has been put into appli- 
cation, perhaps many of the difficulties which have 
been encountered in this essay will disappear.
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Meaning and generality. 
(Austin £. Duncan-Jones )
I. Introductory.
The topics to be considered in this essay fall into three 
groups: first, the analysis of meaning; second, the analysis 
of generality; third, the consideration of certain incidental 
questions, the chief of which is the bearing of a theory of 
meaning upon the truth or falsity of some forra of solipsism, 
the first group of topics occupies sections S - 9 o~J '5 o^J |& ^ 
the second sroup sections 10   12^ ; and the third ftroap 
sections '1, IS", a^J \°-[ . 1 regard the analysis of meaning 
and the analysis of generality as interdependent, in the sense 
that one analysis con only bo moved a stage forward if at the 
same titae a correspondln|» advance la made in the other, and that 
a complete solution of one problem involves a complete solution 
of the other. Thus this easaj rasj be said to be concerned <^ith 
a ningle topic In which it i* convenient to distinguish two an- 
peats. 1 hope to reach a certain point in the analysis of tnean- 
ing and generality, but do not claim to give the final analysis.
Meaning in used in several senses, but in nil the senses 
with which 1 deal meaning is a ohjiraoter of words or combinations 
of words,or non-verbal symbols or their combinations. ?o ask 
for the analysis of meaning is rather like asking for the analysis 
of ancestry or causation. One might give en answer by saying that
2ancestry la that character or property which someone has in 
virtue of having the particular parents grandparents and so 
on whora he did have. Bat it would bo much more simple and 
straightforward to give the analysis of tteorge T was an ancestor 
of George V, or x was an an oca tor of ^, or a, was at Qauge of j>. 
Similarly it is much more convenient to consider the analysis 
of meaning by considering sentences which state that some ex- 
pression has a certain cleaning. 3o 1 shall constantly be ex- 
amining sentences like /pfoat noons ffatT. /writing means doing 
thisjr, /JTljeflt parti means he has gonej. ^/qy pen is on the table 
means that this is on thatj*
In asking for an analysis I am always consider in?* some ex- 
pression, or fom of expression (ai when one substitutes x for 
Oeorge Y) . and asking for soae other expression which has the 
same meaning as the expression first consiuorod t but which also 
corresponds more exactly with that raeanlnf?, or with what is meant, 
than the original expression does, ?his is not an analysis of 
analysis; 1 do not want to decide here the question whether 
analysis is fundamentally concerned with facts or propositions 
or sentences, but shall assume that it can proceed by the method
uv:
1. Symbolist: italic^ axe used, here and throughout, to indicate 
that the italicised expression is belnft referred to an an exnregsi 
and not used significantly; v/hen it is necermary to refer to an 
expression which itself contains an expression referred to in this 
way, the contained expression in itRlloisod and the oontalnins 
expression enclosed in square
of performing a particular sort of operation upon sentences. 
fo analyse analysis I should have to explain how an expressIon 
can correspond more exactly with a meaning than another expression 
does, and in doing this it would be necessary also to decide 
whether correspondence with a meaning invalvelcorrespondence with, 
or gone relation to, a fact or n proposition. Only then could 
one decide with what analysis) is fundamentally concerned, even if 
the question what analysis Is fundamentally concerned with is not, 
as I suspect it la, an obscure way of asking for the analysis of 
analysis.
This is obviously not the place to analyse analysis; for, 
an has Just boon said, in the method here adopted an analysing 
expression la to be defined as an expression which both has the 
same meaning as & certain other and has the further character of 
corresponding more exactly with that meaning. Consequently 
neither of the two characters which an analysing expression must 
have is likely to be enalysable in a way whloh would not involve 
the analysis of meaning. ?he analysis of meaning most either 
precede or accompany, and can not follow, the analysis of analysis, 
unless there la a radical mistake in the preliminary definition 
Of analysis which 1 have suggested.
8, fype and token.
1 shall generally avoid the word gentenoe. partly because
what 1 henre to a ay applies to none things whloh ore not sentences, 
and partly because It does not apply to all sentences. Boashly, 
1 am concerned with all combinations of objects which ore used 
to cxake statements. Them what I have to say applies both to sooa 
corabinations of non-verbal symbols, saoh as those aged in mathe- 
matics and logic, and to other seta of objects used according to 
a prearranged code, such as the glass on the dl»h used by Tlsdora's 
gangster to show that he has killed Al Capone (logical construct- 
jlonsJT, *lifld April l&^l p, «i06); these combinations ^ould not 
usually be called sentences. On the other hand some sentences 
are aueatlona requests or commands, and to these what I am saying 
will not apply. I propose to cull sentences which are not ^ 
requests or commands or nonneuse, end all oonbinatiori)19) of objects 
which are used in the sara« way aa thene scntenoes, prepositional 
signs. One may define a proposition*!! si^u as any recurrent com- 
bination of objects used with that sort of meaning which belonns 
to statements. It then becomes clear that the analysis of pro- 
positional sign?! of the form £ jhs a uroiiof^itional nign is part of 
the analysis of meaning.
I called propositional signs recurrent combinations beoau.se 
aentsnoes are, roughly, reourront oonblnationn. In the ordinary 
sense of sentenoe. a sinnle sentence nay be apoken written and 
heard any nuraber of times, and we raay say of a number of separate 
 vents or states of affairs that they are all the sane sentence. 
1 propose to use the phrase promositional sisn in a similar way;
I shall say of different events or states of affairs that they 
are the same gropositional sign, and each o£ the separate Instances 
I shall call a pro positional token (the terminology here used is 
taken from C. 3. Pelroe and explained by F. P. Bamsey. fpondationa 
of mathematics p. 274); propooitional tokens which, in the sense 
explained, are the same propositions! sign will be called tokens 
of the same type. Elements or parts of prepositional signs 
be called proposltlonnl units, or emits simply, and individual 
instances of theae elements will be celled unit tokens. Pro- 
positions! units may be words or combinations of words, and may 
be saoh things &** a glass renting on a plate, as in Wisdom's 
example.
2. Definition.
I propose to analyse mean as it occurn in lour different 
aorta of definition. These four different sorts are given us 
by a erosa-olassifieatiOfl. tfirst one aay divide definitions 
into those in which a propooitional niftn and those in v;hioh a 
prepositional unit is defined, which one na,? call proportional 
* and unit definitions. secondly one raay divide thera into those 
in vrhioh the definition is b^,' neana of another expression and 
those in which it is by neans of an object or proposition; these 
may be oallod lubstitutive and objective definitions, ?he sub- 
stitutlve prepositional definition will be called sentential; the
objective prepositional will be referential; the sabntitatlve 
tutlt definition will be oonnotational; and the objective unit 
definition denotatlonal. ?he four examples in raj first section 
were a oonnotational definition, n denotational, a sentential, 
and a referential, in that order. Other examples are: sentential, 
/John and James are brother a weans J.ohn and James are pale and 
had at least one oonnon pareiitJ: referential, /lyhe provident is 
dead (for example, in a newspaper) means that liindenborg ia deadj 
- I might say this to nomeone who thought it was Koonevolt - or 
/Ulndenbar^ la dead means that Kindenbarg is deadj - as one nlrrht 
say in a logical discussion; oonnotational, /To roi means the 
kin^7; denotational, /"the vlotor of Aneterlita meoiir? '.'apoleonj. 
In the first and third exaraplaa we may substitute noajaa v7hat is 
raeaat \$_ for aeans. and the tr-to ItalioiaeQ expressions may be 
pat in either order; this is why the? aro called sabstitative 
definitions, A nubsfcltu^lve definition oau always be turned 
into an objective definition; wo do awa^ with the Italics of the 
defining expression, and insert that after means if the definition 
is propositional. On the othor hand, whether an objective defin- 
ition can be evade sab^tlfcutive is a matter of chance, ?he tr?o 
sorts of subatltutlve definition can be defined in terms of the 
two sorts of objective definition. In thin uaj; if n means h_. In 
the substltutive r»aa*e of ncrsn. than ?rhat & means in the objective 
sense is identical with what b_ means in the objective nense. "o 
oy principal need is to analyne the objective sense, or rnther
the two objective senses, of raoaii. "She deflnition.i of the two 
subatitutlve senses niay then be o;iven a rather les» cryptic form.
Quite apart from the dependence which 1 have Just pointed 
out of the substltutive senses) on tho objective senses, it in, 
1 think, natural to expect the objective senses to be of nore 
philosophical Interest than tho others, because they aive the 
relation of language to the world, or to facts, while the «?ub- 
atltutive senses warily f?ive relation internal to
4, Method: prepositional alsna an piotoren.
She analysis of meaning ^hloh 2 shall try to give Is baaed 
on the view of language expressed by Hittgensteiu in tho words 
'the proposition is a picture of reality* ( tract at ua lo&i.oo-jjhilo- 
4»0l). Ho also says (E«15j r that the elements of the
picture are oorabinad with one another In a definite v/a,y represents 
that the things are so combined with ono another 1 . 'Jhore are 
obvious consideration?! in favour of tills general point of view. 
In moot lannsaa^es the raothod of saying \7hatover hn*t to be said 
la (ieterralned, within certain Units, by the vocabulary, which 
links words and phrases with objectn, ami the rules of syntax, 
which link the ooabiniAT of toras with the combining of objects; 
often, of course, the vocabulary and syntax allow alternative*, 
but the number of alternatives is Halted. To any difference
8in what has to be said a difference of vocabulary or of syntax 
or both corresponds. A good deal of Russell's logical wor^K 
has bean direoted to showing that gradualleal form is not a 
guide to the form of facts. One can now see that it is a very 
imperfect galdo. yet it oan not be denied that there ia some 
formal correspondence between language and what it expresses, 
and that nearly all linguistic prepositional signs display it 
ia some degree.
On the other hand, quite apart from the logical defects of 
language as an analysing agent, to conceive lanpjua^e an a p Jet tire 
or formal counterpart of what it expresses in r.ot a sufficient 
explanation of the connexion. It is possible to tell what a 
picture in the ordinary sense represent?* by simple inspection 
of it. But it is rarely possible to tell, from simple attention * 
to a spoken written or arranged ai^n, what it represents; or 
rather it is impossible to toll from unsophisticated attention. 
What the sign represents can only be perceived by a person who 
is sophisticated in the sense that he krto'-vs how it is belnn; used. 
we know, fron the fact that there are clifferent lanp,uai?*es, that 
different si^ns can represent the sane objects and combinations; 
and from the possibility ol" njr.ibicu.lty, that the same sign can 
represent different objects and conblnations. ^e nay »ny roughly 
that it is possible for any sl^n to represent anything;  1 think 
something of this sort has been said by ,T ittger»stein IB aisoussions  
-though there are differences of convenience and practical limits.
9Thus it is correct to call proponifcional signs pictures or formal 
counterparts only because If someone knovra how their units are 
being used and how the placing or arranging of the units is beln^ 
tisad, ho knows what they represent; and not because they renemble 
what they represent in the direct way in -tfhioh a picture or iiodel 
(Wittgenatain'o worQ t fi«12j reaorablos vrhat is depicted or copied. 
fiadom, in disougsinr: 'flttgenstein (logical conatraotiojig I, ?,!ind 
April 1931 p. £02) f £oes further; he aoya 'harQl^ ajii/. If Q«^, 
aejntenoea in any ordinary language do picture i'aota . ... ho is 
trying to point oat an ideal to which some sentences try to attain': 
but I thlrik this la too far.
What is required, then, for an an&lysla of meaning in the 
denotations! senae ( § 3 j is the discovery of what is meant by 
saying that a propositional unit i$ linked by tisane with nomo 
Object, or is used to atan3 lor some object; and for the analysis 
of meaning in the referential aense, what is naaat by saying that 
the combining of certain onitn in a propositioned si^n is linked 
by uaage with the combining of certain objects.
It is 3oa©time3 aasiuracd, J think, that the usa^e factor in 
aeaning, Ja^t referred to, must be a mental factor; that is, that 
it moat have sotae relation to aantal happenings oonoistinp, of 
people consciously ftttaohin.i; a nenne to a si^c or unit. If this 
assumption were trie, tha aarJLynis of ajeonlzi^ in the denotations! 
sense - to take the simpler case - would be on those lines; de- 
notational definitions would mean that raoat people who have uned
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a certain propositional onit have attached a certain sense to it, 
or perhaps h«ve one*!! it to ntanfl for n certain object. Tuoh an 
analysis would not nmoont to raach tintll ono had anplifiod it by 
unalyfllnsr attaching a sense, or unlntf n unit to »tand for an object; 
thin factor would, of coarse, hava to he anfclysad in terms of some 
conscious mental process. I rcuppect. though I ara not certain, 
that if it were true that a mental factor of thia sort wag involved 
in the analysis of rtienjiinr;, it; woulfi turn out that thin mental 
factor wai still in need of psychological e-*^ experimental in- 
ventis;atioa t so that we should not yet be in a position to carry 
the analysis any farther; we fshould have to weit until we co-old 
analyse the descriptions* of thia mental factor pat forward by 
psychologists. But tiUis ia *iuly a conjecture. In any case I 
doubt whether the usage factor in meaning in a mental factor, and 
will try to say why.
It is well known that children all learn some language, havlnc 
previously known none, and th&t people living arxmc foreigners 
with whom th® f^ hove no lanp,nap;e in ooranon can pone the less pick 
ap the lan?ump:e spoken by the people rowfl them. It in clear 
that when a lansaafce if? learnt in thin way the process of learning 
mast be baned in none way on observation of the llnkinr; of pro- 
positional tmitj? with objects an3 of comb i not 3 on n of them with cor.- 
bination?? of objects. It in clear thP-t mental processes of ntt 
a ?ense to a sign exe not observed, -.Vhet in observed conaints, 
roughly, of the uttering of certain nounds, most of which are of
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ft general netare which reours a aumbex of times, and the occurring 
of certain other happening or atates of i*f fairs ix oortain spatio- 
temporal reletlons to thene sounds. It seems to me that it may 
!»» possible to analyse rr.eaElxig simply in terms of the sort of 
phenomena which would be observed by someone picking up a language.
Th* argument from pitting up a language la cot a conclusive 
proof that meaning oan be snelyned In terms of non-mental phenomena. 
The argument woxLd t© that, since people sometime? know ?/hat the 
prepositional si^na belonging to a certain language mean when they 
have fiisde sufficient observations! of the npatlotempornl relationpi 
and other observable relations between the si^na and other objects, 
what they ere knowicg about, meaning fjimpl^ conBlats of the facts
that the observable relations have occurred; end therefore all
a.
factn to the effect that pou?o proper? it ional ^Igc or o.r,it has/cer- 
tain meaning are simply con.^titutee b^ the holding of observable 
relations between expren^lorif? oud other objects. This is the 
assumption which 1 ar/i in fret adopting. But the alleged facts 
about piofciiig o*> a I*4iguag6 wouJ.cl be or^able of another inter- 
pretation: that the ooourrenoe of the obrorvr.ble reletiong bo- 
tneen sign? and other ofcjeotn to rhloh 1 hs.ve rcforrcfi , or the 
obourvHtioii of them, oa.uaes ^Jhe nupponoa Ic&rnora to infer that 
the u»«rs of the nlcnn nre attaching oortr-in rsenses to then, and 
that what the learners (ire Saiowln^ vrlien they kr.ovr thr.t the pro- 
positional sir;n9 and onitq hnve certain neaningn consists of facts 
partly con^titutod by mental factors, namely the attaching of
IE
aenaes; there might or might not be the attaching of a sense 
by th« learners an an intermediate oaunol stn/*o.
I therefore do not venture to say for certain that meaning 
oan be analysed witboat reference to nny mental factor; I think 
it is clear that the analysis oan go none distance, bat possibly 
mental factors have to be brought in to oonplete it. 3at if 
mental factors ere involved, the arfturaent iron picking tap a 
shows that whenever a prepositional aign or unit has n certain 
meaning it must always stand in certain observable relations to 
objects xrom which it would be lop.ioally possible to infer the 
mental factor. There would be a systematic correspondenoe between 
these observable relations and the mental factors; so that if 
the observable relations could bu traced, if they did not fora 
part of the analysis of meaning, they would, all the same, show 
the pattern or structure of the raental factors which did form 
part of the analysis.
fhas we may reasonably expeot observable relations between 
prepositional siRns and onlta, nn<3 objects and their combinations, 
to take us some distance in the direction of seeing how sirens 
and objects are linked by
5, speakers and reporters.
If meaning oan be analysed on the lines suggested, so that 
the relation between a prepositional nign and its neaning is seen
to be comparable up to a point with that between a plotare and 
what It represents, provided Its units and their arrangement 
are properly linked by usa^e with objects and their combinations, 
then it will be clear that the relations which constitute the 
meaning of language are simply a special and nonewh&t subtle cane 
of the ordinary uniformities which are obnorvable throughout the
of
wholes/nature. ?his_, which seems to me the most fruitful way of 
regarding language, <4j£ han been very clearly expressed by L. J. 
Eoasell (procrarist 8 soc. sup. vol. XE£I» 1 9*»4* p. 177): f any 
public performance .... can be called a "report" . A "report" 
is relative to a "reporter"', which may bo a machine, or a plant, 
or an animal, or a person, oto. An aolfl turns blue litnun paper 
red. "Turning red" is the report made by litmus paper In the 
presence of an aoid. A weight of 1 It), put on the scale of a 
good balance makes the finger of the balance turn to the nark 
*1 lb." ?he taking up of thles position by the finper In the 
"report" of the balance when 1 Ib. in on Itn noale*. One onn 
see that the difference between Russell *s litnuu and pound weight 
and a person writing or talking Knglish Is one of degree. Imagine 
a parrot which has a vocabulary consisting of the worde John and 
Kary; suppose It snyq John only when John cornea into the roon 
and l^ary only when Mary ooneg into the room; It would perhaps 
be a stage nearer to the adult human decree of sophistication 
than the litraos paper, though it would not have attained syntax. 
The next stage would perhaps be found in the early utterances of
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an infant, when rudimentary syntax begins to operate: find so on. 
The link between the turning red of the paper and the acid, the 
link between the saying of John and the entry of John, can oor- 
tainly, and the link between an infant'*1! early remarks and objects 
they represent oan probably, be analysed wholly in terms of observ- 
able factors, When one considers the natter in this way it seems 
natural to expeot that the links which constitute the meaning of 
language in its sophisticated u*ea can also be so analysed.
6. Events, modes, facts, elements, objects. ^
It la agreed that there are curtain objects or ooraplexes 
whose relation to prepositional sifpis constitutes the meaning 
Of those signs. But there arc various different declinations 
for these objects or complexes, of which fact im perhaps at 
present the favouxito. tfinciora in logical const ructions and irs 
18 analysis a useful method In philosophy? (proo. a«ist. soc.
sup. vol. A IT . 1934 j bases his discussion of analysis on the
relations between sentences and facts; <7iadorn begins by 
the facts which ordinary sentences in the ordinary sense express, 
and ends by distinguishing different types or orders of facts, the 
existence of some of which he claims to be analynable in terras of 
the existence of others. The reference to facts is very oonvenient, 
for two reasons; first, aocording to the ordinary colloquial use 
of the word fact, to which vladorn carefully confines himself as
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far BUS possible, to every true sentence or true use of a sentence 
there corresponds one and only one foot, which it is natural to 
call the fact expressed by that sentence. To some sentences 
different facts correspond according to the circumstances of their 
use - these are chiefly those which contain^ personal or demon-
£«->•—Cifi^t-i Itil d-L^m\Xji fJ^^C^J.
strative pronouns,/and here, then, now, and so on - but there is 
no great difference of principle. T?hos when an analysis Is sought 
a sentence is put forward for consideration, and provided the 
sentence, or the use of It which is in question, is true,,it is 
certain that one and only one fact is being investigated. All 
sentences with the same meaning express the sane fact, if they 
express any, and all sentences expressing the seme fact have the 
sarae meaning. I'hos the product of analysis ia a new sentence 
expressing the same fact as the sentence first considered t and 
with the sarae meaning, but expressing that feet or that neaninf; 
more analytically, ^eoondly, s point srhlch follows frees the 
first, a fact may have any decree or kind of particularity or 
generality, deternlnatenca?) or Indeternlnater.eRs, and so on. In 
exact correspondence with these characters as they belong to 
sentences or their moaning?.
Wisdom's logical work4 IB based on the varloble nature of 
facts, as 1 have just described it. *hl& is not necessarily 
a defect, for I do not think it can be questioned that the word 
fact actually is used in such a way that my description is true. 
But this use of fact is analytically imperfect, and is recognised
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to b<t so by Wisdom. Accordingly he gives an analysis of gen- 
erality which is roughly to the effect that the existence of 
general facts la to be analysed In terns of the existence of 
non-general faots and of general sentences which Incompletely 
express thera (this Is ay approximate way of patting It; ??lscion's 
statements are in logical canstraction V. : ind April 1&&5 p. 192, 
a»d Is analysis & useful method in philosophy? pp. 72-3). He 
thus concludes, to use for the moment a terminology which I should 
agree with hlra in finding unnatinfactor?, that non-^enerel facts 
are more fundamental than general foots. This is the type of 
eolation for the question of generality to which I think one natur- 
ally cornea if one considers mainly relation* between prepositional 
signs and facts, and i ara not certain that it la not correct. 
I think, however, that this type of solution seems less obviously 
correct if one considers prepositional signs otherwise than in 
relation to faots.
It Is the peouliarity, and op to a point the convenience, of 
faots, that the sentences, for Instance, ^oott vyrote Xarmlon and 
the author of 'ovorlej wrote Maralon express two differect faots - 
difference of meaning, difference of fact, is the rule. ?hls is 
puaalln/?;, if one reflects that both the sentences and both the 
facts relate to one single set of happenings, tue writing of a 
particular book by a particular person, and if one allows one's 
mind to dwell too maoh on the conception of facts as what the 
world really consists of; not, of courne, that one has any
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to be puaaled. 1 propose to consider prepositional signs, not 
In their relation to facts, bat in their relation to the happenings 
to which I have Just vaguely said that the two sentences and the 
two facts relate. ?or therte object?? t which it would not always 
be correct to call happenings, I shall use a special word, borrowed 
from 'Tisdom. The word event has often been used by philosophers 
in recent years, whether in accordance with colloquial usnf^ e 1 am 
not sure, to mean something which in not a continuant, but differs 
from it In that, while a continuant lasts for a certain tine and 
pastes through certain changes, what is called an event occupies 
a time and contains changes. ?/lsd'on (lo.fllool constructions TT. 
Kind Oct. 1931 pp. 46ii-£>) points out that it Is incorrect to call 
anything an event if it does not contain a change, and 
the use of another word, taode_. 1 propone to adopt this 
and shall use it, as 1 think /iscion did, to netin something which 
either is an event in the sense ,1ust pointed out, or differs from 
an event only in that it contains no change (this is n denotatlonal 
definition). .Ylsdoa's exanple of a lao&e of tiie latter sort is 
the persistence during a certain time of a certain colour unchanged 
throughout a certain aren. loott*n writing of ""orraion VTGS cither 
an event/" if he wrote it at a sitting or a sot oi separate events. 
(if he wrote it at several sittings), ana accordingly either a node 
or a set of separate node?*.
Consider a comparatively simple mode, consisting for instance 
of my pen falling to the floor. W« may say thet the prepositional
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sign as 2SSL hfta faHen on the floor raeona that this node has 
occurred; this is a referential definition. How Just aa facts 
are commonly spoken of «a made ap of certain elenentn, nodes 
also can be divided Into elements. Bat this division can be 
made in any number of different ways. One may aay t for instance, 
that the elements of the mode in my example are ray pen, the process 
of falling on something, and the floor; or that they fire the fall- 
ing of (ay pen and the resting of u\y pen on the floor; and so OK. 
About each set of elements one mention?) onu may odd and these are 
all the elepunts. Thus a st&teraont that certain objects are the 
element(i of a certain node is not ueuonaarily incompatible with 
a statement that certain othor objects are its elefaontn. 7he 
division into elenaatu? is in a way arbitrary. But not wholly; 
If one selects none elements from one set and dome from another, 
it may torn out that together they nake up the mode, or it may not. 
For example it ?/ill not do to lnola«3e the felling of Rjy pen (en 
event;, end the prooem? of falling la character involved by that 
event jj In the aaae net. 'then two elonentn can be included in the 
flame set we nay say that they are ^coordinate eleraents; and when 
two or raore elements ere a ooraplete rtet f that ia f together moke 
ap the node in question, we rany pay that they are complementary 
elements.
I think these remarks show raore or les^ how 1 use the word 
element t although 1 am not able to ftive a connotatlonal definition. 
It is sometiraos oonvonioct to use tii® word object. An object,
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as 3 use the word, is anything that can be on element of n mode, 
and also anything that oan be an element of a fact. ?htin ny 
03 e of the word is completely general. It may occasionally be 
convenient to speak of non-existent objects, for instance to call 
unicorns objects; but this need does not often arise, arid no ham 
will be done if It is not borne in mind . ?hene uses of the words 
and ob|ect occasionally cause misunderstanding; this is
generally because it is supposed that to call something an element 
or an object in to say seme thing about its analysis, or to give 
some  xplsnetion of itn nature. This is not BO, for instance 
when, in aaivcrgals and p_artioolarf? (prog. arif?t. soc. ISiJiS iJ 
I refer to a time as cm eleneat of a fact, I am not making any 
claim about the analysis of tine. ^gnea^ end object, are .julte 
non-committal. Here ray use of elecient appear?) to differ forra 
^iatiom 1 ^. He would, 1 think, distinguish elements of facts from 
parts and sections of facts (logical oonatruotiong Til', vind Oct. 
193£ pp. 443-Sj; but his parts and sections would I think be 
elements in ray sense,
7. Applicative regularity.
1 con now begin to consider the analysis of meaning In the 
sense In which the meaning of a prepositional unit Is given by 
a denotational definition - It will be convenient to call meaning 
In this sense denotations! moaning. Both here and In section 3 
I am concerned with those senses of inefinln^ In which we talk about 
the ordinary or accepted or correct meaning of an expression. 
Thus I am not concerned at present with the senses In which we 
can any that someone has used an expression with a certain meaning, 
or has attached a oertoin sense to It, oia a certain occasion; 
though I may be concerned with the senses In which we can say that 
an expression is commonly used with a certain meaning. ?he typo 
Of analysis \7hlch I an trying to glvo in indicated in section 5: 
if one Is hoping to find unii'ornltieR of connexion between the 
 rents which constitute prepositional sl,<?ns and othor pieces of 
the world, one is obviously adopting a route which rrlll lead first 
to ordinary uses and only subieniently to special uses.
It will be convenient to distinguish the serwe of observe 
in which someone is only ob*ervin«r something if It. Is a factor in 
his experience at a particular time, 1'rom the sense, used already 
In my earlier sections, in which the recurrence of somethins at 
several times can be observed. I shnll say that what is observed 
in the former sense is directly observed. 1 propose to exnnine 
the way in which a familiar expression, which raipht be used by 
anyone In giving an account of something he Is directly observing.
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la related to the observed object for nhich it stands; for 
example, the phrase or proportional unit the rain raifrht be usod 
in aoch prepositional si^ns as the rain has stopped. Uie rain Is 
getting heavier, the rain la tarniBR into snow, and so on. What 
oou-T'-e should I take if e foreigner or s child asked ne what the 
rala meant? I ml^ht point out of window and say /The rain raeant 
thatj, or I might say /¥he rain mean* the water falling from the 
sfe^J, or /jThe roln means what j»oa would feel if you wont oat of 
doorej. ^he-ie v«>ulS all be correct Oonotationnl aeflritions, 
though ortly the pooond Is eonvcrtlljle, in tho vr®y described in 
section 3, into a oonnotational definition. In n flecotational 
definition one ma^ adopt, an^ method one 13kop of brlnfflnrr to the 
notice of one lei henrex or ror^ei- tho object neant: the definition 
CTI»J' be, like ny i'lrst, whnt Joloiston called ost;cnnive f or of any 
other sort, ^hat link dooa this definition asrtort to exist be- 
tween the pro positional anlt nnd the ob.joot nointod oat or clesarib 
The obvloas acswor Is on the linos of scyinft that "iost poople 
have used the rjajn to raemi whot is pointed ou.t. Bat inin<? sono- 
thing to mesn something vrould still reciuire analysis. Let us 
iflagine, for the moraent, thiit ^n^llah is a ver^ simple language 
ttaed by B. primitive tribe. "?hls tribe only has names for a small 
number of objeots, all of which are directly observable objects, 
and its laaja^e has no syntax of the ordinary sort. &Jiy name, 
when uttered, means that the object nnned is present in the 
speaker's environment. '?he nenbers of the tribe are so simple-
minded that whenever one or them obsnrves fl-n object for which he 
nan a naiae he names it, and so observant that nothing escapes 
their notice. Kow from the two premises that every namable 
object in always named and that the rain in asted to menu rain 
it follows thnt every situation which hws included araong its 
element"! a menbor of the tribe and rain has also included a unit 
toteen of th© type the rain. and over-? situation which hasi included 
among its elements the propositions! unit lyoe rajln and n member 
of the tribe has also Included rain. This linking! in u^e between 
a propOflitir»a«l unit and an oh.leot f^uoh na the type of happening 
of whioh a shower ii nn In^tHnc'?) T on 1.! npplicntive regularity. 
In ny imaclnar^ exiiraple the ixnlt the rain would have perfect app- 
licative regularity; bat oaf courne all notu.nl unitn will only 
have applicative regularity in some ver^? imperfect decree. If 
a unit really were 'wed llko t_he £oin in ny example 1 should say 
that it had aborir.in&l correlation with an object.
The sooner one cnn get ecway from thepe aborlginaln the better. 
Is it possible to find true premises frora which it would follow 
that sone proponltlonal unit really has some degree of applicative 
regularity? 1 think it can be done, or at any rate one onn *et 
somewhere near it. ^uppoem that for every propositions! unit 
'vhloh is tiied to mean a directly observable ob.leot there have beon 
more situations in which it hnn beon used of which the object neant 
has also been an element than contrary sltaatlonn, and that the 
rain la aa«d to mean rein, it will follow that there have been
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more situations In which the; rain /as an element than situations 
whioh have not. ^hea® premisjesj are much neerar the truth than 
the previous pair, but. th«iy are still a good way from it, or at 
any rr.te from what ©no o*m know to be the truth. These premises 
oighifc pass If emits omening directly observable objects? were only 
auaad ia the preaowo© of those ob^eota. But o;C ooiu'fta they are 
not. 1 aia Jost as likely to aa^ th^o £ain, wag hBgjyior tltat year 
thsm la ay^jf' ptheg I. jgm: yemenbor T or tho irnln hnji bee.^. fatal to
xain i£ .i^ttli)^ heavier, or any
o£ thoaa ntatsrsenlss of diroo 1'; obiei*'* fits ion. ConBO^iiontl;; the slt- 
aatloao In '.vhioU both a aiit lioke.n o.f the tyya _tho r^lii ^ind rain 
hare bean elesienta s.ro probably in a small minority amour; the alt- 
uationa in -^hioh the, yaia han b@en a^ad .
Bat n/e enn find n still ler,* objootlocablo pro«Jflo. Consider 
»«nt*J3CQS la ^?hloh the rala. occurs vrhloU BXB only likoly to be used 
to report actual observations of v?hafc i? ^oijw; oa in the rapealter 1 *? 
eaviroaraent; i'or in^tanoe, the rajln. hag gt.0jn>_ed . or the .rain la.
I ^ant to u«je iuiatlott in 3uoh a jianse that
it rain has been falling na# has just stopped one may gpesk of 
this «ltaatlos as having raiii as an alement; that in, 1 treat 
a situation am. a sort ox" expanded ispQcioas prea«nt. 1 Tear the 
examples ^iiloh lead sse to write in thi.s trsg1 are perhaps not very 
happy, bat 1 have not been sbl© to fleet others ;fhloh both arc 
raora convenient and enable me to keep strictly to colloquial uses 
Of language. Suppose the sentences I have just 4 uoted have nearly
pr
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always been used by speakers to give on account of what In 
happening in their environments; and have nearly always been 
used truly. Then we may nay that most* situations -Thioh have 
L included one of these prepositional signs as an element have
also included rain as an element. 1 oan now farther amend the 
pair of premises J have been considering. Suppose that, for 
 very propositional unit which is used to mean a directly observ- 
able object, there are at least two prepositional signs, of which 
it is an element, of which each has been used in more situations 
of wiiioh the object meant by the unit has also been an element 
than situations of which it has not, and thai, the rain has been 
used to raean rain, it follows that for the rain there is at least 
one prepositional sign of the sort described in the premise. 
The supposition here made is not extravagant - one could orgae 
for its truth even if it is not true or not precisely true, The 
suggestion I wont to make la that perhaps the oonclunion here 
drawn would I'ollow, not merely from the double premise, of which 
the rirnt half 1* specially designed to meet the case, bat from 
the single premise that the rain has been used to mean rain. 
For if this were 30, then the analysis of meaning In the denotation- 
al sense would include or consist of nomethlnrr like the first 
clause of rny double premise.
The assumption that when a prepositional unit means some 
directly observable object, llice rain, there always are proposition, 
al signs containing it the utterance of which has generally been
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accompanied by the object meant. In fairly plausible. It Is 
quite plausible, for instance, to suggest that situations whioh 
have Included the rain has stopped 03 an element have generally 
also included rain as an element. It la necessary to suppose 
that for taoh propositional unit there are at least two proposition- 
al signs satisfying the required condition, for If there were only 
one the accompanying of It by certain objects could not constitute 
the meaning of one of the units making it up rather than another. 
Thus If It happened that situations In which the rain haa stopped 
wan uttered always Included rain, this fact alone would not aoffice 
to give e correlation between the rain and rain rather then between 
the rain and stoppage, or hag yttp^pefl and rain. But if we con- 
sider the situations whioh contain as elements other propositions! 
signs in whioh the raJM occurs, suoh aa the rain i_s petting heavier. 
and other proposltlonal sl^ns in which has stopped occurs, such as 
the shoutinr; has stopped. and so on, we find a correlation between 
the rain and rain, and between has stoiled and stoppage, but not 
between the rain and stoppage or hag ntopjted and rain.
I think the suggestion 1 am making can now be put feirly 
olearly. If a ?»lven prepositional unit la part of at least t«o 
different propositioned sl^n^ each of which has been an element 
of at least one situation of whioh a oertaln object has alno been 
an element, I shall way that the unit In question has aosae decree 
of applicative regularity, and has sorae decree of applicative 
correlation with the object in question. If the favourable sit-
nations, that is, those whioh include the correlated object, 
outnumber^ the unfavourable, I shall say that the prepositional 
unit has a high degree of applicative regularity and correlation. 
Then ray suggestion is that the meaning of a prepositional unit, 
and the link between it and the object it means, is constituted 
by its having a high degree of applicative correlation with that 
object. Caution is necessary in putting forward an analysis of 
the denotational sense of meaning in theae terras. For applicative 
correlation in the sense defined can only hold between prepositional 
units and directly observable objects. thus the meaning of such 
a word aa ©thnoloflj. or statistics (not (nooning ooluuns o±' figures), 
whioh do not raean directly obnervable objects, can not be COR-
i^ W^o tA~W
stituted by their applicative regularity,/. To allow for unobserv- 
able objeotn there are two courses one one take: ono can say that 
when unit a axe said to mean anabBorvnblc ob^coto raoan io U30i3 in 
a different sense from when units are said to moon directly observ- 
able objects; or one can say that meanLing is to be analysed al- 
ternatively. If one ^ivea an alternative analysis it t/ill be 
thuftj whatever £ nad _a nay be, /% means a, in the denotatioaal 
sensjgj tneana in the referential oense that either x has a high 
degree of applicative correlation with a, or x la linked v/ith a 
in the way in which unitn are linked with unobaervable objects 
which they mean; in this referential definition, the naoond 
alternative in the analysis has,of course, still to be filled in. 
If the supposition that meaning has two separate denotational
gex>8*a, one for directly observable and the other for unobnervable 
objects. Is preferred. In the above analysis for that either »    -. 
or read elt.hor that • • • • • • or that.
| This analysis of the meaning of prepositional units which 
mean directly observable objects Is based on two assumptions to 
which exception may be taken; first, that people rM>re often than 
not speak the truth, at any rate in reporting their observations, 
and second, that all such units are connoiily used actually in the 
presence of the objects they mean. Each of these assumptions 
VMS be objected to on two grounds; first, that it is false, and 
second, that even li it is true its falsity would be compatible
. with directly observable objects being meant by prepositional units: 
the second is the serious objection. I think that in point of 
fact the two assumptions are true: even if people do not usually 
apeak the truth, they are rarely, I think, tempted to deceive about 
what they are directly observing; and it Is very herd to think of 
a name of any directly observable object which people would not 
naturally use in phrases like that table. that thunder, and so on. 
These ore the obvious considerations. But If I can show that the 
falsity of the assumptions is probably or certainly incompatible 
with directly observable objects belnp meant by propositions! units, 
since sone units do raean directly observable objects it trill follow 
that the assumptions are probably or certainly true.
I can only offer some vory general remarks on this point. 
If meaning la to be constituted by applicative regularity, the
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degree of regularity moat bo pretty high; if a low degree were 
allowed, ray analysis woold often compel as to say that a unit ueant 
some object which in fact it dojis not noan. If truth speaking 
about directly observed objeotn were not fairly common, the sat- 
isfying of thin condition, high applicative regularity, could not 
be guaranteed. (?he quastlon is, does the fact that some units 
mean directly observable objects really entail that, at any rate 
in their accounts of what they are directly observing, people 
generally apeak the truth? It neens to me that it probably does, 
on these grounds: people who are picking up a language (in the
 
way describe*! in section 4) are, among other things, discovering 
the meaning of prepositional units; as I have said in section 4 
on this point, I am assuming that the meaning of prepositional 
units is constituted by observable relations? between them and 
other object3, and if this la so what the people mentionefl are 
discovering consists of these observable relations; but unless 
a certain amount of stateaenta ary true there will be uo observable 
relations sufficient to aistlnRolsh the object* meant by some unit 
from other objects; thus the fact that some turita uean objects 
(whether directly observable or not;, in other words, tiiat units 
have denotational meaning, entailn that amount of truth speaking 
which in necessary for the occurrence of applicative regularity. 
'Ursilarly one mfjy a«k whether the fact that SO&G units aean directly, 
observable objects really entails that these units are often used 
in the presence of the objects meant, Jt nay be contended that
it la logically possible, even If it rarely or never happens , 
for a word or phrase to mean norae directly observable ob.leot and 
yet not be used in its presence. Here ai*ain I think the armament 
I fron picking up a language holds; on the lines that a correlation 
between an object and one unit rather than another could not be 
observed unless the unit and the object Roraetinea accompanied one 
another. But I think it mast be adnltted that it is logically 
possible for an expression Meaning a directly observable object 
never to be used in the presence of the object meant. 1 should 
maintain, however, that if this ever occurred the use of the ex- 
pression would have to be based on units havinp applicative regular 
ity ? in the sense that moat people would know how it was to be 
defined in terns of auoh units.
I am aware that I ara only in a position to rive a very sketchy 
defence of the proposed analysis of clenotntionnl raoanins. It 
aeons to ne that the general type of analysis? adopted is probably 
right: bat I think thero are two fllffJcultiea In the way of the 
presentation of it: first, that the precise annlynia I have given 
may have the wronf* forn, even if it, i«i on the right lines, nnd 
second, that, the clearing up of donotational mosiinin?: is
* dependent on the clearing up of me-onlng in other
A
f
CQ.
80
Q. <Hruoture and torn.
A 8t»6Xt has now been raade towards the analysis? of denotatlonal 
neaning, and thereby of unit laciuiinn in general. ?he next question 
I to be considered in how the crrouningo of units in pro .JOH it local 
signs are significant, 1 no<r have to follow up the suggestion 
from "7ittnen**t©in which in stated in section 4; 'the proposition 
is a picture of reality 1 . He also says(2*16 J 'that the elenentfs 
of the picture are combined with one another In a definite way, 
represents that the tlvingr? are so combined \7ith 02^0 another. 
This connexion of the elements of the picture i?s called its 
structure 1 ; (4»1£11.) "a proposition r i shows that i.n its sense 
the object e oooare.  two propositions frn a and ^._a that the^ are 
both about tho oarao object,'. ?ha slgnifiormce oi' the n*oupings 
of prop.onitional units in to bo explained nonahovr or othor in 
ternis of a conraunlt;? of structui'e between proiiosltional nl^nn ?.rA 
what th&y reprenent.
A sinpl^a illustration of tha t^pe of relation that 1?! called 
id entity of structure ia given by the re?.?ition between & map and 
the country napped, or between a mirror image and the scane it 
reflects. Those illustrations aro ase^ by ^isflor., who remarks 
(^^''^oal rconntruotj_on_n I t j:ili>d Apxil 1931 p. '205) *a ^ontenoe is 
not identical in struot^re with the fact it expresses in the sense 
in which a reflexion, a ploturo, a dlagran or a man i«t identical 
in structure with vrhct it reflects, pictures, repreaents, or naps. 
A paragraph or account of a state of sffnirs i? idontionl in
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stru.otu.re in this sense with the state of affairs of whloh it is 
an account. A sentence is not like a map, bat like one of the 
facts which make up a map, suoh an that this dot is above that. 
This fact is of the same form as the faot about the intor-rel&tion- 
ship of two towns which it is used to represent 1 : end 'even the 
best sentences are identical in form with a fact in only a rather 
unexciting way - not like a map and a country. A sentence is 
identical in form with a fact if and only if they contain the same 
number of elements'. Wisdom appears to distinguish between the 
structure of a set of sentences and the form of a single sentence. 
I shall consider structure first.
The sense in which a nap and a country or a reflexion and 
a scene may be identical in structure is discussed by Wisdom in 
a note on identity of structore (Mind. April 1931). He dis- 
tinguishes between systems constituted by the holding between 
various sets of terms of a single relation, which ha calls plain 
systems, and systems constituted by the holding between various 
sets of terms of various relations each of vrhich is a determinate 
of a certain determinable. Co the latter type he reives no name, 
and I propose to call them crossing systems. He points out that 
maps and reflexions are crossing systems, and I think it is clear 
also that if a language or the set of objects thet make up its 
meaning is a system it must be a crossing system. I shall only 
be concerned irith crossing systems, and shall therefore use the 
word system by itself to mean crossing system.
in his note first defines identity of structure in 
a senna in which it holds betweon two crossing systene when eaoh 
element of one is linked with one element of the other by some 
material relation, such aa the relation neant by is uned 03 a 
symbol for. His definition la «» follows: 'let R rmd R be 
the deterrainables of the components of 3 end S x respectively . 
Let e be a one-one relation whose domain in the constituents of 
3 and whose converse domain is the constituents of 3 . Lot eaoh
determinate, 0, of E be such that there in Jast one determinate,
/ / £, of H auoh that if two oonstitaeata of 3 are related by $> then
their correlates (with respect to P; in S x ore related by (> and 
yioe ver§a' . He then tries to adapt this definition so ns to 
define P in axtenaional terras, with a view to giving a senao in 
whioh identity of stimoture nu3$ hold between two aystems whose 
elenenta are not linked by any laatorial relation. He Ooes so 
in this way: '^here P. is the relation determinate* of thioh are 
components of n and Rx the relation detenainates of which are oon- 
ponentg of 3 , eaoh determinate, 0 ? of H is saoh that there ir« o 
fleterrainate, ^\ of BL / , such that for ever# oooarrcnce of ^ in S 
there is an oooorrence of ^  in S , an3 if in any two ooonrroncos 
of £ in S the referent (or rolatonj is the same then there are 
two occurrences of £ in S in whioh the referent (or relaturn)
is the same 1 . ?hls definition aeems to be imperfect irs two w 
ambiguity and incompleteness. First, "/iadon's expression *th.e 
referent (or selatumj 1 is anbiguoas; it is necessary to interpret
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the lost statement (froa 'and if ' ) as aeanlus tittit if of on? two 
o£ in 3 the refer out in ono ia the aauo us t.iO ie-
foront In tho othar, there are two oaourrencea of (/in 3 X of 
which tho rei'oraat In one is the saao as» tho rofero/it in the other,
1^ tho roj-'erent in ono in tho aorao aa tha relatuci in thy o£hor,
j
then in 3 the roferent in one is the sawo as the relattua ia tho
other, and if tho relaton is the saiae as the relntun, then ii] 3
fehe relafcari is tho aania aa the r&laton. leooudi^, the definition 
in inoom;ilet>o in two vnys: it '3o0a not onsore that, i£ th«ro are 
lr*7o relations la S oaoh of whiah hoa two OGoarronoea with a ooramon 
torm, then tharo .shall ba for «ach o^T them a differeiit relation in 
3 whioh htia fc^/o aooiii'A'aiiO^s vritu a oo.aion toraj mid it v.oos not 
ennaro uhat u given torn in 3 shall bo oori.*elato3 with one term 
and ono onl;/ in ^ ', not «ordl^/ '.fhen is oooojea an a tor;-i of a single 
relation, but Siuaapliotib tiie 3^sto;:i » a tor^ &K& occoi" aa a term 
of an^p nofiiber o* relations , In oJaitioii to thaatj tiro dofeots, 
Wiadoia 1 ^ ilofinition is fraaeC so aa oiily to oovor thoao s^oteiMi 
iruioh are ooufltitufced nolol^ b^/ two-torcioil relations. But it ia
le to have systww oon«jtjt:ut;03 b^ roXationn of more thon t^vo 
nn{3 to Kiavo rolationn  tfhoso aunbern of terras are rljfferent
thosa ^hlah oonfititata a single »3>sftanj a^atoci^ of thio 
l&st kind nay be oalled oon^ounfl ay^tosag. Conpoiiad «ysfconn may 
have tha "jama ntrucstare jant; an Miioii f»i 9ia;>lor types: ooznider, 
for exsunpls, the relation between the fierier of letters A 3 B A A 
B B A C ]) ii CDEand a aonnet whone rhyao scheme it symbolises; we
say , roughly, that the holding of the two-termed relation, 
B following A, syiabollees the 1'act that the first lice does not 
rhyne with the oeconil, the holding of the roar termed relation, 
t A having B anfi B between It and A, nyraboliaea the faot that the 
fjrot line floes rhyme with the fourth, and oo on.
I shall trj- to give in extenaionel terms a definition of 
identity of struct tire in the general sense in which it may? hold 
between oroanins a^sttxaa whether or not they arc compound - it in 
ohvioufl, of (ntirejo, that two ej^afcetas with the aarae structure arc 
oither bo feu eom.ioond or botii iiot eoa^ounci. As the definition is 
somewhat cKtrapliaated it will be best to tiiviae It into numbered 
ol Gases . ftcr;} f^ U& tile ^Kuafe txi.iql;.are aa ggtegi S neens
that (1 ) the .auiubev of doteriaintite relations occurring in ^ la the
an the jaa^bcr oocarrin/t in S ; (2J for ovary nunber.n, the
camber of relations occurring in °» ~n tloos is the same aa the
career of relations oocarring in ^ n tines; (ij) for ovory term,
x, la n t there nxii ba ao:.io toriu, y, 1*1 ^ t nuoh that the nonber
Of relntiioafl ol mil oh :c ia a ter^i ia che sarae BS the number of 
re i at i arm of i?hioh. y is a towa, and whatever ntunber n nay be, for 
ever;? different relatloii in which x oooors aa a terra n tines there 
le ft a2ffe*Mii6 relation in vrLioh j? ooours BS a tern n tinea, and 
the place ttii«n bj? y always oori-espoi-us with the place taken by 
z; «;) if thoi*c» are t^o or L&jctt terras in ^ related to one another,
within 3 f «« x ftnd y in olatis* (i*) are aaiti to be related (that 
is, b^? the number of relationo of nhioa thoj/ are torma, b^ the
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noraljer of times the^ arc temn, acti the places thetf take), then 
there are the aajue number ox fcenoe in 3 ' ao rel&teii to one another 
and to the terra? In <iueotioc. it 9, The places which & tern oan 
take are, of coux^o, first eM second la u tv.-c-terc-.ed relation, 
first second &nc! third In t. three- teruefi relation, antl ao on,
Leas aeefi be said here about fcrsa. Aooordiia^ to '«Yiadon*a 
definition, aaoted &brller In this nectloo, a nantaAOt la Identical 
in form with s fact If etd oulj if tixej contain tht.- ssiiid nonlaer 
of  leroeatw, Aa » result oi She oorrelafeioii botvrean i'aata and 
truo 89ntonc33, pointed oat In -santloa u, 1* might bo ol alaed that 
every nojatenoo vfhioh qspro-ss Q *aot i3 iSaiitlo^al ia for.i with the 
faot it ezprenaea, at aaj ratio In a genao or 1'orra baaod on som« 
^o or other of el^noat - ami In the lator instalaeata of hl«
a^proaolaoa tliia tiu^ o* spaa^inp.. If
were ?=io, If it oo'old bo nhovm that a f»iv©» acutoiiO'a expressed 
eon© fact i* '-rottf-fl follorr that the;1 rero In rjono soiuic o* the name 
form, 1 thiak o^rermliac o;\r. be c^iai^acu i;i tonr^ o- i;u,-aniiip>t 
And moaning Jn its torn, »,^ to a poir.t c.t auy rato, li; turras of 
ft»-5l1oat,lve rerrolf-tTlly aavl iclcctit;' oi' n tract or-. I think the 
£om oi' pi-0£>ositiojj«d r:icus f ii: tiic otince uciiiictl t,^ u: isiiom, is 
of import Piine, r»ot for the tm&l^&ia ci' meanitig, tut for the caialysia 
of aprl^sis; in rjialysln.r; imnlysic it ncy te uccens&x^- to consider 
rhet;hr5 r - 5n tshio Qnsatinieotor^ te-rt,;ii:olo^ - tho iiura.'ber of elenonta 
in a propositional algn is the sarae GB the nusber of fundamental 
 lementa In t> fact; but thin question does not arise if it, in
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9. The moaning of prepositional signs.
I shall now try to ^ive B first sketch of em analysis of 
referential meaning. It la necessary to proceed in this way, 
step by step, for the reason which 1 hare given in section 1, 
that an advance in the analysis of meaning depends upon an advance 
in the analysis of generality v which I have not so far touched. 
The analysis 1 can n-lve at this stage will be United to the noon- 
ing of prepositional signs which are free from certain types of 
generality.
A propositions! sign whose constituent units have applicative 
regularity may be involved in systems of various types. Consider, 
for example, jjhe cot iff on the mat. We may divide this proposition- 
al sign into three propositional units, the oat, is on. and the 
jaai; it may be presumed that each of these has a high degree, of 
.applicative correlation with a certain type of object, the second 
of them being correlated with an object of the type called a re- 
latlon. Of course this account of the division of the prepositional 
sign into units is very much sinplified; ono raay hope to nhow ul- 
tinnately how the sipin can be divided into six units - words - each 
of which plays its part in a special way in riving the whole sign 
its significance. The account is also unsophisticated; it does 
not allow for the fact that when different situations contain an 
object of the type with which the oat in correlated they are con- 
taining either different continuants, or the sane oontinuent on 
different occasions; but when different situations contain an
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object of the type with which is on Is correlated they are con­ 
taining either different determinate relations of a particular 
deterrainable, or the same determinate relation. This faot would 
| have to be allowed for If one were analysing oats and mats, or 
spatial relations, bat need not, I think, be regarded at this 
stage when one Is analysing meaning.
It will be convenient for me to oae relation in the wide 
sense in which the terns of a relation ore not necessarily ob.loots 
of the same type; for I shall reqalre to apeak of the relation 
between a character (or, one might sny, a charactorinin? object) 
and a characterised object. Consider, for example, naoh proposlt-
> lonol signs as the oat in asleep, or the rain has stopped. If —— — —— ——— —— ——
we are going to say, as J shall presently, that in pone system 
ft token of the <oat is asleep oorresponds to some node in another 
system consisting of a cat be in/*, asleep, It will be necessary to 
correlate the relation between the cat and the character of belzw; 
asleep with the relation of succession between the two onlts, the 
oat and is asleep. Clearly It will also be necessary to give 
a sense in which this relation of succession has applicative reg­ 
ularity. ?hln in easily done. It in not desirable to call the 
relation Itself a prepositional unit, as it is not separable from 
Its terms In the way in which they are separable from one another. 
We may call it on order-factor, Then the order-factor has ap­ 
plicative correlation with the characterising relation, but in 
ft slightly special sense of correlation. It has it if on mor?t
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occasions on which some pxo positional sl^n wade up of only two 
units is as ad the object correlated with the second unit does 
in fact characterise the object correlated with the first. I an 
not, of coarse, proponing an analysis of the character oi being 
asleep or having stopped; the special conventions just made are 
necessary if they ore characters in some sense, as they clearly 
are (the analysis of stoppage, for instance, would probably be 
on these lines: there was rain at t" , there won rain at
there was no rain at t
1 shall now try to describe two systems which will illustrate 
the structural relations between propositions! slstns and objects, 
Suppose some situation in which a cat is on a nnt has contained 
certain other features. Suppose I an sitting on a sofa facing 
the fire, with a door behind me. A cot is asleep on the hearth­ 
rug, a mouse hag just ener^ed from its hole and is standing in 
the riddle of the roon behind the sofa. I am suraalng up the 
chances of the cat catching the mouse, and 1 use the follonlnn 
sentences} the cat; jLr* on the nat t _the oat .is sa.leep . the no use 
i<§ on the carpet, jbhjg moiJiqe £r± frightened, the gofa jg betyeeii tho 
mouse end the pat (this explains why neither has yet seen the other ;, 
the mouse la between the aofa aji^ the door . TV* six proposltional 
tokens which 1 should use forri a compound system; the sentences 
have been purjmaely chorien to rrive different numbers of terms. 
If one may for the moment treat sleep and fright as observable 
objects, then each of these sentences can be divided into
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lonal unit a whioh have applicative regularity. Vhen one roaches 
the three-termed relation of being between it becomes necessary 
to aay that a unit aay Include words which are not adjacent, bat 
ft no new principle is Involved. One nog say that the prepositional 
unit the oat has been used whenever anyone has uttered a proposit-
-Vtv-d^ul'ifci
lonal token of the^forra the oat - or - - the o&t. and so on; sim- 
ilarly a oertaln prepositional unit has been used whenever anyone 
has tittered a token of the forra - IB between - and - . Then 
there la another system consisting of six overlapping nodes - 
overlapping In the sense that they have oonnon parts - consisting 
Of the oat on the mat, the nouse on the oarpet, the sofa between 
the oat and the mource, and so on. All the systens ox the first 
sort, those which consist of prepositional tokens used in sane 
situation, having among then the oat la on the mat, together make 
up a system whioh I shall oall the 3ign*.aystem relative to the o&t 
JL§ 9S, IffiQ ciRt; the oontained a^ston involvad in a particular sit- 
uation taay be called a slp.n-set. Slnllarly all the ,«ynteras ol 
the second sort, thone whioh conslnt of nodes involved in a certain 
situation 7?hloh Include anon^ thenraelves a oat on a mat, when the 
situation alno includes the '3rmorjltional si?rft the o^at in on th£ 
mat, together n^ke up a syntuu vuiich I shall call the sltuatiori- 
sygtem relative to t,he oat IB on t^hq nnt; any of the contained 
systems may be called a nit ant ion-net. Each sirn-set and ??ltuation< 
aet is, of course, a part oi the slgn-Byntenj or nitaation-3y?iteia 
relative to each of the proportional signs contained in the
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sign-set.
Sign-ayatem and sltuation-systema here been defined in saoh 
a way that those relative to a ftivon prepositional oi^n necessarily 
| have the same structure, they are defined by the selection, from 
all the occasions of the use of a prepositional aifsa, of those 
occasions on which it is used truly, and in the presence of that 
mode on account of which it is true. I shall use thene systens 
to give a highly simplified analysis of referential raeanln^, rrhloh 
may then bo adapted and elaborated.
The simplified analysis la an follows: any proportional 
sign may be symbolised lt(x'--x r'j, where tlie x's stand for the 
, units which make it up, of which there may be any norsbor, and
R(-) for the relation in which they stand to one another; then, 
whatever pro positional sir,n H(x^- -x^j may be, /I?(x'- -xh j raoans 
that x' xh are related by j^J aioana that (1) every prepositional 
unit it contains has a high degree of applicative correlation with 
one of the objecta, x 1  -x", (£} the sign-systera relative to it 
has the same structore aa the situation-system relative to it, 
(3) the slgn-aysten relative to any proponitional aijrn, ^, con- 
tained in any sign-set relative to lUx 1  *"} has the same straoturc 
as the nltaatloc-systen relative to that proponltionnl sign, and 
siailaily the slj»n-sy»tem and rrit oat ion-ray ster: relative to any 
sign,^, related to p as p is to ftfx*--'X*"*), hove the snrne structure, 
and sc on t for any r ao related to <{ t and no on, for all niftns 
indirectly related to H(x*~-x 71 ), (4) every propositions! unit
contained In any of the signs referred to in clause f3) baa a 
high degree of applicative regularity.
Uhls analysis Is simplified In the following ways: II) it 
Is constructed in such a way that, if any prepositional si&n has 
a certain meaning in this sense,it will follow that on at least 
one occasion it has been used truly; (2) it is only applicable to 
prepositional olgna whose units aro applloatlvely correlated with 
(that is, tneanj directly observable objects. It is also poaalinp! 
in these ways: (oj the analysis is reflexive; it appears to apply 
to itself; (4j the analysis appears to be circular; It appears 
to analyse the meaning of a propositional sisn in terms ox the 
meaning of the sign itself - It rnipht sinllorly bo claimed that 
the analysis of denotational meaning analyses the meaning of a 
propositional unit In term3 of the meaning of the unit Itself;
(5) the analysis suggests that the nenning of & prepositional
sign in socie way Involves the whole or a large part of the language
or symbolic system to which the uign belongs.
Objection (1) 1 shall shortly try to correct: the correction 
Of (2) depends upon the solution of some of the generality problems: 
(3j I shall dlsoussi later: (4) may be dealt with straight away-
(6) 1 think the meaning of a propositional sign, in the sort of 
sense in which wo talk about its ordinary or accepted meaning, 
does involve the whole or a large part oi' the language to which 
the ai^n belongs; it involves the general syntactical scheme of 
the language» and this is, roughly speaking, a logical construction
from the straoture of the total si rjn-systein made ap of all actual 
uses of tho languages t in its relation to tho structure of ^ome 
total situntlon-nystom.
(4) Circularity of the analysis. ^he analysis interprets 
the referential weaning of n propositlonal sir,n in terns of the 
structure of the situation-system relative to it, arid th© situntion- 
system relative to it is determined by the occurrence of modes or 
objects which ranke up the raeeclng of tho sigr.. Thus the situation- 
system relative to the cat is cm the mat i?s partly determined by 
the ooc<irrer.ce on certain occasions o* cats on mt\to. 'tone the losa 
the analysis is not circular; because, flrot, when I say that /;Ehe 
oat JLs oji the jgg^ neaas that the oat is OD the matj neaas that the 
units have applicative correlation, find so oc, whtui the sane v/ords 
occur after meann that as have occurred before it they are bein$ 
used air,nil'icently, and their raeaning 10 not being alluucd to bat 
used; and, second, it Is a natter of chance whether, in n refer- 
ential definition, words oocor after meana that whloh have also 
occurred in the Sefined expression. It imppans to be convenient 
to oae the sane wor3s or a^nbola. But I could have given the 
analysis in this aort of form: /The oat in on the mat .-neans thet 
that is on thatj moans that tlio cc.t hns appllontivo corrolRtion 
with objects of the typo of that - and 30 on. liailarly. In the 
analysis of denotatiocal neaninn, 1 could proceed by noyinft that 
/Ihe cat means that/ means that the oat has a high decree of 
applicative correlation with the type oi' object to which that
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belongs, and so on. In giving an objective (that In, a denotation- 
al or referential; definition one may oao any expression one pleases 
whioh will serve to identify the object or raode which is meant, or
| whioh constitutes the meaning of the defined expression.
(1) ana (2) iiemoval of simplification. Any prepositional -si?n 
which has a referential meaning in the defined sonne most have been 
asefl truly on st least one occasion, for otherwise there would be 
no slgn-systora and situation-system relative to it. But we know 
that as a matter of fact a propositions! «?lp;n may be an entirely 
new combination of on! to, or if not new may only have been used 
falsely - the great value of syntactical language being that it
. Allows now types of statement! with old raaturlals. "Te raay allow 
for new combinations by amending the analysis thus:
means that Jat(x*— -x^jj means that either K(x*-«ocn J has the ohareoter 
defined in the simplified analysis, or eaoh emit contained in It 
has a high decree of applicative correlation vtith one of the objects 
at'— oc*\ and has been part of at least one prepositional token of 
a type whioh has had the character defined.
Of coarse this Is still ouch too sinplo, because of the re­ 
striction to prepositional units correlated with directly observable 
objects. The prepositional nigns in a p,ivon language to whioh the 
analysis could be applied would make up within that Ituiguage a sort 
of limited language of direct observation - it would be a logical 
construction from them, .Just as a language in the ordinary sense 
is a logical construction fron all its proponitiond slpns. ?he
analysis oan, I think, be extended so as to cover objects which 
are observable, in the sense used in my earlier sections, bat not 
directly observable. One oould, I think, define & secondary sense 
of applicative regularity in terns of which one would define the 
sense in which expressions of npatial and temporal distance have 
meanings « aaoh expressions as £ive rairnites a^o or a pile awa^. 
This would give a language of observation, ^oinf? slightly beyond 
the language of direct observation. Bat the meaning of expressions 
displaying most types of generality would still be unexplained. 
Bat I think the analysis so far given has sone sort of validity, 
There are three possible ways in which it may be utilised in a 
more advanced analysis: (1) It may be expanded and adapted, so 
as to give a slnirle analysis of the meaning of all pi-o positional 
signs; (3) it nf«y form part of an oaalysin in alternative rorra, 
stating that a sign has a certain referential meaning if either 
it has the character given by the analysis In this section, or 
it has som« other character, or one of several, appropriate to 
signs of greater generality; (i>J we may conclude that there are 
several senses of reLfeire.nt i nl /^eaninj^, ana that the proportional 
sijj;ns of a Ifjc^ua^e of observation have neanin^ in a special sense, 
and that this anol.ysig, or rottg,]ily this, la the enalynis of that 
sense.
Note3. I* is perhaps worth while to point oat "shortly here 
the importance oi syntax and structure. LGn^aa^en may de divided 
into uuiit languages, group languages, and struoturo languages.
Examples of a unit lanfuapre would be the language of the parrot. 
Imagined in section 5, whose vocabulary was jtohn and £££2.; and | 
the primitive language described In ^eotlon ?J. A unit len^uase 
would consist of Indivisible proposltlonfil sl<?ns, each correlated 
with a single type of mode. i»hc modes raiirht have a highly complex 
structure, but the signs would have no structure. A group language 
has not ao far been illustrated; it la the highest form o~ lanfruape 
the meaning of whose signs could be analysed without reference to 
identity of structure. It would Include nnmes for types of char- 
acterising object and typea of characterised object, and could also 
include names for symmetrical relations. Instances of proponition- 
al signs which might occur in such a laniruar^e ajro the oat iff n?leog. 
John and George are brother^. But there would be no rule fixing 
the order of the prepositional units; one would be allowed to say 
indifferently J^ ^oljoen the .ont, and the reverse, nrg brothorq nnd 
Jpljn, George, and ao on. A fjroup lenruape would hevo rudimentary 
syntax, nut the syntax would only rule thrt the npncn of the objectn 
linked in a fact aust be spoken a<3Recently, or so as to make a 
single aoun<2 t whereas proper syntax fixes the order of the units 
as well as the collocation of then. The proportional signs of 
a group language would, of course have identity of fora, In the 
sense Riven by vfisdon as quoted in section 6, with the facts they 
expressed; but there would be no iilontit;; of structure between 
sign-syntens and situation-systems. A group language would be 
able to make new statements for a certain tine, but their number
would be limited by the possible combinations of a certain number 
of propositional units in groups of not more than three, and the 
possible combinations would presumably in time be exhausted (they 
would be if in practice the speakers actually did make new state­ 
ments). It would be to this extent richer than a unit language; 
but if it did not include indivisible prepositional signs, 00 well 
aa groups, it would also be very much poorer, since it would be 
logically possible to correlate a unit sign with a fact of any 
complexity; not so a group sign.
It Is only possible to Improve on a group language by having 
* language with genuine syntax, and this can only be secured by 
means of Identity of atractare between slftn*>ay sterna and situation- 
aypiteiaa. structure languages are those whose pro positional 
have meaning in a sense whowe analysis involves this Identity, 
structure becomes necessary once one reauires the power of ex­ 
pressing new types of fact involving unsymsietrlcul two-termed 
relations, or many-termed relations.
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10. The typos of generality.
It is now commonly recognised that All ordinary colloquial
Btatementn and proponitlonal nl^no are in aorae way or other general j
L 
so, in consequence, are those the nature of whose meaning I have
so far been trying to analyse. From the use of the word faot 
pointed oat in section 6, it follows that all the foots expressed 
by ordinary sentences ore also general, in the sense appropriate 
to facts, and that the types of generality displayed by faot a are 
parallel to the type?* displayed by sentences or proportional slrtna,
i
It is also convenient to say that certain objects are general, but ' 
the generality of objects need not be considered here - in one sense 
every element of a general faot is a general ofc.lect; bat in another 
sense only some are; for some of the elements of some general facts 
are modes, and it is nonsense to oall a noile general or non-"encral 
(it la absolutely determinate; thus one may nay, in some sort of 
old sense, that to oall a raode non-general is helpful nonsense, to 
oall it general is harmful nonsense). I consider that the general- 
ity of faota can be analysed in terns of the generality of proponit- 
lonal slpjris, just as 1 consider that the nature of factn (sec note 
below on the word pat tire J oan bo analysed in temn of relations
I apologise for the clumsy phrase the nature of whose mono ing; 
but the need for it arisen, not for tho""Sir«*t tjlrle, frbn tile 
ambiftuity of analyse the noaninn of. ^hls may mean sinply to 
analyse, or mey no fin to ail  ' ly n b netm 5 nrt in the sense in which so 
and so has meaning The dlffioulty in to tie it down to the 
second senno. It would he desirable never to soy anf»lyr»e the 
meaning of Instead of analyse.
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between proponitionnl si^nn and modes. i
It la easy to point out generality, though very difficult to 
analyse it. A propositions! slrtn la general if there is more than 
one possible mode or situation or Bet of nodes on account or which 
it would be true. Generality may conveniently be divided into ; 
various types, which I think clearly have in common the character , 
whioh I neve Just stated: 1 do not know whether it is proper to 
cell them apeoies of a genus. 1 ahull distinguish five types; 
the division adopted in convenient rather than systenatlc. ?hey 
ere as follows.
(Ij Elation (which raey also be called pimple or open hiation), 
(£j Latent hi at ion. I 
(3) Hypothesis. . 
(4J Limited hiation. I 
(5) United formal implication (or hypothenls), | 
(6J negation.
1 shall sey briefly what the?*a ralx types are. 
(1) ?he word hiatus is introduced by Wleidon (lonloal con~ 
struction?f ||1. I'inA Oct. 19^2 p. 4B&) to mean any word used in 
the same sort of way as something. His renaon for choosing the 
word in obvious: gqnething is not oorrolatod with any oh.leot in 
the way in which, for instance, thg ont la; if for the o_at in on 
the mat one substitutes something i.o. on the aat one leaven an 
object out of one*a wtatemont rrlthout putting eu^ythin!? el«»e ir« 
its place. If one is speokinp, in terras of propositions or facts
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one may say that a gap is left In the fact or the proposition, 
in a prepositional sign answers to a <?ap In what
It expresses. I shall nay that n proportional si™ haa hiation, 
* or io hlRtive, if it contains none word like something, used 'at 
*n something Is on the flat, or some . used in a sinilar way. If 
two pro positional nigns differ onjy in that a hiatus in one takes 
the place of a name in the other, they will, of course, always 
express different facts. On the other hand, supporting on some 
occasion one person says aotaetliln^ jls on the nat t and another 
person, with better eyesight, adds the oat is on the mat, and the 
oat is on the mat, although they state different factn there Is 
only one mode or BOO o unt of which both statements arc true - or, 
to put this taore analytically, nuppoae a sense o,T al tuat ion-system 
has been defined for hiatlve signs, the mode corresponding to the 
token the oat la on tjie mat in the n it oat ion-ay at era relative to 
its type will be the same as the node corresponding to the token 
aomethlnp, 1^ oa the rant In the sltaatlon-nyaton relative to itn 
type. It is In the connexion with a single mode of prepositional 
signs of different decrees of generality that 1 hope that part at 
any rate of the key to generality nay bo found.
9 (2) Latent illation is the typo of generality which is din- 
played by all or almost all ordinary nentoncen, even If they lack 
the other kinds. A prepositional sign has latent hiation If It 
contains no hiatus but has the seuae meaning (In the substltutlve 
sense j as some sign containing a hiatus; or in other words If it
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Beans that something (not specified) haa a certain oharaoter or 
stands in e certain relation. The prepositional signs whioh I 
have considered in analysing raeaning for a language of observation
I have all suffered froa latent hiation, though some of them have
perhaps not been general in any other way. 1'hoa, the meaning of 
the gat jiff, on the mat is something like thin: there IB some object 
whioh has the oharaoter of bolnj» a oat in aotae determinate form 
and there is aorae object whioh has the character of being a mat in 
some determinate form, and the first object in in none determinate 
position on tho neoond, and there is no other ont or mat to whioh 
we are attending - eoraothlnj; of that kind. 7hus tho oat Lln on 
the mat la fall of aoacoalod hiatuses, and 1 fear contains also 
concealed negation.
(3) ?he propoaltlonal si#ns whioh I oall hypothetical are 
those tthloh woald often be oalloS Rener^llflGuioiig nlraply, or stat- 
istical or inductive ^enorallsations; ond various deductions fron 
generallDations. Their meaning can ^otnetl^es bo expressed in the 
form of a formal implication, but not ail formal implications are 
hypothetical in the sense here repaired. A proposltionel gi<Tn 
displays hypothesis if it means that any object which has a oerteln
" character also has a certain other, oi;d if further the first ohar- 
aoter is not one which is necessarily only possessed by objeots 
llraited to a certain number. Sood illustrations of what I on 
calling hypothesis are given by Xansej (on general propositions 
and causality, foundations of mutheaatios p, 2S7 }; arncnic i_s
poisonous, all mop ajy mortal. Theme arc hypothetical proponlt- 
lonal signs, which Ramaey distinguishes from each & sipjn aa Everyone 
In Cambridge voted. This belongs to type (5), which will shortly 
bo dealt with. Ooraraenttng on the nature of prepositional signs 
like jTfienlc jLs pojlgonou.?*. which nay be called hypothetical, Eamsoy 
says 'it always yroes beyond what we know or want', 'it expresses 
an inference we are at any tlrao prepared to make, not a belief of 
the primary sort', which 'Is a nap ox' neighbouring space by which 
we steer 1 ; 'if we professedly extend It to infinity, It is no 
longer a map; we cannot take It in or steer by it. Oar Journey 
is over before we need its remoter ports' (foundations, p.258;, 
The special problem of thia type of generality is stated very 
clearly by Ratasey in the paper from which I have quoted.
(4; and (5), United Illation and limited formal implication, 
are easily pointed out, and their analysis does not, I think, oii'er 
so aerious a problem as that of the unlimited types. limited 
formal implication is illustrated by Earaaey'a everyone in Cambridge 
voted. A prepositional sign displays limited fomal implication 
if it meano that any object which has a certain character also has 
a certain other, and if further the first character Is one ^rhioh ii 
necessarily only pogseased by objects United to a certain number. 
Thus the number of objects which OPJI passes* the character of being 
a person In Cambridge (at a particular tine) In United to the 
number of the population of Cambridge at that time. T.inlted 
hiation is very similar, Kxamplea would be sotne of the people
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at the meeting cheered. one of them burst Into tears. A proposit­ 
ions! sign displays limited hi at Ion it it means that one or some 
of the objects possessing a certain character also possesses an- 
other, and if further the first character can only be possessed 
by a limited nanber of objects,
(6) Negation con be recognised without any special explanation, 
It would be possible to point out in addition latent negation, 
and I think latent hypothesis. But 1 have confined myself to 
latent hiation because it is both the most easily detected and the 
most pervasive of the concealed types of generality.
There are two sorts of problems of analysis connected with 
generality. 1 olnim so far to have analysed, up to a point, mean­ 
ing in the sense in which prepositional signs in a language of 
observation would have meaning. Then one considers prepositional 
signs which hfive generality of some type one may try to analyse 
the generality of thone signs - anting such ^uestions as, what is 
meant by proportional signs of the form £ 12. flenerd? thin in 
the sort of problem of generality which in usually dincussed. 
Or one may try to analyse meaning, in the aonrse in which general 
algns of sorae type have meaning l?he problem nre allied if, as 
1 think is the case, analysing prepositional signs of the form 
3 Is general involves showing what constitutes the meaning of p. 
The first sort of problem should properly be called the analysis 
of some type of generality, the second, the analysis of some type 
of meaning; to avoid confusion between the second analysis and
the analysis of a proposition!*! sign, when this is celled analysis
O^ ftj >f<7»*, I )&-*<Xi*u» J*M *£~*f *^* j-luf-J a~*M^,<:-,
of the meaning^/ie of the nature of meaning, not of meaning simply. 
For one type of meaning, then, the meaning of a langaa^e of obnerv 
ation , the axialj 1?!?? of its nature has already been given up to a 
point« It remains, therefore, for me to analyse the generality 
of the various types of prepositional si^n which are general, and 
to analyse tha natare of the meaning of those types of 
sign which wooia not be foanS in a langttosQ of observation. I 
shall treat neort Motion, 03011 and latent.
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11. Elation.
Prepositional units which have applicative regularity may 
for the moment be called names, though this is probably not the 
sense in which it will ultimately be convenient to use nan e . 
They will narae the objects with which they are appliontively 
correlated. The character stated in the analysis of referential 
meaning given in section 9, may be called primary structural 
regularity; for the prepositional signs which possess this 
character, that is, which have meanings in the sense there 
analysed, e shorter designation is needed, and they will be 
called nanln'? signs. Those nodes in a gituatlon-syntera of 
which each corresponds structurally to some token of a ^iven 
prepositional si/»n may be called the correlative nodes of that 
sisn, and each will be the correlative mode of the token to which 
it corresponds.
I raaat now try to define a hiatus. A hiatus is a propo^lt- 
ional unit like something . sone . somebody . But one con not define 
it by aaylng that it in e proponitional unit used in the aaiae way 
•a gome or some t hin.fr ; for such a definition would Involve the 
aeanlng of gqmething . in the oenae that one could not understand 
it without knowing what something neont. But what nan to bo 
defined is the nature of the meaning of words like n
Bor can one define it by saying thnt it is a prepositional unit 
which is not a name or part of a name or combination of names - 
although it is that - for then any unit not contained In e language
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Of observation would be a hiatus. It; woold be a little better 
to say that a unit, is a hiatus if its replacement by a name usually 
or always results in a naming nign. But this would no* <2iatin^uish 
between some thin/! and everything, nor allow for languages not based 
on languages of observation.
Ordinary language does not, of coarse, consist wholly of what 
are here oailed names and hiatuses. Hiatuses in prepositional 
signs may b© filling places which could be filled by nanes, or raay 
be filling plnooa which oould be filled by aome other typo of unit. 
It la possible, therefore, that hiatuses can not bo satisfactorily 
defined until the nature of the meaning of certain other types of 
unit has been analysed. 1 think, however, that I oan sivc a defi­ 
nition whloh will serve for the momoat. If one conp&ren proyopslt- 
lonal signs containing hiatuses with prepositional oinna oontalniDg 
,eye»y or everything, it is clear thnt the former oan be Derived 
from nawing aigna in a much nore simple wcy than the latter. If 
in a fiVGui une a givon naming sign is true, it lollowa that a sign 
differing 1'rora it only by the substitution of u hiatus for a nane 
will in the oane circuiartanoes bo true fil^o. r?hus, if the oat _ia 
on the taat is true, then sonetalnn in oil the mat, the oat hjxs gotae 
relation to the mat, the cat 1«? on go.^ethin^. are also true; bat 
everything Is oc the r^at. and no on, nre not. 'T-oaething la on 
the mat la the sort of expression people use on entering a badly 
lit room and poroeivinr; a black object, but not identifying it aa 
the oat. ^hua one may suppose that in oiroiinRtanoeg in %7hich
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cats/on Li&ta oaoh expressions as gonothj.;^ ^ on the not are more 
comonly used than saoh exprenniona an evorftthing iri on the nat . 
I propose, therefore, to nay that a prepositional emit 5n R hiatus 
» if It satisfies theoe oondiMonn: (1) it is not n nf*no, has no
parts ivhioh are aaiaea, and Is not part of a name; (2; it has sorae- 
times beau used as part of proportional ril^s in which nil the 
other units hav® been naraem, which T?oulfl booorae asrain^ nl«?n3 If 
one of some set of n&raea were ^ihgtitutecl fr>r it; (3) If saoh a 
prepositional sign i0 used Is a situation in v;hioh all the objects 
named b,y the names it contains are present, and if the placing of 
the objeots oorreaponfis to the placing of the names, then suppoalns: 
a certain nar.ie were flubstitated for the unit (net a neune) which is 
in question the pro posit local token which vould result would be 
part of the sipjn-s^gtera relative to the type of which it would be 
a token, and the situation would contain a ;?itD.&tlon-»et which would 
be part of th» relative Ritu.ution-r5i?st«m. I think those conditions 
serve to identify iiistuaes for the noraent, tiioogh 1 uoabt whether 
the^ nave a correct definition,
fhe sens© In which pooping 3fi aied above hag not yot been ex-s~ 
plained. ^lacing is easily pointed out b? reference to identity
* of struotore. "apponc that somo token oi' the, ont inn 01^ the nat 
ia part of fjorae sign-system, and a certain oat on a nat is port 
of a Bituatioji-fysteia with the ami© structure. If In the situation- 
cyatdm instead of this oat beln^ on the nnt the nat wexe on the cat, 
while all the other parts of the system r/ere unchanged, then the
I
^ op
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of structure would be impaired; though if, of course, 
in all oases met9 were on oats instead of oats on rauts the identity 
of structure vitmld be preserved (unless other characters oi' the 
oats were involved in the systems). If the systems have perfect 
identity of a truest arc one may gay that the placing of the oat and 
the mat correspond to the placing of the token unit3 the cat and 
tjie mat: and that when two sy a tana have the aatje structure every 
element of either system fixes the place of some element of the : 
other is easy to see {though hard to analyse).
The analysis of open hiation is fairly simple. For all values 
Of £ 2? nr*s °Peja hl&tloijT" raeons that p is mafia tip of nnnen and 
hi at unen; or if sign's ure to be included which tire iiot uerived i'roia 
e langaoge of observation niciply by puttirig a htatu0 in plaoe of 
a neme, /j^ hoo open hi at i 0^7 aeansi that p contains at least one 
hiatus. But this is not a very valuable analysis, beonuae of the 
imperfection of the definition of hiatus so far given. ?he analysis 
of latert hiation will also be impaired by this Imperfection, bat 
it will be ranch roore valuable than the analysis of open hiation 
because it will contain the analysis of latency.
In order to awalyno lr.t©noy It will be mjceasar;; to consider 
sabatitutlve definitions (ne& section 2j. ^o far an approxinate 
analysis hag been given of the referential meaning of naming signs - 
this analysis has had the form of a referectiel definition of a 
referential definition. In terms or this analysis it will be 
possible to analyse sentential (that is, sabstltutive ) definitions
of naciin^ eiRRa. fh© analysis ia aa follows: for all vnlaea
of 2 Wld il» l5 «e»»8 i, «n3 £. «ad £ are nw.iixiB slgncj rceansjr-u«>coi*( 
£ and £ have primary ^ regolcxlty, and if £ and £_ hcve relative
sign-ay sterna and nltuatiott-nyntoriB, then every correlative mode 
of £ contains some element which lo noraefl by ench of the names 
in ^, and eveiry correlative node of & coEtalcs sone element named 
by ench of the nt-mea in £, nnfl the plcclne of the neses in each 
sign corresponds to the placing of the elements named lr> each 
ooirelatlvt; mode of the other sign. It woald not be correct to
BB$ that e&ch name in £ nn/nes the same object as one name in £
^"-d 
and one only. This condition would be satisfied by^nfiFiinr: si^rns
with the ssuae raeaning, lor exaiaple by the cat i? aglee_p_ and le 
phut dort ; but not by all, not, for example, b^ the sofa JB to 
the left of the mst atid the mat ja to the rip.ht of the aofa; and 
when we oome to aif;asj which are not nauing sinnn tr.o oorreaponding 
condition is far r.ore oonnpicaoanl^ not fulfilled, as, for instance, 
it is not full'illod by Jolxn and ^Qorno are b rot horn cud John ?xnd 
e tiro .inslo anjt have jtt lo^MJS, oou parent IB coctnon . ?ho fsofa
Al to, the left 0£ ;^iiQ nat and the not ,in to tlxg, r_i ;lxt of the n 
aet precisely tlio ^.-amo liiaitf? *o those tnoflers vrhSoh are to oonply 
with the attitenaiit noflo, but tiic./ do .^o b^' noejie of cliff erent 
aolootjons of cleaoats, oolootionst which ttre nltornative to one 
another in the we# i>ointecl out in noction 6.
Hext it ia neceaaary to define Identity of oeanlns betv?ceri a 
naming olnn and « hlative sign (that is, a sign composed of nones
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and hiatoaeej the type of identity of meaning, thet in to aay f 
which holds, for instance, between the gat Jhs black an2 the oat 
Is .^ojng snhede Qf brl_ack« If in the latter sentence one «nj.bstitatc3 
£$r g,Q!ge ahaSe ojT d nsise i'or son© shade of black the- resulting 
sentence 'voald sgain be a cabins sign; or agf.in, consider the oat 
is cm ther a»a| . the oat i? .in goroe £O3iTtioc QJR the mat, the cat in 
ia J|.h« middle of the mat. The first and secocfl -sentence are a 
jifiosing sign «und 6 illative si5;n with ths same meaning; the third 
sentence replaces the hiatus bj- a fresh C&IKG, thus nel:ir,,t a more 
specific or less general sign, which has not get the same meaning 
sa the firnt and stoona (strictly in ^the mi,adle is not aerely aab- 
stituted for |jj oome ^o^itioa. aince in addition on if changed 
into o^; a tisore correct; illustration forraall^ woalcl Vo given by 
the oat io, j^ ^he mt<,t . ^ho oat is Q£ tiho net iij some position. 
the cat is .pi1, tho :^;t ia the ^iddlo j . It will he convenient to 
hav« a spaoial znsme lor a propcnitioni^l gic-,n Qlii'oring from a 
given hiative   jl&a onlj i:J that It han a aaLia ir. the place of each 
liiatun; 1 shall oall it a closer of the hiciive si^a, beoeuso it 
closer? the 'raps, For n r,l^«*« olorsar wo osu ver^ likely find none 
flttbatitut® vritii the same ;ne?inian which i^ Cijain n hlatJTO
if
will bo jsllQ«2 an optuier, For inntanoe tho closer given
above, ^e tqtat jUs la th._e cl.lalo of tiio. mat . i*s rsoponed by the oat 
is .in BQirte poatar.g In the nil 231 a of tha nnt. . and «»o on. ^has from 
any naming sign which has latent hiation a series can be ?;eneroted 
by the relations of opecintT and cloning, each cloaer raaivlnn the
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previous opener more specific; saoh a series m&y be called a 
closure series * it goes in the opposite direction to the oaiasion 
aeries described by Wisdom (logical constructlona 3JJ, ^_ind_ Got. 
1932 p. 464; t aad differa i^om it &y filliag all the gaps it 
creates.
?he relation o£ closing Is simply fiof iuefi: for rll values 
of jj «wrt<3 &, ^ is a closer 02? <jj means that p is a juonitig flign and 
£ ia a hlative sl^n, and either £ dl£±'era froci £ onl^ in that in 
it a hiatue rajjlaoes one oi' the aaaea in £, or tsone ccaaloj; aign, 
i" f ouu bo ioand, such that £ means? r, onfl a. differ$5 frora r only 
in that in it a hiatus replaces oae oa: the names in r. It is the 
relation of opening whioh ia oruoiel. For all valaen o±' £ end q f 
£ is an opener of $ if £ and <j. have the saae ifte?miiip! t i ia a naming 
, end p ir? a hiative sign oontai^Jrj--, or»e hiatus. This if3 the
of ^jgvlag the g.Qjae moajUag v?hioh 1 ahall .rso^ analyse. The 
analysis Is aa follows: lor all value? oi' £ aad ^, ^ means $, 
and j> if u hiative alga, awfl q. is a Baaing signj noons that (1) q, 
has primary straoturai regularity, (£} ^ is made up Ox names and 
hiatuses, (3j an^ oorrelativo mode oi <i vtoultl oontain all the 
objects lioaed h^ t.h® nawea in £ (and thane would be all its elements 
in the sense pointed oat, in section 4, that icj, the? r/oald make 
dp the mode), (4) a propositional sigr*, r, cat; be i'oand, whioh
TjtyKoJtj «.HL^<;, --^ i. jt<A l*if u- ^ ^Mt^AtH >-^* ^
differs from £ onljr in that in it every hiatl^si 1» £ is^r every 
naase in £ vrould nr.me an element, and the placing o£ the elements 
wou!3 correspond to the placing of the nafaea 5n £ t aad if any
correlative mode of £ contained the elements named in r and not 
named In jg, then the placing of the elementn in that node would 
correspond to the placing of the nocien in g. Definition of 
opener: lor all value*? of £ and &, /£ is an opener of gjraeans that 
£ la a hiative sign containing only one hiatus, & is a namiri? 
ac<2 £ aeans &. Analysis of latent hi at ion, for nawln<* »l?.n«: 
B naming oigu, has latent hi at ion/' raeans that j> is p. naming 
and none hl&tive ales £ can bo found such that p_ raears £ (or an 
oponer of £ ccua be i'oondj.
fhls analysis, I era aorx^v to 8a# t is iraperi'eot in two ways: 
it is lapaireS by the inperfeot d0i'lnitloa oi hiatas, snd it atlll 
oontaias a certain element of fiction, I«lor it aap^esfcs that when- 
ever a propoeitional sign, or at any rate a naniap, sif,n, has latent 
hiation, the 'neana actually exint; In ordinary lanj»aa^e for generat- 
ing a closure «?sri0a from it, having as its lest tern a propoalt- 
.lonal sign freo rrora hiatioa of any kind. Bat the analysis -aoes 
not directly entail that tha clontxre ferier? cnn be carried on^ it 
only entails that fox any ain» with latent, hi at ion ordinary laaffanir 
provides an openor, encl that if it provide^ n oloner for the opener 
it also provides an opener for that, and »o on. If the series 
had been carried s oertaln distance, a sl^n mlffht bo found rrhloh 
one felt certain still had latent hiation, without beln» able to 
nee how to find ail opener for it, or how to find one in ordinary 
laivtua^e. On the other hand, es « rale the opener probably can 
be found, and the oleaent of fiction is not ver;; #rave: if the
analysis required us always to be able to find a closer, it would 
bo a very different matter. 7he sign which would be perfectly 
non-hiative is tm ideal limit, and is not involved in the analysia 
of latent hi at ion.
12. Comparison of the present analysis with
Wisdom's analysis of generality.
An analysis of generality is implied, though not stated 
very folly, in the last instalment or Wisdom's lor, leal countru.ptlong 
(Mind April ISiJii. pp. 191-196). The analysis differs a good deal 
from the analysis of hiation given here; how far the difference is 
merely one of form 1 am not sure. Wisdom writes on page 192, f if 
the faot that something is red is an incomplete fact, then '^one- 
thing la red" incompletely locates a faot f and conversely, This 
is because The faot that "pmothinp is red ij3 an inooraplete faot 
jast means '""Something is red" is. ec |aoonplete sentence' (1 think 
he should have added here and there la _a fact which it locates, or 
some such clause). He adds in & footnote 'this is a theory of 
general facts'. Farther on (p.193) f it appears that we have not 
many species of faot but many uses of "faot". One of these uses, 
namely that applicable to atomic iacts, is land amenta! in the sense 
that all the other uses are eeoondary to it. To say of one use 
of a word that it Is secondary to another means that the one is 
definable by means of the other, bat it means moro; namely that 
the less fundamental is not a determination or specification of 
the fundamental 1 (in the sense in which the meaning of horse in 
the sense of male horse is a determination of the meaning/horseA "~
in the sense of nember of the horse species). *What terminology 
does suggest in that there is one use of "faef and that vre have 
this and that species of fact, a,?. Incomplete facts and complete
facts. What we want is one word suoh aa "a fundamental" "a base" 
or "a fact" to be used In plaoe of "fact" aa aaed In "the fact that 
ja & j|n when a ii & is atomic. Then confining ourselves to Tacts 
of the first level, we can say that our sentences express incomplete 
facts when they incompletely locate Facts. We aay that our sen- 
tences express secondary facts, i.e. faots not ox the first level, 
when they indirectly and not directly locate Facts'. t.
What exactly in Wisdom claiming? 1 think roughly this: there 
are certain facts, called atomic facts, which are absolutely de- 
terminate (in some sense the world is made up of all the atomic 
faotsj, and the sentences, if any, which express them nust there- 
fore be completely non-general; when the word fact is used other- 
wise than in reference to an atonic faot or conjunction of atomic 
faots, for exmnple in /The oat is on the mat expresses a faotj, 
the sentence in which in occurs can be analysed in terns of atomic 
facts and a complex relation between atonic faots and some general 
sentence. The account of this complex relation is very elaborate, 
and can not be sa-vaarined. But we may conclude that Tlsdora's 
analysis of the fact that a.HJ> iji_ ja general fact would be something 
like this: £lae sentence a. Rfe has the complex relation in question 
to an atocaio faot or conjunction of atonic factsj". there would 
be soae difficulty, I think, in applying this Rnaly^is to a false 
general sentence, but I dare nay it coulG be ovoroone.
My analysis of the generality of prepositional signs with open 
or latent hi at ion has already been riven. 'Vhat would be ray analysis
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of the generality of the corresponding facts? i think as follows $ 
for all values of lUxlr^Jt the fact that jB(x*--/."; has open or 
latent Motion means that R(x'«~x*1 ) - that Is, that Ii(x < --x_>1 j la 
true, - and that Hhc^-oc^j (the prepositional sip;n) has open or 
latent hlatlon In the sense appropriate to sir;n£. Thus the two 
analysts appear to be inconsistent, for Wisdom 1 IB involves atonlo 
facts and mine does not. But are they really Inconsistent? 
This depends, 1 think, on the definition of atomic foot,. 
I should be inclined to say that facts can be analysed in terms 
of modes and signs, those facts, at least, that have any elements 
in any sense of ej..eaocj. which are modes or elements of oodes   
Wisdom expresses a similar view in j.o^ioal oonjB^ratBti^ng JJ, pases 
463-9 (Mind. Oct. 1931); 1 do not know whether he has changed his 
raind since then, the exaot analysis would depend on the way in 
which fact occurred, but aa example raay be given; I should say, 
for instance, taat thg fa.otj3 are jw ^ h^aye jlaat. stat^oci neons that 
for all values of £, if 1 have Junt tsaid _£ f then p (that i®r 31 is 
truej, and I have Just said something. The reference to modes 
would come in when the convention, used above, was analjsed, that 
|» symbolises a proportional nl^n. ^uppoisinR for the moraent that 
atoniio faot simply means non-eon,Itmotive and nbBolatcly doternlnato 
fact, then 2 think the onalyai* of there are ntonic faot_a ^ould be 
it is loaloally possible., to find aomo g. .suoh that j> if? true o.nd it 
IS 521 logically poasible. to find any opener for % (this necares 
absolute determlnateno?!'? ) and farther it is not lorrically poqqible
to. fuiPtl an.y. <^t jr, and go on. such that £ means the conjunction of 
&t £» flAA 30 on (this necuren non-conjunctiveness). 3 So not know 
whether wisdom woald accept such an analysis OB this; bat it he 
would he could, I think, analyse his ooraplex relation between gen- 
eral sentences and atomic foots in terras of a different complex 
relation between the meaning of general «entenoes and the meanings 
of non-general sentences. I'hia complex relation mi^ht be that 
from the general sentence It was logically possible to generate 
a closure series which, would end in complete closure, that la which 
would hare as its last term either a sentence with the oharaoter 
which 2 *ias 1" the above analysis of atoraio facts, or a sentence 
having the aone meaning an a oonjonction of sentences with that 
character - that IB, it would not be logically ponnlblo to find 
any opener for the last terra. Such an analysis would not be much 
unlike the aaaly.^ig of latent hiation which I hi;ve ^ivon. It 
would differ from my snal^ais by the reference to logioal possi- 
bility, but exact by how naoh this dlffaronce anounts to I on rot 
prepared to say.
If '"TlBdora would not admit on analysis of atonic in terns of 
modes and proposltlonal nlgna, our analysts certainly roost be in 
some degree inconsistent. 'i'he only ground I oan think of on which 
he night object is that atomic facts are In some sense or other 
more fundamental than nodes or thati propositional signs - that is, 
that sentences containing atomic fact are more analytic. I doubt 
whether this is true. But I think hia analysis night still be
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consistent with mine, though it rai^ht not.
It might be held that the farther analysis of the situation* 
system, in terms of which the meaning of naming signs was analysed, 
would involve reference to atomic facts which contributed to making 
up the systems. If that wore so, atomic facts would also be In- 
volved in the analysis of latent hiation, and it might or rairht not 
turn out that my analysis was equivalent to Wisdom's, as applied 
to latent hi&tloa. ?here nra two ways in which analysis >#fr oi' the 
nature of referential tneaning raiftht bo held to involve reference 
to atonic facts, one tenable and one, I think, lintenable. It 
night be held that the analysis of referential meaning involves 
the fact that there are atonic faobs - that i% thnt there are non- 
conjunctive absolutely determinate facts. I think it in true that 
there are atomic facts in thin sense, and that consequently this 
view of their ooccexion with meaning if* tenable. or it mifjht be 
held that tho analysis of referential uaaninp, involves the feet 
that there are precisely those atomic facts, or thone types oi" 
atonic facts, which as it happens do exi^t, This 3 think in not 
tenable, nor is e corresponding vie?/ 01 the connexion of atomic 
facts with generality tenable. For it seems to me oleer that we 
both know the meanings of a number of propositions! slrtns, and 
roughly what is meant hy »ae attinft. and know that all or mo^t ordinary 
prepositional signs are general, arid roughly what is meant by general; 
and that on the other hand, though we may know that there must be 
atomic facts, we do not know what atonic facts there arc, or what
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types of atomic facts there are - although we may nake guesses 
when we are considering facts about souse-data. I conclude that 
the analysis of meaning and tho analysis of generality oan not 
Include the existence of the atomic facts, or types of atomic fact, 
which actually do exist.
About wisdom's analysis 1 conclude that (1) If he woald accept 
»y sort of analysis o£ atomic faot his analysis Is very likely 
equivalent to mine: If he would not, either (8) he would hold that 
the analysis of generality involves the existence but not the pre- 
cise nature of atonic facto. In which ease his analysis nay be 
A. true and oonnistent with alao, B true aaC Inoonraistent with 
mine, C not vrholly true but less or riora appraxlinntoly true than 
mine; or (3j he would hold that tho analysis of generality in- 
volves the existence of preolsoly those atonic faotfj or typoa of 
atomic faot which do exist f in which case I think ixin analysis 
la
t 
1
S
13 Hypothesis. 
If one examines a prepositional sign of the form/ y> raeanS
t^-* __
faQ&tfa* and jo is a hypothetical sign? there are three 
points in respect of which it may be analysed; an analysis 
may explain meaning, in the sense in which v> has meaning, 
it may explain the generality of v>, and it may explain 
the hypothetical nature of j>. I think that in an ex­ 
haustive treatment of hypothesis it would probably have 
to be recognised that hypotheticals are of a great 
variety of types. I shall distinguish two types, which 
may be called generalisations and applications, corres­ 
ponding roughly to what Ramsey (foundations of mathe­ 
matics p. 24o) called variable hypotheticals and ordinary 
hypotheticals. Instances of generalisations are all meii 
are mortal, all timers are dangerous, rain is wet; and 
of applications, if you ^o near that ti^er he will attack 
you, if you go out you will get wet. Many attempts have 
been made, some obviously up to a point successful, to 
analyse generalisations and applications. It has been 
claimed, for instance, that all generalisations can be 
analysed in the form (x> .<*>* D&K , or ^ : (J x'1 : c£)r . ^ 
so that all timers are dangerous means (x). x is a tiger 
implies x is dangerous: similarly, that the analysis of 
applications must have the logical form v>D Q , so that
if you go out you will get wet means it is not the case 
both that you will ao out and that you will not get wet. 
I think that, as it happens, the first analysis is 
clearly correct, as far as it faoes, and the second clear­ 
ly wrong (Moore has often pointed out in discussion 
that most propositions of the linguistic form if——then —— 
are clearly not of the logical form pDq : the quickest 
way to see this is by reflecting that if I say to some­ 
one if you ^o out you will get wet, the corresponding 
material implication must be true if he stays in or if 
he &ets vvet without going out, both of which things may 
happen when it is not raining and what has really been 
said is false; moreover if he stays in-thus making true 
the material implication-it is none the less relevant 
to say afterwards if you had %one out you would have 
got wet).
I give these illustrations chiefly in order to 
point out the senses of meaning which I want to consider, 
the senses in which the word occurs in the above analyses, 
or in the corresponding referential definitions. The 
types of analysis to which I have just referred do not 
directly help on this point; they are directed to show- 
in^ what may for the moment be called the logical form
of certain propositions, and they are in terms of meaning 
in one of the senses in question.
I regret that I do not see at all clearly how mean­ 
ing in these senses is to be analysed: but it is perhaps 
worth while to state certain aspects of the problem to 
be solved. First I shall give reasons for thinking 
that generalisations are, in a sense, more fundamental 
than applications; and then I shall try to point out 
the various elements of the problem of generalisations.
It seems to me that applications are to be analysed 
partly in terms of generalisations. Thus it seems to 
me that the analysis of if you go out you will get wet. 
for instance, is on the lines of / you will get wet is 
entailed by you will ^o out together with certain facts 
about the circumstances (that rain is falling, and so 
on) and certain causal laws_/ . But only on those lines, 
not exactly that; for people who use applications usual­ 
ly know what they mean, but do not usually know exactly 
what causal laws and facts about circumstances would 
entail the consequence they are asserting. The analysis 
might perhaps be of the form /"if J? then £_ ~\ means /there 
is some set of facts or other about present circumstances, 
and some set or other of causal laws, such that they 
together with £ entail £ "| • I believe that there is a 
causal law (with some character or other) must be 
analysed a generalisation could be found (with the cor­ 
responding character) which would be true, or correct.
If this Is so, then according to either analysis the 
sense In which applications have meaning will have to 
be analysed in terms of the sense in which generalisations 
have meaning; since the meaning of an application will 
either include the meaning of some generalisation, or 
will include reference to the possibility of finding a 
generalisation, that is, a prepositional sign with the 
type of meaning that generalisations have.
Consider a fairly straightforward generalisation, 
sav all kittens are restless, or all books are made of 
paper - the latter because it may be as well to keep a 
false generalisation in mind. In a way one can see how 
such a prepositional sign can be derived from a naming 
sign, in the same sort of way in which a hiative sign 
can be derived from a naming sign which would be a 
closer of it. The meaning of all kittens are restless 
obviously has some relation or other to the meaning of 
this ki11 en is resiles_g - a relation which one expresses 
in unanalytlc terms by saying that the former will be 
true if the latter is always true, or is true of all 
kittens. NOW the nature of the meaning of this kitten 
is restless has been approximately analysed, in terms 
of the applicative regularity of t.o names, this kitten 
and is restless, and of the primary structural regularity 
of the whole prepositional sign: the analysis is, of
course, only a sketch, since it treats the sign as hav­ 
ing two, instead of four, significant parts; but it is 
an approach to an analysis. 'Ye might express the ad­ 
ditional problem by using the expression /this kitten 
is refetless would be true of every kitten! , and then 
saying that it is the nature of the meaning of the 
unitalicised part that has to be analysed. The generali­ 
sation obviously contains two parts - kitten and restless - 
which have applicative regularity in some sense, though 
not strictly in the sense which has been defined, it 
is clear that there is some sense or other in which 
these words are correlated with elements of the world, 
and in which this and is are not, though in ray very 
general sense of element they are. In this other limited 
sense it may be said that such words as all, this, is, 
are, show the place in the world of tne elements named. 
But this unfortunately carries one no nearer to the 
analysis which is required: one of the forms of the 
present question would be, what is the analysis of /g.1.1. 
is used to show the place of elements in the world/ ? 
I think the problem is to be approached on these 
lines, which I can not at present make at all definite. 
A sense must be found in which such words as kitten and 
restless and rain and stop_ and between and so on have 
applicative regularity, as distinct from phrases like
this kitten or has stopped. This may be called the ap­ 
plicative regularity of names (in a new sense of name). 
Then another quite different sense must be found in 
WL.ich one would speak of the applicative regularity of 
expressions of the form this—is——, the ——is ——. 
these—-are——•. this is a——. and so on. This, which 
may be called primary applicative regularity of formal 
units, would consist of correlations between the ex­ 
pression thijs.— is.——, and the holding in some situation 
of the characterising relation between some one object 
and a characterising object; and so on for the rest of 
the formal units referred to. Then certain other formal 
units would be pointed out, such as all—«— are ——•, 
— is always—^, Most-—ar e —_, about which the first 
thing to be said would be that they had not got primary 
applicative regularity. I think the difficulties in 
defining the applicative regularity of names, and of 
formal units like this—-"is—— , which we may call 
primary formal units, would not be very great - the 
question can probably be treated on the lines followed 
in section 7 • If this treatment were successful, the 
resulting analysis would be well on the way to the 
multiplicity of actual syntax.
The most obviously hopeful method of approaching 
the meaning of what may be called secondary formal units,
such as all — . are-~r , every —— is — -, depends on the as­ 
sumption that generalisations are more often than not 
used truly; a comparable assumption has been made for 
prepositional signs which are not generalisations, but 
I do not know whether in the present case it is so 
plausible. If the assumption is made, an analysis might 
be constructed as follows, suppose the gaps in all — —are 
are filled by units which are names in the new sense; I 
shall symbolise by $ and ^ the names which might fill 
these gaps. Then for all values of (ft and *J> , F
means that all <JP are l^,and (p and^ are names (in the 
new sense )_/ means that <p and ^ have the applicative
~
regularity of names, and most of the names which have 
filled the first and second gaps in all ~^are^Lha ve 
been such that all the objects named by the first have 
also been objects named by the second.
This is a mere sketch of an analysis. It is also 
open to two objections which deserve consideration. 
First, is it not circular to analyse the nature of the 
meaning of all—- — are — ^i n such a way that all occurs 
in the analysing expression (occurs outside the square 
brackets^? I think it is not circular. For what is 
being analysed is not all , but meaning in the sense in 
which all has meaning. The objection could fairly be 
made if mean occurred after means that outside the square
brackets, and did so In the sense under consideration. 
A similar objection might have been made to the defini­ 
tions in section 9, but I think there the defence would 
be exactly the same, on the other hand it is possible 
that a proper analysis of all would lead one to modify 
the type of analysis which ia proposed for this sense
. and I admit that I am not entirely comfort­
able about this point.
Secondly, this analysis of meaning involves a 
partial analysis of all . it contains the words 'the 
names which have filled the first and second gaps in 
all—- ar e — have been such that all the objects named 
by the first have also been objects named by the second 1 . 
This expression attributes two very questionable charac­ 
ters to a generalisation: first, that it relates to 
absolutely all the objects which have been of a certain 
kind, not merely those which have been observed or 
observable; second, that it relates only to those ob­ 
jects of that kind which have existed in the past. The 
first of these characters I think generalisations do 
possess in some sense or other, but probably in rather 
a different sense from that in which it may be said that 
a naming sign relates to the objects named; and it is 
not clear exactly what this different sense is. The 
second character most generalisations certainly do not
possess; they clearly relate to the future just as much 
as to the past. They express rules by which we shall 
always continue to be guided, unless they are overthrown: 
compare Ramsey's language (general propositions and 
causality p. 241); 'variable hypothetical ... form 
the system with which the speaker meets the future 1 , they 
•are not judgments but rules for judging "If I meet a <p t 
I shall regard it as a (^ «•. it appears, then, that 
the way in which generalisations relate to unobserved 
cases, and the way in which they relate to the future 
as much as to the past, are parts of the problem of the 
analysis of generalisations. This analysis is not pro­ 
perly to be demanded of those who are analysing meaning, 
although it may be necessary to leave a gap or an ob­ 
scurity in an analysis of meaning until the analysis 
of generalisations has been found. Ramsey's paper from 
which I have just quoted seems to me to throw a good 
deal of li^ht on the question of generalisations, but I 
have not been able to extract from it an analysis of 
generalisations which can be clearly stated.
The above sketch is a sketch of the analysis of 
what may be called secondary applicative regularity of 
formal units. It would also be necessary to define 
secondary structural regularity, the character which 
will constitute the meaning of prepositional signs of
such forms as all——are——; and to extend the analysis 
of meaning in the sense in which it is possessed by 
all-—-are —so as to include every— is —- , —is. always—- , 
most—-are——, and so on, and expressions in other 
languages. For secondary structural regularity two 
systems would have to be found of a rather more compli­ 
cated type than those which gave rise to primary 
structural regularity. Naming signs (which could now 
be defined as those consisting only of names in the new 
sense and primary formal units) as a rule have a number 
of correlative modes each of which enters separately 
into the relative situation-system, and each of which 
is connected in a special way with the meaning of the 
token to which it is correlative. But no modes are 
related to generalisations in the way in which correlative 
modes are related to naming signs; and a generalisation, 
if it does not happen to be ambiguous, is true either 
on all occasions of its use or on none. But a number 
of modes can be found each of which may be said to be 
an instance of a given generalisation; each of these is 
related to every occasion of use of the generalisation 
in exactly the same way. Thus the generalisation 
all kittens are restless is related in a certain way to 
a number of modes, each consisting of a kitten behaving 
restlessly, and is true (if it is true) because all
these modes have occurred and because there has been no 
kitten whose life story has not included a &ood deal of 
restless behaviour. Similarly there are certain modes 
related in the same way to al l_p i_g; s_ are d irtjr, and so 
on. The modes in question, for any generalisation of 
the form all (ft are jJ^, are those such that it would be 
logically possible for them to be correlative modes of 
this (j> is Jfc^y The whole set for a given generalisation 
may be called the positive grounds for that generalisation 
(they are not of course all grounds in the ordinary 
sense, for some are unknown). All the positive grounds 
for a given generalisation obviously have some common 
element, similarly all the propositional tokens of a 
given generalisation have something in common, namely 
the type of which they are tokens. The common element 
and the type are of course logical constructions from 
the individual positive grounds and tokens. None the 
less there is no objection to speaking of a system made 
up of the common elements of all sets of positive grounds 
of true generalisations, and a system made up of the 
type propositional signs which are the generalisations 
themselves, These two systems will have the same structure, 
and in terms of this identity of structure secondary 
structural regularity may be defined - then meaning in 
the sense in which it belongs to generalisations might
be fully analysed on the same lines as meaning in the 
sense in which it belongs to naming signs.
The negative element in the meaning of hypothetical 
will be referred to in the next section-
14 Negation
There remains one of the types of generality mentioned 
in section lo which has not been dealt with. I have no 
analysis of negation to offer, and in consequence I do 
not see how to analyse meaning in the sense in which 
negative propositional signs have meaning. AS a result 
all the analyses of the meaning of propositional signs 
suggested BO far are imperfect, the least imperfect being, 
I think, the analysis of the meaning of hiative signs. 
Both naming signs and generalisations involve in their 
analysis negative signs, and consequently the analysis 
of meaning in the sense in which they have meaning In­ 
volves an explanation of the relation between the signs 
and whatever it is that constitutes the negative part 
of their meaning. Thus, all timers are dangerous may 
perhaps be analysable quite simply as there has not been 
and jwil 1^ not be anything^ which is a_ ti.^er and is not 
dangerous (in this of course the generalising aspect is 
not analysed); if some more complicated analysis is 
found, involving a relation between the generalisation 
and its positive grounds, there will still have to be a 
clause taking account of the negative grounds (and these 
are all the tigers_thgj~e_jmyj^J^jm, that is, and nothing 
else Jhae been_ a tiger), \vhen naming signs were first
under consideration, in section 9, they were treated as
j 1
divisible wholly into names, in a primitive sense. But 
as soon as it becomes necessary to take account of 
formal units it also becomes necessary to take account 
of the fact that definite descriptions are involved: 
definite descriptions do not usually claim to relate to 
an object which is absolutely the only instance of its 
kind, but they are always, nevertheless, limited by some 
negative clause. The analysis of the kitten is restless 
does not of course contain the clause nothing else has 
ever been a kitten, but it does contain some such clause 
(as has been suggested in section 9) as there is no 
other kitten to which we are attending.
4
The analysis of negation would be superficially 
simpler in terms of facts than in terms of modes. For 
in terms of facts one can speak of negative facts, and 
relations between them and negative signs. It is a mis­ 
take to object to this procedure on the ground that there 
are no negative facts. There are negative facts, for 
there are negative sentences which are true, that is, 
which express facts; the word fact is used in such a way 
that facts may be negative- The objection to which the 
procedure may be open is that negative facts are not 
fundamental, that is, that there are negative facts can 
be analysed in a form waich does not involve a negative.
I find myself prone to think that this is so, though I 
do not know how the analysis is to be carried out: I have 
already said that I think that facts are not fundamental, 
but I must make clear that I think also that the negativity 
of negative facts is probably analysable - the analysis 
will not merely transfer it from the facts to something 
else (jud^jraents, for instance) which is negative in a 
different but systematically connected sense.
In the absence of an analysis of negation I do not 
see how to analyse the nature of the meaning of negative 
prepositional sie,ns.
fo It would be worth while to have a special name for 
the way in which negation is alleged to be analysable. It 
is claimed taat if negative expressions are used at several 
levels, in wisdom's sense (logical constructions IV, Mind 
Jan. 1933 pp.53-4), then there is no level at which they 
are used such that in that use they can not be analysed 
wholly in non-negative terras, although some levels may be 
partly analysable in terms of others. If this is so, one 
may say that negation is finally analysable. Compare exten­ 
sion, according to the Mill-Russell type of theory: the 
extension of physical objects would be analysable in terms 
of the extension of sense-data, but extension would not be 
finally analysable. The finally analysable is said to dis­ 
appear in analysis.
15 The meaning of language in general.
The expressions the nature of whose meaning has so far 
been considered have been only a limited class selected 
from all the types of expression we use: they have been 
confined to the expressions which could occur in what I 
have called a language of observation, and those that 
differ from them only by the presence of hiation or 
hypothesis, obviously a great deal of any language in 
use among civilised people has been left out. The most 
conspicuous omissions are, I think, of expressions which 
relate to abstractions and those which relate to mental 
events (this classification is not very exact). There 
seem to be two possible ways of completing the analytical 
scheme which has been outlined. The missing parts of 
language can be included either by showing that meaning 
in the sense in which they have meaning can be analysed 
in terms of meaning in one of the senses whose analysis 
has already been considered, or by giving special analyses 
of the nature of the meanin^ of expressions relating to 
abstractions and to mental events. It seems to me pos­ 
sible to adopt the first alternative for abstractions, 
but I am doubtful whether or not it will meet the case 
of mental events. First I shall try to point out what 
I mean by abstractions, and the sort of way in which I 
think the meaning of the words standing for them is
related to the senses of meaning already considered.
I mean by words standing for abstractions such words 
as tendency, influence, probability, causation, chance, 
space, number (in some uses), frequency, repetition; 
and as nature, humanity, animulity^, and so on; and certain 
verbs and adjectives connected with these nouns. I think 
all the words arid other expressions of this class can be 
analysed by means of a language of observation and the 
types of generality which have been discussed. It might, 
of course, be maintained that there are expressions which 
are not of any of the types so far considered, cannot be 
analysed by means of them, and do not relate to mental 
events; but I do not think that this is so, unless there 
are mathematical expressions which fulfil this condition - 
with mathematical expressions I do not profess to deal. 
I am assuming then that, apart from expressions of mathe­ 
matics (and formal lo&ic), there are no expressions which 
are not either of one of the types so far considered, or 
capable of being analysed by means of expressions of one 
of those typesj or expressions relating to mental events. 
I shall suggest that if an expression can be analysed by 
means of one of the types of expression with which I have 
dealt, then the nature of the meaning of that expression 
can be analysed in terms of the nature of the meaning of 
one of the types with which I have dealt. I can make
the suggestion clearer by constructing an example.
Suppose I want to analyse tendency, I may examine 
such a sentence as the rat tends to get through the maze 
more quickly; as an analysis of tend in this use I may 
suggest that the rat tends to get through the maze more 
quickly means that each time the rat gets through the 
maze, after the first, it gets through it quicker. I 
think this is approximately the ri^ht analysis, but 
whether it is or not does not matter for the present 
purpose. The question that has to be answered is, what 
is the analysis of means, as it would occur in such an
analysis as is given above? I suggest that means in———— 
this sense can be analysed in terras of meaning in the
senses discussed in my earlier sections; and I will try 
to &ive an outline of the way in which it would be 
analysed.
The general linguistic form of prepositional signs 
relating to tendency in this sense may be symbolised 
the <p tends to do _j^_ (I call this the general form 
because I think it illustrates in the simplest way the 
lines on which all the propositional signs in question 
could be dealt with). The analysis of the general form 
would be f the jfr tends ^to__dp_J^. means that the y) 
does V more and more T . The analysis of means in 
this sense: / the (p tende^ to do U^ means that the
(JP does W more and more, and d> and y> are names*7 
means that (p and y have the applicative regularity of 
names, and most of the names which have filled the gape 
In the—tends to do— have been such that the object 
named by the first (and identified by the) has gone 
through the process named by the second more and more. 
An objection might be made to such an analysis on the 
ground of circularity, because more and more occurs in 
the analysing expression; but I think such an objection 
would be unfounded, and is to be met in the way sug­ 
gested in section 13 for the analysis of the meaning of 
hypotheticals.
It would be unsatisfactory if a different analysis 
had to be given for the meaning of every abstraction, 
but the foregoing analysis can easily be generalised, on 
some such lines as these: / jF (x~ — x ) means that 
g(x* - x ), and x£. - _x. are names, and £ is either a 
name or a primary or secomu..!^ formal unit, and f is 
neither a name nor a primary or secondary formal unitj 
means that x1 - *" and £ have applicative regularity 
(of the appropriate type), and f has not got appli­ 
cative regularity (of any type so far discussed), and 
most of the na.ues which have filled the gaps in 
g(_ _ .) have been such that the objects named by 
them have been related in the way indicated by & and 
the placing of the names. The question whether, apart 
from expressions meaning mental objects,
all expressions which
are not of any type dealt with In my earlier sections 
can be analysed by means of expressions which are of 
one of those types, may be expressed in terras of this 
analysis: it is the question whether for every ex­ 
pression which could take the place of £ above some 
£ can be found which satisfies the conditions stated 
in the analysis.
The analysis ^iven above (if it were fully worked 
out) would define the sense in which a certain class 
of prepositional units had rneanine- "e might say that 
a unit satisfying the conditions satisfied by £ above'—
had tertiary applicative regularity; and we should 
proceed to define tertiary structural regularity 
(giving the syntax of propositional signs involving 
abstractions) on the lines which have been suggested 
in section 13 for secondary structural regularity. 
My view of the nature of the meaning of all proposi­ 
tional signs not relating to mental objects may be sum­ 
med up by saying that I thinV they all have either 
primar.; or secondary or tertiary structural regularity.
Next allowance must be made for mental objects. 
On this point I think the analysis of meaning awaits 
the analysis of mental and other similar words, that 
is, I think different accounts of ?;hat constitutes the
meaning of expressions relating to mental objects must 
be given lor different analyses of the expressions 
taemselves. I think there are two relevant alternatives,
[ behaviouristic and non-behaviouristic. Either every 
propositional sit,n relating to a mental object can be 
analysed waolly in terras of observable modes or not. If 
the former alternative is true, every propositional sign 
relating to a mental object will have either primary or 
secondary or tertiary structural regularity, and there 
will be no special problem of the nature of the meaning 
of these propositional signs.
* If on the other hand the completely behaviouristic 
analysis of all statements involving mental factors is 
not correct ——— and it is a very paradoxical analysis, 
waich has never, I think, been fully worked out ——— 
the nature of the meaning of these statements is cer­ 
tainly a 4Uite separate problem. All the analyses 
&iven here , waether they have been ^iven in detail or 
in outline, have been wholly in terms of what is ob- 
«. servabie; they have either been in terms of observable 
relations between expressions and other objects, or 
built up from analyses which were in those terms. It is 
natural to think that such objects as an act of judge­ 
ment or memory, a pain, an impulse, a feeling of longing,
and so on, are not obser ble in anything like the sense 
in which a bodily movement, a smell, or a shout, is
observable. A behavlouristic philosopher would regard 
this as a mistake; he would have to maintain, roughly,
that propositional signs in which pain, for instance, 
occurred, were to be analysed in terras of the observable 
happenings which would ordinarily be described as signs 
of the occurrence of pain, or evidence for its occurrence.
If the behaviouristic analysis is not correct, mean­ 
ing, in the sense in which designations or descriptions 
of mental objects have meaning, will have to be analysed 
on radically different lines from those that I have fol­ 
lowed. I do not know what the correct analysis would be, 
but I think it would have to take account of the philoso­ 
phical problems of the nature of understanding (as a 
mental process), and the nature of the inference (or 
whatever it is"i by which the existence of mental events 
is inferred from physical signs.
My outline of an analysis of meaning is now concluded. 
Apart from omissions and vagueness, it is imperfect for­ 
mally, I am sorry to say, in two serious ways; it does 
not take account of the existence of ambiguity (many 
senses for one expression) or of alternative syntactical 
forms (many expressions for one sense), and, although 
names and various types of formal unit are distinguished,
<u
it has not got the multiplicity of actual syntax. Names 
and formal units correspond rou^ihly to parts of speech. 
But an ideal syntax would certainly involve far more 
parts of speech (not necessarily those in grammar books), 
the use of inflexion* and connecting words (relative 
pronouns, conjunctions, and so on), the various types 
of compound sentence, and many other r«
16 The meaning of propositional sign-
It has been convenient to use the phrase propoeitional 
sign inconsistently. I began, in section 2, by pointing 
out in unanalytic terms the expressions I proposed to 
call propositional signs - namely sentences which are 
not questions, requests or commands, and other symbolic 
expressions used to make statements. But when I used 
propositional sign in the sections in which I was 
analysing meaning, the phrase should not have been 
understood in this sense. / £ is a propositional sign! , 
in the sense which I originally gave the phrase, and 
In which it is in general proper to use it, may be 
analysed: j~ p_ has either primary or secondary or ter­ 
tiary structural regularity (or the character which be­ 
longs to those si^ns which relate to mental events, 
supposing that is different)! . Thus, when propositional. 
sign occurred in, for instance, a definition of primary 
structural regularity, it ought to have been used in a 
different sense, so that circularity in the definition 
of prepositional si^n in the regular sense might be
A
T avoided.
The circularity could have been avoided at the ex­ 
pense of introducing a complication whose tiresomeness 
would have outweighed the gain in accuracy. It could 
have been pointed out that among spoken and written
expressions certain obvious divisions are to be found - 
in writing, the division made by a full stop, in speech, 
the division made by certain types of pause. Then it 
would have been possible to say that each of the groups 
of words so separated was to be called a sentence, and 
that certain sentences would presently be shown to have 
a certain additional character on account of which they 
would be called propositional signs, and which they would 
be found to share with some objects which were not sen­ 
tences (for instances glasses on dishes). I thought it 
more convenient to use from the start a phrase which 
would identify all those and only those expressions with 
which I was concerned. But strictly speaking p_r_opq_si.tional 
sign should be analysed in terras of the analysis of 
meaning of which an outline has been given.
17 Reflexivity of the foregoing analysis.
I think the cause of the appearance of circularity which 
some of the analyses here suggested have is that many of 
them actually have a rather different character, which 
may be called reflexivity, or at any rate they approxi­ 
mate to reflexivity. An analysis is reflexive if in 
some sense it applies to itself. It is obvious that 
analyses of meaning and of generality are likely to have 
this character. In every analysis of the type with 
which I am concerned the link between the analysed ex­ 
pression and the analysing expression is means or 
means that. If some expression, £, is being analysed 
in respect of means as it occurs in £, then if the link 
between £ and an analysing expression CL is means in the 
sense in which it occurs in £, or in an allied sense, an 
analysis in the same form as CL has, or in a similar form, 
could be given of this occurrence of meana. Thus an 
endless series of analyses would be generated, of the 
form rf r £ means 3. ") means £ ~] means s_ ~] means 
In this series £ would be the result of the application 
of the analysis of means to the first occurrence of 
means, s the result of the application of the analysis 
to the second occurrence, and so on. An analysis of 
generality is reflexive in a slightly different way. 
If the analysis of some sense of generality has the form
IT!. £ is general (in sense n)J means that q J , it is 
very likely that this whole sentence is itself general 
in sense n. Then a series, endless like the first, can 
be generated in this way. Supposing w« call the whole 
analysing sentence an. then an1 is general in sense n.
we apply the analysis to / an 1 is general in sense n 7 ,\, —-— j
and the resulting analysis may be called an_2. gu t an*2 
will also be general in sense n_; the analysis of this 
statement will be an5 ; and so on. In point of fact all 
my analyses have been, I think, both hypothetical and 
latently, if not openly, hiative. Thus all the analyses 
of generality have presumably been reflexive in the sense 
pointed out; and some at least of my analyses of the 
meaning of propositional signs have probably been reflexive,
Is this reflexivity objectionable? it seems to me 
not. suppose one of my analyses of referential meaning 
is that I p_ means that q 7 means that r; and suppose that 
the second means is being used in the same sense as the 
first. Then the following points seem to me clear, 
(ifr From the fact that the analysis is reflexive it does 
not follow that it is circular: it would only be circular 
if r_ contained some expression in respect of which £ £ 
means that q 1 was supposed to be analysed. (2) Two 
purposes may be distinguished which the finding of an 
analysis is intended to serve; they may be called the
logical and the psychological purpose. The logical pur­ 
pose is to find an analysing expression which has the 
same meaning as another expression and which also has 
the formal character (whatever it may be) which distin­ 
guishes an analytical definition from other kinds. The 
psychological purpose is not to cause the analyst to 
understand what is analysed - he understands it already - 
but to cause him to understand it more clearly (or with 
more insight, as 'isdom would say 1). (3) In the special 
case of analysing prepositional meaning aa endless series 
of analyses can be generated. But the logical purpose 
is only to reach the first stage in this series, since 
the first stage will satisfy the formal conditions of 
analysis. The psychological purpose is realised (on the 
assumption tnat the analysis is correct) when the analyst, 
considering j_[ £ means that ^ 7 means that r J t gains 
improved insight into means in both its occurrences 
simultaneously. ,hen this happens, he sees that it is 
logically possible to carry on the series of analyses 
for ever. But he would not improve his insight or clarify 
his understanding by advancing to any further stage. 
Similarly the logical purpose of the analysis of
OU-t
generality is realised when the first analysis/of the 
possible series is given. The psychological purpose is 
realised when the analyst sees that the analysis of
generality (n) is as stated, arid at the same time sees 
that the total analysing expression is general (n). 
His understanding would not be improved if he proceeded 
to the stage symbolised by an2 .
13 solipsism
The type of solipsism which is now current, and is 
sometimes called methodological solipsism, together with 
the accompanying principle known as the principle of 
veriflability, certainly has an important connexion with 
the analysis of meaning in the sense in which one speaks 
of the meaning which an expression has for a particular 
person. I want to consider whether it has any bearing 
on the analysis of what is called ordinary meaning, 
whether, that is, its truth or falsity would affect 
that analysis. This type of solipsism emanates princi- 
pally from Wittgenstein, and I shall consider a brief 
statement of "ittgenstein's solipsism given by 
R. B. Braithwaite (Analysis 1, 1, p. 14): 'it does not 
deny that you are having toothache (under the circum­ 
stances when you would ordinarily be said to have 
toothache), but it does deny that the analysis of this 
proposition is essentially similar to that of the pro­ 
position that I am having toothache' (that '"ittgenstein 
would accept this statement is, of course, too much to 
hope, but what I am concerned with is the point of view 
stated, and not whether '"ittgenstein adopts it).
This, like most other statements of solipsism, is 
given in a very puzzling form. In the ordinary way, if 
the question were asked, what is the analysis of, for
too
instance, I have toothache? it would be taken to mean 
what is the analysis of that sentence as it would ordinarily 
be used, and as it might be used by anyone on any occasion? 
One might then begin an analysis on these lines; a toothache^ 
is occurring now which _is_ part of the series of mental 
events each of which is a part of my experience, or some­ 
thing of that kind. Then in analysing you have toothache 
one would use exactly the same formula except that your 
would be substituted for my. But I think this is clearly 
not what Braithwaite wanted when he claimed that the 
analysis of his having toothache was not 'essentially 
similar' to the analysis of someone else's having it. 
What he wanted to claim was something like this: that, 
while the analysis of I (Braithwaite) arn having toothache 
may be more or less as I have stated, the analysis of 
y_ou (not Rraithwaite) are having toothache would be quite 
different; perhaps physical phenomena are occurring which 
are members of the class of phenomena which I call signs 
of toothache and also members of the class of phenomena 
which I calj^ appearances of you, or something like that. 
Thus he is not claiming that the analysis of I have tooth­ 
ache in its ordinary use is radically different from the 
analysis of you havei toothache in its ordinary use, but 
that the analyses of the two expressions as he would use 
them are radically different.
Every methodological solipsist, if he expressed 
himself carefully, would therefore as a rule ask questions 
of the form [_ what is the analysis of p_ when I use p ?7 
And his account of the analysis of J have toothache, for 
instance, as used by somebody else, would I think have 
to be radically different from the analysis of any expression 
at all as used by himself. For his analysis of his own 
expressions would be of the form I by £ I mean what I should 
mean by £ j. Then the analysis of other people's 
expressions would have to be of the form / by £ he means 
what I should mean by cjl . He means, as used by the 
solipsist under consideration, would have a very complicated 
analysis, ^uite different from the analysis of I mean as 
used by him; it would be something like this: by //by 
p_ he means what I should mean by ^ I I mean that there 
has been an utterance of £ which has been a member of the 
class of phenomena that I call appearances of him, cind 
there have been certain phenomena in this class which have 
been what I call signs that he uses English in its ordinary 
sense, and what I should mean by £ has a certain complex 
relation to what I should mean by c^. Now if solipsism 
were correct I should have to give a very complicated 
explanation of this sort whenever I wanted to say anything 
about what Braithwaite meant. Thus, if I want to consider 
the hypothesis that solipsism is correct the easiest course
Lol
will be for me to try to adopt a sollpsistic point of view 
myself.
What course do I adopt, If as a aolipsist I try to 
analyse meaning in the sense in which we speak of ordinary 
meaning? Suppose I start by giving one of the analyses 
which occur in ray earlier sections: say it is of the £orj» 
(a name) means a | means that a_ has a high degree of 
applicative corrlation with a \ . It V7as understood in 
my earlier sections that means .that, had the sense of would 
ordinarily be used to mean that, and the analysis of this 
sense was subsequently discussed, when I came to structural 
regularity. The existence of structural regularity involved 
that certain expressions had been used on a great number 
of occasions on which I rai^ht have been present or might not. 
Braithwaite (I.e.) writes 'to be a solipsism a philosophy 
must not only analyse propositions about another person's 
experiences in a different way from that in which it analyses 
propositions about my pxperiences but it must analyse them, 
and indeed all propositions, ultimately in terras of my 
experiences'. We may say, then, that as a sollpsist I 
hold that every expression which does not ostensibly relate
jtt/ri **>M vpiVurf^
to my experiences is finally analysable. ' *^niu$ in this 
way. i gay that by T £ was used on occasions o*... o n
on which I was not presentJ I mean that phenomena have 
occurred (or perhaps always will occur) each of which has
iol
been what would ordinarily be called a sign that there 
has been an occasion on which £ has been used, strictly 
speaking what would ordinarily be called presupposes the 
analysis here given, but there may be a solipsistic sol­ 
ution of this difficulty. I might say each of which has 
been a sign, explaining that by a s i gjn I mean a phenomenon 
which has a certain observed character, not a phenomenon 
which has a certain relation to something unobserved.
By the process here sketcned a solipsist can, I 
think, appropriate an analysis of the type that I have 
been putting forward. He takes the analysing expressions 
and sixbmfts them to a further process, which may be called 
private analysis. Speaking again as a solipsist, I think 
I can distinguish just as easily as a non-solipsist between 
a public analysis and a private analysis. The difference 
is pointed out, of course, when I say that the analyses of 
meaning in this essay are public analyses, and the process 
just described would be a process of private analysis. 
But it can also be defined. I say (as a solipsist) that 
an analysis is public if when it is completed the analysing 
expression (after means or means that) still contains 
expressions which do not ostensibly relate to ray experience, 
and it is private if it consists of the analysis of the 
results of a public analysis in terms of my experience. 
The expression ostensibly relate to my experience would
ot course, have to be analysed, and I do not know which 
type of analysis this would be.
Braithwaite, in the ^aper from which I have quoted, 
claims (p. 14) that if a eolipsistic theory, instead of 
asserting propositions incompatible with the common sense view 
of the world, propounds analyses of those proportions, it 
can not be rejected as contrary to common sense, l think 
this claim is misleading. Fo; all the analyses that we 
ask for and consider, expept when we are considering
solipsismsmerely proposes an analysis of common sense"K
propositions, suggests that it offers something which is 
an analysis in the same sense as the analyses we usually 
consider. Rut In point of fact it is not, since it is not 
a public but a private analysis.
Thus it seems to me that I can have no objection, 
while posing as a solipsist, to the types of analysis which 
are given in this essay, though I think it necessary to
go beyond them in a certain way, by adding a private analysis.
{taw, 
On the other/ it is impossible for a non-solipsist to admit
that he agrees with a solipsist about these analyses, or 
about anything else. For he knows that the solipsist be­ 
lieves that the public analyses are not final analyses, 
the final analyses being wholly in terms of the solipsist 's 
own experience. Since the non-solipsist does not believe 
that all final analyses are in terms of some solipsist 's
experience, there are scarcely any questions, if any, on 
which he can admit that he agrees with a solipsist. 
Speaking as a solipsist, I of course claim that I do agree 
with all non-solipsists on many questions,lttdI have some 
complex private analysis of agreement.
Note7. It may be worth while, even if it is not strictly 
relevant, to comment on another claim made by Braithwaite 
in the paper from which I have quoted (solipsism and 'the 
common sense view of the world'. Analysis 1,1.)- Me claims 
that solipsism is an analysis, not a denial, of common 
sense propositions. This claim has already been noticed. 
He draws the natural inference that solipsism is compat­ 
ible with common sense, and this way of formulating the 
point makes it possible to consider it in another aspect. 
Consider the solipsistic analysis (private analysis 
of course) of some historical statement - almost any ordinary 
statement would do, but this ^ives a striking illustration: 
consider Caesar, crossed the Rubicon. Speaking from a non- 
solipsistic point of view, I should cay that, roughly speak­ 
ing a solipsist analyses this in terras of what would ord-
for 
inarily be called his grounds/believing that Caesar crossed
the Rubicon. speaking as a solipsist, I say something like 
this; by Caesar crossed the Rubicon I mean that I have come 
across certain printed statements in books stated to be by
j. caesar, and so on, which have had the verbal 
form Caesar crossed the Rubicon, or some verbal form with 
the same ordinary meaning (see my analysis of ordinary 
meaning), and I have come across certain phenomena which 
I call Roman remains, codices, coins, and so on, and all 
these phenomena together have the complex character which 
I call being good grounds for believing that Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon (a character defined wholly in terms of relations 
between items in my experience); or perhaps, in a more 
sophisticated analysis, I mean that mj future experience 
will confirm the hypothesis that I have experienced the 
grounds lor belief just stated (experience bein& used in 
a different sense about the past from that in which it is 
used about tne future).
Speaking, as a non-solipsist, I think it is clear that 
there is something very paradoxical in claiming that the 
above statement &ives an analysis in the ordinary sense 
of analysis (for, as has been said, I find it impossible 
to a^ree with a solipsist if he is claiming that his 
private analyses are analyses of the ordinary senses of 
expressions; but an analysis in the ordinary sense is of 
the ordinary sense of an expression). But the point I 
want to raise now is whether it can possibly be claimed 
that such an analysis as the above is compatible with
common sense. It can only be compatible or incompatible 
with common sense if it is a matter of common sense that 
anyone (whether or not he is a solipsist) means a certain 
thin& by cae_sar crossed the Rubicon. The common sense 
view can be expressed crudely by saying that anyone 
usino the words in their ordinary senses means by thie 
that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and anyone using in
their ordinary senses the words I have experienced certain
tWi 
pieces of evidence means by/that he has experienced those
pieces of evidence. The question is, then, is it con­ 
trary to common sense to suppose that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon has, in its ordinary sense, the same meaning as 
some expression like I have experienced certain pieces of 
evidence (though not exactly that)? It seems to me that 
it clearly is contrary to common sense.
Braithwaite's general point of view could, of course, 
be saved, if he maintained that solipsism is neither 
compatible nor incompatible with common sense, in that 
to claim compatibility for it does not make sense.
lor
19 Reasons lor undertaking the foregoing analysis.
I have now concluded my sketch of the analysis of 
meaning. It has been pointed out by C. K. Ogden and 
I. A. Richards (the meaning of meaning, c d t>. VIII) 
that the words mean and meaning have been constantly 
used, with little explanation by modern philosophers. 
In particular, the words are of the utmost importance 
for the analytical school or group of modern philosophers 
(the school of Moore, Russell, Broad, Stebbing, Wisdom, 
Wittgenstein, and so on, if they would consent to be 
called a school), because they are constantly asking 
for the analysis of some expression, proposition, or 
fact, and when they find it frequently tiive it in the 
form of a statement about the meaning of some expression. 
A good deal has been implied, here and there, about the 
nature of meaning, by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and 
others, and above all by Msdorn, but none of them has 
set out to analyse meaning. In general the need does 
not arise; that is, when people discuss whether or not 
some expression does give the meaning of a certain other 
they generally understand one another pretty well. 
Occasionally, however, a critic says 'but what is this 
meaning of the sentence, on which your analysis turns'; 
and, although it is possible to answer 'you know perfectly
well', it is desirable for the request for a definition 
to be met. I wish I felt certain that it has been 
adequately met here. I can not claim, however, to have 
done much more than reveal various aspects of the problem, 
It seems to >ne certain that an analysis of meaning must 
allow for some vocabulary element, which will have 
formal properties not unlike those of ray applicative 
regularity, and some syntax element, with formal proper­ 
ties not unlike those of ray structural regularity. That 
in some sort of way language, even the most depraved 
ordinary language, is a system which approximates to 
identity of structure with what it expresses, I am sure. 
But I do not know whether the relations involved are 
precisely those that I have put forward-
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